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ABSTRACT 
The thesis examines the likely effects on the European 
Community of the prospective European Monetary Union (EMU). It 
examines some of the structural problems which the newly joined but 
less developed members encountered on joining the customs union and 
then the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). Analogies are drawn 
between these events and what might happen were Turkey to join first 
the customs union, then the ERM and finally the EMU. The status of 
Turkey as an Associate Member of the EC since 1963 is compared with 
countries in the European Free Trade Area and Eastern Europe. The 
main conclusion is that a further decade of successful structural 
reform would enable Turkey to benefit from joining an EC which 
continued on the same path for a further decade, and to benefit from 
joining an ERM in a wide band, but joining an EMU is unlikely to be 
beneficial. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The thesis initially examines the principles and procedure of 
forming a Monetary Union in Europe (EMU), based on the Delors 
Report, within the current decade. 
Chapter II gathers the recent literature and arguments on the 
likely effects of the prospective EMU on the EC compared with the 
existing Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary 
System (EMS). 
Chapter III deals with the structural problems which have 
been encountered by the less developed Community members when they 
joined first the customs union and then the ERM, and which are 
likely to occur if they were involved in an EMU at an early stage. 
Analysis here is mainly from a customs union enlargement point of 
view. 
I feel obliged to point to the lack of literature on 
discriminatory aspects of the EC and the proposed EMU as an entire 
block in the face of the rest of the world. There is a shortage of 
up-to-date data on the adjustment paths of those recently joined EC 
members which are characterised by varying structural problems and 
this also remains an area for further investigation. 
The thesis continues, in Chapter IV, with a review and 
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assessment of Turkish structural and stabilisation policies which 
have been pursued with little reversal since the beginning of 1980. 
The Chapter compares the OECD area, within which Turkey itself is a 
member, with those less developed new EC entrants: Greece, Spain and 
Portugal. The impact of these policies implemented for more than a 
decade in Turkey on its economic and social life, is analysed in 
such a way as to enable us to distinguish the useful policies from 
those which were ineffective or, in some cases, counter-productive. 
By doing so, it is intended to derive some suggestions for 
the future management of Turkish economy in the 1990s on its way 
towards the approaching provision of customs union with the EC by 
1996 according to the relevant Agreements. 
It is the findings of the Chapter that Turkey has not yet 
achieved a bright picture of a structurally adjusted and stable 
economic nation; however, Turkey's problems are basically similar 
to, if greater than, those of its Mediterranean neighbours, Greece, 
Spain and Portugal, which are still only partly solved. 
The main conclusion is that a further decade of successful 
structural reform could enable Turkey to join a customs union, and 
an efficient stabilisation policy could lead the country to 
participate in both the EMS and the ERM if the Community continued 
the same economic path. However,. if the EC succeeds in forming 
the EMU by the end of the current decade, as well as accommodating 3 
or 4 EFTA countries within itself, again in the same period, the 
economic case for Turkey joining does not seem to be realistic 
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before the next decade. 
The current challenges together with the previous 
developments of Turkey-EC Association Status established since the 
entry into force of the Ankara Agreement in 1964 are demonstrated in 
Chapter V. 
It is the conclusion of the thesis that Turkey, as an 
Associate Member of the EC for twenty-eight years, is set up to 
reach the customs union by 1996 entitled by all the other provisions 
arising from the relevant Agreement and other documents; but has not 
benefited from this Associate Status properly, as was initially 
intended by both sides. 
Recently coupled with the current EC goal and ambitions such 
as the EMU and the new candidates from EFTA, and consequently from 
the Central and Eastern European formerly Communist countries, 
Turkey's case to participate fully in the European Community looks 
rather, if not blocked, troubled. 
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CHAPTER I 
EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION 
9 
1. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION SCHEMES 
Introduction 
Before starting the study of monetary integration in the 
European Community, it would be useful to point out the different 
forms of 'international economic integration' which have actually 
been implemented. Most specifically, it can be defined as the 
discriminatory removal of all trade impediments between the 
participating nations and the establishment of certain elements of 
cooperation and coordination between them. The latter depends 
entirely on the actual form that integration takes. 
various forms of economic integration are: 
Hence, the 
i) Free trade areas where the member nations remove all trade 
impediments among themselves but retain their freedom with 
regard to the determination of their policies vis-a-vis the 
outside world; the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and 
the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA); 
ii) Customs unions, which are very similar to free trade areas 
except that member nations must conduct and pursue common 
external commercial relations; for instance, they must adopt 
common external tariffs (GETs) on imports from the non-
participants, as is the case in the European Community (EC) .. 
iii) Common markets, which are customs unions that also allow for 
free factor mobility across national member frontiers, i.e. 
capital, labour, enterprise should move freely between the 
10 
participating countries. Examples: the East African 
Community (EAC), and the EC; 
iv) Complete economic unions, which are common markets that ask 
for complete unification of monetary and fiscal policies, 
i.e. a central authority is introduced to exercise control 
over these matters so that existing member nations 
effectively become regions of one nation; 
v) Complete political integration, where the participants become 
literally one nation, i.e. the central authority needed in 
(iv) not only controls monetary and fiscal policies, but is 
also responsible to a central parliament embodied with the 
sovereignty of a nation's government. 
Beside these different forms of integration, there are two 
types of international economic integration: "positive" and 
"negative". The term negative integration (Tinbergen,1954) refers 
to the removal of impediments on trade between the participating 
nations or to the elimination of any restrictions on the process of 
trade liberalisation. The term positive integration relates to the 
modification of existing instruments and institutions, more 
importantly, to the creation of new ones so as to enable the market 
of the integrated area to function properly and effectively, and 
also to promote other broader policy aims of the union. 
11 
2. DEFINITION OF MONETARY UNION 
Monetary integration has two essential components: an 
exchange-rate union and capital market integration. An exchange-
rate union is established when member countries have what is, in 
effect, one currency. The actual existence of one currency is not 
necessary, however, if member countries have permanently and 
irrevocably fixed exchange-rates among themselves, the result is 
effectively the same. Of course, one would argue that adoption of 
a single currency would guarantee the irreversibility of undertaking 
membership of a monetary union, which would have vast repercussions 
for the discussion in terms of actual unions; but one could equally 
well argue that if a member nation decided to opt out of a monetary 
' union, it would do so irrespective of whether or not the union 
entailed the use of a single currency. 
Convertibility refers to the permanent absence of all 
exchange controls for both current and capital transactions, 
including interest and dividend payments and the harmonisation of 
relevant taxes and measures affecting the capital market within the 
union. It is absolutely necessary to have complete convertibility 
for trade transactions; otherwise an important requirement of CU 
(customs union) formation is threatened, namely the promotion of 
free trade among members of the CU, which is an integral part of EU 
(economic union). That is why this aspect of monetary integration 
does not need any discussion; it applies even in the case of a free 
trade area (FTA). Convertibility for capital transactions is 
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related to free factor mobility and is therefore an important aspect 
of capital market integration which is necessary in common markets, 
not in CUs or FTAs. 
In practice, this definition of monetary integration should, 
especially, include the following: 
1. An explicit harmonisation of monetary policies. 
2. A common pool of foreign exchange reserves. 
3. A single central bank. 
The central bank would operate in the market so as 
permanently to maintain the exchange parities among the union 
currencies and, at the same time, it would allow the rate of the 
reference currency - (suppose union members decide either that one 
of their currencies will be a reference currency, or that a new unit 
of account will be established) - to fluctuate, or to alter 
intermittently, relative to the outside reserve currency. For 
instance, if the foreign exchange reserves in the common pool were 
running down, the common central bank would allow the reference 
currency, and with it all the partner currencies, to depreciate. 
This would have the advantage of economising in the use of foreign 
exchange reserves, since all partners would not tend to be in 
deficit or surplus at the same time. Also, surplus countries would 
automatically be helping deficit countries. If one country ran a 
large deficit, the union exchange rate would depreciate, but this 
might put some partner countries into surplus. If wage rates were 
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rising in the member countries at different rates, while 
productivity growth did not differ in such a way as to offset the 
effects on relative prices, those partners with the lower inflation 
rates would be permanently financing the other partners. 
3. PAST AND PRESENT DEVELOPMENTS ON ECONOMIC AND MONETARY 
UNION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
3.1 The Objective of Economic and Monetary Union 
In 1969, the Heads of State or Government, meeting in The 
Hague, agreed that a plan should be drawn up with a view to the 
creation, in stages, of an economic and monetary union within the 
Community. This initiative was taken against the background of 
major achievements by the Community in the 1960s: the early 
completion of the transition period leading to a full customs union; 
the establishment of the common agricultural policy (CAP) and the 
creation of a system of own resources. At the same time, the 
"Bretton Woods system" was showing signs of decline. The Werner 
Report, prepared in 1970, presented a plan for the attainment of 
economic and monetary union. In March 1971, following the Werner 
Report, the EC Member States expressed "their political will to 
establish an economic and monetary union" in the foreseeable future. 
Several important moves followed: in 1972 the 'snake' was 
created; in 1973 the European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF) was 
set up; and in 1974 the "Council Decision" on the attainment of a 
high degree of convergence in the Community and the "Directive" on 
stability, growth and full employment were adopted. Yet, by the 
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mid-1970s the process of integration had lost momentum under the 
pressure of divergent policy responses to the economic shocks of the 
period due to the crisis in oil prices. 
In 1979 the process of monetary integration was relaunched 
with the creation of the European Monetary System (EMS) and the 
European Currency Unit (ECU). The success of the EMS in promoting 
its objectives of internal and external monetary stability has 
contributed in recent years to further progress as reflected in the 
adoption, in 1985, of the internal market programme and the signing 
of the "Single European Act". 
3.2 The European Monetary System and the ECU 
The European Monetary System was created by a Resolution of 
the European Council followed by a Decision of the Council of 
Ministers and an Agreement between the participating central banks. 
Within the framework of the EMS the participants in the 
exchange-rate mechanism have succeeded in creating a zone of 
increasing monetary stability at the same time as gradually relaxing 
capital controls. The exchange-rate constraints have greatly 
helped those participating countries with relatively high inflation 
rates in gearing their policies, notably monetary policy, to the 
objective of price stability, thereby laying the foundations for 
both a downward convergence of inflation rates and the attainment of 
a high degree of exchange-rate stability. This, in turn, has 
helped moderate the cost increases in many countries, and has led to 
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an improvement in overall economic performance. Moreover, reduced 
uncertainty regarding exchange-rate developments and the fact that 
the parities of the participating currencies have not been allowed 
to depart significantly from what is appropriate in the light of 
economic fundamentals have protected intra-European trade from 
excessive exchange-rate volatility. 
The EMS has served as the focal point for improved monetary 
policy coordination and has provided a basis for multilateral 
surveillance within the Community. Moreover, the system has 
benefited from the role played by the Deutschemark as an 'anchor' 
for participants' monetary and intervention policies. 
At the same time, the EMS has not fulfilled its full 
potential. Firstly, two of the Community countries (Greece and 
Portugal) have not yet joined the exchange-rate mechanism and two of 
those recently involved in the ERM (Spain and the UK), currently 
participate with wider fluctuation margins. Secondly, the lack of 
sufficient convergence of fiscal policies as reflected in large and 
persistent budget deficits in certain countries (such as Greece, 
Italy and Ireland) has remained a source of tensions and has put a 
disproportionate burden on monetary policy. Thirdly, the 
transition to the second stage of the EMS and the establishment of 
the European Monetary Fund, as foreseen by the Resolution of the 
European Council adopted in 1978, have not been accomplished. 
In launching the EMS, the European Council declared in 1978 
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that a "European Currency Unit (ECU) will be at the centre of the 
EJ1S". Apart from being used as the "numeraire" of the exchange-
rate mechanism and to denominate operations both in the intervention 
and credit mechanisms, the ECU serves primarily as a reserve asset 
and means of settlement for EJ1S central banks. Although it is an 
integral part of the EJ1S, the ECU has for some reasons, played only 
a limited role in the operating mechanisms of the EJ1S. One reason 
is that central banks have preferred to intervene intra-marginally; 
therefore, compulsory interventions and the build-up of intervention 
balances to be settled in ECUs have remained fairly limited. 
By contrast, the ECU has gained considerable popularity in 
the market-place, where its use as a denominator for financial 
transactions has spread significantly. It ranks fifth in 
international bond issues, with a 6% market share. The expansion 
of financial market activity in ECUs reflects in part a growing 
assurance of ECU-denominated debt instruments by the Community 
institutions and public sector authorities of some member countries, 
and in part the ECU's attractiveness as a means of portfolio 
diversification and as a hedge against currency risks. 
International banking business in ECUs grew vigorously in the 
first half of the last decade, but has moderated since then, 
although the creation of an ECU clearing system has contributed to 
the development and liquidity of the market, as did the issue of 
short-term bills by the UK Treasury. The lion's share of banking 
business represents interbank transactions whereas direct business 
with non-banks has remained relatively limited and appears to have 
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been driven primarily by officially encouraged borrowing demand in a 
few countries. ECU denominated deposits by the non-bank sector 
have stagnated since 1985, suggesting that the ECU's appeal as a 
near money substitute and store of liquidity is modest. In 
addition, in the non-financial sphere the use of the ECU for the 
invoicing and settlement of commercial transactions has remained 
rather limited, covering at present only about 1% of the Community 
countries' external trade. 
3.3 The Final Objective of the Monetary Union 
The final objective of the monetary union was defined as long 
ago as 1970 in the Werner Report in a formulation that still applies 
today: 
A monetary union implies inside its boundaries: 
- the total and irreversible convertibility of currencies; 
- the complete liberalisation of capital transactions and 
full integration of banking and other financial markets; 
- the elimination of margins of fluctuation and the 
irrevocable locking of exchange-rate parities. 
The first two of these requirements have already been met, or will 
be with the completion of the internal market programme. The 
single most important condition for a monetary union would be 
fulfilled only when the decisive step was taken to lock exchange 
rates irrevocably. 
Decisive criteria for a monetary union are thus the 
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irrevocable fixing of exchange-rates and movements of capital within 
the single monetary area that is free from restrictions. 
The monetary union is the "monetary superstructure" of the economic 
union in which the "four freedoms" have been realised, namely the 
free movement of goods, services, labour and capital. Within the 
common single market, economic activity is to be based on a free 
market system of "competition". Besides agreement on regulative 
policy, an economic union demands a far-reaching harmonisation of 
government regulations in order to bring about equal competitive 
conditions and uniform markets. The three above-mentioned 
requirements define a single currency area, but their fulfilment 
would not necessarily mark the end of the process of monetary 
unification in the Community. In principle, national currencies 
can be retained in the monetary union, but the adoption of a single 
currency, while not strictly necessary for the creation of a 
monetary union, might be seen for economic as well as psychological 
and political reasons, as a natural and desirable further 
development of the monetary union (see Report on Economic and 
Monetary Union in the European Community, 1989). A single currency 
would clearly demonstrate the irreversibility of the move to a 
monetary union; considerably give the union a "monetary identity"; 
facilitate the monetary management of the Community, avoid the 
transaction costs of converting currencies; eliminate the residual 
risk of parity changes among the national currencies and hence 
assure the continuing existence of the single monetary area. A 
single currency, provided that its stability is ensured, would also 
have a much greater weight relative to other major currencies than 
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any individual Community currency has. The replacement of national 
currencies by a common currency could thus be seen as the "crowning 
act" of the process of the monetary integration. 
The establishment of a monetary union would have far-reaching 
implications for the formulation and execution of monetary policy. 
The coordination of many national monetary policies with their own 
currencies participating in the union would not be sufficient. The 
responsibility for the single monetary policy would have to be 
vested in a new institution, in which centralised and collective 
decisions would be taken on the supply of money and credit as well 
as on other instruments of monetary policy, including interest rates 
(see, D. Gunter Baer and T. Padoa-Schioppa, 1989). 
This shift from national monetary policies to a single 
monetary policy is an inescapable consequence of monetary union and 
constitutes one of the principal institutional changes. Although a 
progressively intensified coordination of national monetary policies 
would in many respects have prepared the way for the move to a 
single monetary policy, the implications of such a move would be 
far-reaching. On the other hand, the permanent fixing of exchange 
rates would deprive individual countries of an important instrument 
for the correction of economic imbalances and for independent action 
in the pursuit of national objectives, especially in price stability 
reflecting, probably, the main obstacle to a rapid move to such a 
union. 
Besides these integration effects of a single European 
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market, a monetary union provides a number of additional economic 
advantages. Firstly, the irrevocable fixing of parities means that 
the exchange-rate associated with the intra-Community exchange of 
goods, services and capital is eliminated. This will foster, in 
particular, the integration of financial markets and the 
strengthening of competition. Secondly, there will be saving in 
transaction costs since market participants will be increasingly 
willing to accept partner currencies or the common currency without 
taking recourse to hedging operations and to hold them as a means of 
payment or investment in the place of national currencies. 
Thirdly, the creation of a monetary area with a greater weight 
internationally entails advantages in transactions with third 
currencies since the international acceptances of the Community 
currencies will grow; the Community will become less susceptible to 
external shocks and it will be able to represent its monetary policy 
interests more effectively at the international level. 
4. THE DELORS REPORT 
At its meeting, in Hanover on 27 and 28 June 1988, the 
European Council agreed that, "in adopting the Single Act", the 
Member States of the Community confirmed the objective of 
progressive realisation of "Economic and Monetary Union". The 
Heads of State or Government therefore decided to examine, at the 
European Council meeting in Madrid in June 1989, the means of 
achieving this union. They decided to entrust to a Committee 
chaired by M. Jacques Delors, President of the European Commission, 
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the task of studying and proposing concrete stages leading towards 
the union. The Committee reported just before the Madrid summit 
and its report is referred to as "The Delors Report" on the EMU. 
According to the opinion of the Committee, the EMU must be 
seen as a single process, but this process should be in stages which 
progressively lead to the ultimate goal; thus the decision to enter 
upon the first stage, should commit a member state to the entire 
process. They emphasised that the creation of the EMU would 
necessitate a common monetary policy and require a high degree of 
compatibility of economic policies and consistency in a number of 
other policy areas, particularly in the fiscal field. The Report 
pointed out that the realisation of the EMU would require new 
arrangements which could be established only on the basis of a 
change in relevant parts of he Treaty of Rome and consequent changes 
in national legislation. 
During the first stage, which should be related to the 
creation process of the EMU, there would be a greater convergence of 
economic performance through the strengthening of economic and 
monetary policy coordination within the existing institutional 
framework. The economic measures should be taken for the 
completion of the internal market and for the reduction of existing 
disparities through programmes of budgetary consolidation in the 
member states involved and more effective structural and regional 
policies. In the monetary field, the emphasis would be on the 
removal of all obstacles to financial integration and on the 
intensification of cooperation and coordination of monetary 
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policies. Realignment of exchange rates was seen to be possible, 
but efforts would be made by every member state to make the 
functioning of other adjustment mechanisms more effective. To the 
Committee, it is important to include all EC currencies in the 
exchange-rate mechanism (ERM) of the EMS during this stage. The 
1974 Council Decision defining the mandate of central bank governors 
would be replaced by a new decision indicating that the Committee 
itself should formulate opinions on the overall orientation of 
monetary and exchange-rate policy. 
In the second stage, which would commence only when the 
Treaty had been amended, the basic organs and structure of the EMU 
would be set up. The Committee stressed that this stage should be 
seen as a transition period leading to the final stage; thus it 
should constitute a "training process leading to collective 
decision-making", but the ultimate responsibility for policy 
decisions would remain with national authorities during this stage. 
With this understanding, the EC should: 
1. Establish "a medium-term framework for key economic 
objectives aimed at achieving stable growth, with a follow-up 
procedure for monitoring performances and intervening when 
significant deviations occurred." 
2. "Set precise, not yet binding, rules relating to the size of 
annual budget deficits and their financing." 
3. Assume a more active role as a single entity in the 
discussions of questions arising in the economic and 
exchange-rate field." 
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In the monetary field, the most significant feature of this 
stage would be the establishment of the "European System of Central 
Banks (ESCB)" to absorb the previous institutional monetary 
arrangements. The ESCB would start the transition with a first 
stage in which the coordination of independent monetary policies 
would be carried out by the "Committee of Central Banks Governors". 
It was envisaged that the formulation and implementation of a common 
monetary policy would take place in the final stage; during this 
stage exchange-rate realignments would not be allowed except in 
exceptional circumstances. The Report stresses that the nature of 
the second stage would require a number of actions, e.g.: 
1. National monetary policy would be executed in accordance with 
the general monetary orientations set up for the EC as a 
whole; 
2. A certain amount of foreign exchange reserves would be pooled 
and used to conduct the interventions in accordance with the 
guidelines established by the ESCB; 
3. The ESCB would have to regulate the monetary and banking 
system to achieve a minimum harmonisation of provisions (such 
as reserve requirements or payment arrangements) necessary 
for the future conduct of a common monetary policy. 
The final stage would begin with the irrevocable fixing of 
member states' exchange rates and the attribution to the EC 
institutions of the full monetary and economic consequences. It is 
envisaged that during this stage the national currencies would 
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eventually be replaced by a single EC currency (see A.M. El-
Agraa,1990). 
In the monetary field, the irrevocable fixing of exchange 
rates would come into effect and the transition to a single monetary 
policy would be made. The ESCB would assume full responsibilities, 
especially, in four specific areas: 
1. The formulation and implementation of monetary policy; 
2. Exchange-market interventions in third currencies; 
3. The pooling and management of all foreign exchange 
reserves; 
4. Technical and regulatory preparations necessary for the 
transition to a single EC currency. 
In the EC summit which opened in Madrid on 24 June 1989, EC 
member nations agreed to call a conference which would decide the 
route to be taken to EMU. This agreement was facilitated by a 
surprisingly conciliatory Mrs. Thatcher on the opening day of the 
summit, setting out five conditions for joining: 
1. A lower inflation rate in the UK, and in the EC as a 
whole; 
2. Abolition of all exchange controls (which still existed in 
Italy, France and Spain); 
3. Progress towards the single EC market; 
4. Liberalisation of financial services; 
5. Agreement on competition policy. 
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After having agreed on these conditions, all member nations 
endorsed the Report and agreed on 1 July 1990 as the deadline for 
the commencement of the first stage. Indeed, the economic and 
finance ministers of the EC at a meeting on 10 July agreed to 
complete the preparatory work for the first stage by December, thus 
giving themselves six months to accommodate the adjustments that 
would be needed before the beginning of the first stage. 
As a conclusion, all these proposals for the EMU envisaged in 
the "Delors Report" are consistent with and satisfy all the 
requirements of an actual economic and monetary union. But there 
are some possibilities of loss of momentum, such as the reluctance 
of the British Government to proceed to the single currency, 
disparities markedly existing in various regions of the Community, 
and the deep recession which has been recently escalated by the 
rises on oil prices and uncertainties, caused by the Gulf Crisis. 
Consequently, in the EC meeting on monetary and political union, in 
December 1990, it was agreed to delay the date for the start of 
"stage 2" by 1994, instead of the end of 1992 set before. 
5. SOME PROPOSALS AND ARGUMENTS RELATED TO THE ECU 
5.1 The ECU, as a common currency 
A common currency describes a currency which is used 
throughout the Community and is not the national currency of either 
a Member State or a third country. 
can be distinguished; 
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Two types of common currency 
i) A parallel currency, which is a common currency that is 
created independently of, and in addition to, national 
currencies. It circulates in parallel with national 
currencies and competes with them; 
ii) A single currency is a common currency that has replaced all 
existing national currencies as a result of an institutional 
decision (rather than a market process). 
A common currency may, however, also be understood as signifying the 
use of a common numeraire (as in the case of the private ECU today) 
or a common reserve instrument as a means of implementing a common 
monetary policy. 
a) What is the need for, and role of, a common currency in 
the process leading to a monetary union? 
b) What should be the future role of the ECU? 
a) One of the various views on this question is that no common 
currency is needed in order to achieve a monetary union, because the 
irrevocable locking of parities, full mobility of capital and the 
pursuit of a single monetary policy would suffice for the creation 
of such a union, i.e. a single currency area. The alternate view 
argues that ultimately the move to a single currency is necessary in 
order to reap the full benefits of monetary union. According to 
this view, only a single currency can provide a convenient numeraire 
for the transactions of private economic agents and for 
substantially reduced uncertainties and transaction costs. It also 
points out that no monetary union has ever existed without a common 
27 
currency and the credibility of the "irrevocable locking" would be 
at risk if many different currencies continued to exist. 
b) The role of the ECU. Any proposal concerning the role of 
the ECU depends, very much, on the views held regarding the need for 
a common currency. To many observers the ECU's role should grow 
with progress towards monetary union and it should become the 
Community's single currency. To some others it is premature to 
formalise arrangements for a common currency, all that is needed is 
to promote convergence and monetary stability (mostly the British 
view). 
There are three major options regarding the future role of 
the ECU: 
Firstly, the ECU would remain a basket of 
currencies and serve as a common numeraire. All 
Community 
possible 
impediments to its voluntary use in private financial and commercial 
transactions would be removed, but no particular official action 
would be taken to promote it; no new institution would be required 
to manage the ECU, but the monetary effects of its growing use would 
have to be monitored. 
Secondly, the official ECU which could remain a basket would 
be used as a common reserve instrument in managing a common monetary 
policy; thus the ECU would become the reserve money of the European 
system of central banks. This approach has been suggested in 
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Governor Crampi's paper. The expanded use of the official ECU in 
this case would not require a link between the official and the 
private ECU (the first one is created according to fixed rules by 
converting international reserves and held exclusively by central 
banks; the other one is an asset denominated in ECUs and held 
primarily by the market). 
Thirdly, suggested by some academic economists, the ECU could 
be made a "parallel currency". It would be issued by a central 
institution and allowed to circulate freely throughout the Community 
as a means of payment, store of value and unit of account. The ECU 
would be an additional - 13th - Community currency and it would be 
defined in its own right (so-called "abstract ECU") and it would 
form part of the exchange-rate arrangements. Its acceptance and 
use by private market participants would depend essentially on its 
quality as money. 
Propositions relating to the ECU 
According to some critics, 
a) A parallel currency approach is neither a useful nor a desirable 
way of establishing a monetary union. 
reject it on two grounds: 
The critics of this approach 
Firstly, it would not contribute to solving the problem of 
coordinating national monetary policies; on the contrary, it would 
add a 13th player to an already difficult coordination exercise. 
Secondly, it could undermine a monetary policy oriented towards 
price stability, because it would add a source of money creation 
that is difficult to link to the needs of economic activity. Some 
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concrete implications of this proposition are that before the final 
stage: 
i) the ECU should remain a basket; 
ii) the independent monetary policy would be instituted for 
the ECU; 
iii) no link would need to be built between the private and 
official ECU. 
b) An imprimatur should be given to the ECU as the future single 
currency of the Community. A single currency, while not strictly 
necessary for the creation of a monetary union, might - for economic 
as well as psychological and political reasons - be seen as the 
natural and desirable further development of such a union. Before 
the Community could consider adopting a single currency, exchange 
rates would have to be irrevocably locked and once exchange rates 
are permanently fixed the ECU will become a very close substitute 
for any national currency. One concrete implication of this 
proposition is that there should be no discontinuity between the 
present ECU and the future single currency, i.e. any debt contracted 
in ECUs before the introduction of the single currency would be 
payable at the face value in the ECUs if the transition to the 
single currency has been made. 
c) All impediments to the voluntary use of the ECU as a "common 
numeraire" and a means of settlement by private economic agents 
would have to be removed. Barring official action discriminating 
in favour of the ECU (which would result in undesirable financial 
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market distortions) and excluding a link between the official and 
the private ECU, there are two types of measures: direct 
encouragement (e.g. increased borrowing in ECUs by public sector 
entities; larger exchange market interventions in ECUs; some 
official support for the ECU clearing system), and indirect 
encouragement (e.g. removal of restrictions on the private use of 
the ECU by giving it the status of a foreign or national currency in 
each member country; demonstration effects through increasing 
operations in official ECUs within the EMS and by enlarging the 
group of other holders). 
proposition are: 
Some concrete implications of this 
i) as a numeraire the ECU would have equal, but not 
privileged, status vis-a-vis the national currency denomination, 
ii) therefore, the ECU would be an additional unit of account 
whenever national legislation specifies the use of a numeraire. 
d) As another proposition, Governor Ciampi suggested that "the 
official ECU could play a role in the conduct of a common monetary 
policy in an advanced stage of monetary union." He presented a 
scheme in which the official ECU would be used as a reserve 
instrument in managing a common monetary policy in the Community. 
This scheme represents one way of giving operational meaning to the 
concept of a single monetary policy. 
In considering whether there are other operational schemes 
for a common monetary policy, it has to be borne in mind that the 
ECU should not become a parallel currency (i.e. the official ECU 
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must remain an asset used only within the circle of central banks) 
and that the official ECU already performs a number of functions in 
central banks' operations. 
5.2 The ECU as a Parallel Currency 
The development of the ECU as a parallel currency would imply 
its increased use in international transactions, both within and 
outside the European Community, while national currencies would - at 
least for the foreseeable future - retain their functions and their 
central rates could continue to be adjusted. A parallel currency 
therefore implies the absence of a monetary union, which is an area 
with either a single currency or with national currencies with 
margins eliminated, full convertibility and central rates 
irreversibly locked (Duisenberg, 1989). 
At present two separate ECUs exist: 
a) the "official ECU", created according to fixed rules by 
converting international reserves and held exclusively by 
b) 
central banks. The official ECUs are created when the 
Community central banks receive them from the "European 
Monetary Cooperation Fund" (EMCF) in exchange for their gold 
and dollar reserves. The official ECU is simply another 
term for these reserves and it cannot circulate in the 
private market. 
-=tc:.:h:.;:e:.."..~:o:..:r;...:i:....:v:...:a::..:t::..:e::......-:E::.C=-U=-" comes in to existence through bankers 
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bundling together the component currencies in the required 
proportions to produce ECU-denominated loans and deposits. 
In the last analysis the creation of ECUs is regulated by the 
average monetary policies of Community central banks. (ECU 
bond issues were running in 1988 at nearly $20bn or some 5 to 
6 per cent of total international bond issues) (ibidem). 
The development of the ECU as a parallel currency widely used 
in international transactions refers to ECUs held by the private 
sector. There are some plans for increasing the use of the ECU and 
allowing the official ECU to circulate by removing the distinction 
between the private and the official variety, while the Bundesbank 
is particularly worried about the spread of ECUs, which have an over 
thirty per cent D-Mark component, outside Germany and thus beyond 
its effective control. 
Table 1 Weighting Coefficients of Each EMS Currency in the 
Composition of the ECU basket from 21 September 1989: 
Deutschemark 30.1 Luxembourg franc 
Irish ·pound 1.1 Greek drachma 
Dutch florin 2_.4 Danish krone 
Italian lira 10.15 French franc 
Belgian franc 7.6 Portuguese escudo 
UK sterling 13.0 Spanish peseta 
Source: Commission of the European Communities (1989) 
"New Composition of the ECU", Background Report 
No. 21, pp.l. 
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0.3 
0.8 
2.45 
19.0 
0.8 
5.3 
reluctant to await market development and they feel the need for a 
more active stance on the part of monetary authorities. They see 
two major different avenues along which official measures can be 
taken to promote its use: 
5.2.1. The market-oriented approach: Actions (like those taken by 
the UK authorities) are taken with a view to facilitate the 
functioning of the private ECU market and to contribute to its depth 
and its overall liquidity. A greater use of the private ECU by 
governments, especially in the sphere of the Community budget, could 
also be seen as a possible element in this approach. It has been 
agreed that the "Dalgaard Group" will closely monitor the 
development of the private ECU, and will call for consultations if 
problems of a monetary character were to arise. A further step 
could be taken by the inclusion in their domestic monetary 
aggregates of Member States' liquid assets denominated in ECUs held 
by residents. In this case, liquid assets denominated in all 
Community currencies should be included also in this extended 
monetary aggregate. 
In general, it would seem that the market-orientated approach 
would ensure a market appetite for the ECU by further increase in 
its use. Therefore, this avenue is likely to be less problematic 
than the situation in which the authorities would provide the market 
with private ECUs which at times may not be absorbed by the market 
without consequences for the exchange rates and the monetary 
policies of the Member States. 
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5.2.2. The institutional approach suggests that the use of the 
private ECU can only be stimulated by giving that task to a European 
institution. More precisely, official involvement in the private 
ECU would be increased by charging the EMCF with responsibility for 
the ECU and exchange-rate relationship between the ECU and third 
currencies. Another suggestion is to abolish the basket 
definition, introducing an "abstract ECU". 
Committing the Fund with responsibility for the exchange 
rates vis-a-vis third currencies means that the decision at what 
level and for what amounts to support a weak dollar - at present 
taken by the central bank of the strongest EMS currency - would be 
transferred to the Fund. The Fund will have to be permanently 
provided with both third currencies and with either Community 
currencies or the possibility to sell newly created ECUs to be able 
to discharge its interventions. 
The effect on member countries would depend on the ECU's 
definition: 
a) if the basket definition were maintained any intervention 
would affect exchange and monetary policies of all member 
countries, strong and weak; 
b) if the basket definition were abolished and an "abstract" ECU 
were introduced, the maintenance of stable exchange rates 
between member countries and the ECU would require the 
introduction of ECU intervention obligations for each member 
country. In that case, dollar purchases by the Fund against 
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ECUs would lead to ECU purchases against national currency by 
the strongest members. The difference compared to the 
present situation, where the stronger members buy dollars 
directly, will be that the decision to intervene is taken by 
the Fund and no longer by the countries concerned. This 
implies that exchange and domestic monetary policies of 
mainly the strongest member countries would be affected by 
actions beyond their control. The size of the dollar 
purchases by the Fund and thus of the monetary consequences 
for the latter countries would increase if the EMCF would be 
enabled to create ECUs by granting credit; 
c) if an "abstract" ECU through its definition were to become a 
near-perfect substitute for the strongest ERM currency, the 
need for the monitoring of an extended monetary aggregate 
would increase. 
5.2.3 Arguments for parallel currency 
a) It is believed that the increased use of the ECU in 
international transactions will enable it to compete with the 
dollar in a stronger position than any national currency in 
Europe could do and this, also, will help Europe to reduce 
its sensitivity to dollar fluctuations (Duisenberg, 1989). 
b) The ECU as a parallel currency is expected to contribute to 
the development of a decision-making procedure in the EMS 
which would be considered more European than the present one. 
c) Some hope that if the ECU is widely used for international 
transactions it may in time develop into a common currency in 
a way that is less painful than the process requiring the 
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high degree of economic convergence and surrender of 
sovereignty, as foreseen in the Council Resolution of 1971. 
d) It is suggested by the industry side that a wider use of the 
private ECU would diminish transaction costs and also the 
exchange risks for intra-Community trade. 
Reducing Europe's dependence on a strongly fluctuating dollar 
would largely be welcomed by most of the European countries through 
forming a solid bloc by the European currencies in order to diminish 
the adverse effects of dollar fluctuations on them. But, the 
development of the ECU as a parallel currency would not by itself 
reduce the exchange rate risks, neither outside nor inside the EMS. 
There is no inherent disciplinary capacity of the private ECU which 
would bring about price and exchange stability. This could be 
ensured only by firm national policies succeeding in wiping out 
expectations of EMS realignments and, of course, by the complete 
liberalisation of capital movements. 
Increasing the European Fund's role in managing the ECU and 
charging it with interventions will, surely, limit the national 
central bank's domestic monetary control. For this reason it could 
never take place in isolation but only in the context of wider 
economic and monetary integration. 
How far could a parallel currency provide a path towards a 
common currency less painful than the one agreed in 1971 requiring 
convergence and loss of sovereignty? On the contrary, it would 
imply an unnecessary detour towards a common currency. There is 
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also a strong possibility of it becoming a permanent feature, not 
facilitating further integration in any way and, moreover, of 
weakening discipline in member countries with higher inflation and 
balance-of-payments deficits. 
It would, of course, be a desirable feature for European 
industry to decrease the transaction costs. Presently there are, 
in most countries, no major obstacles for European industry to use 
the ECU as the transaction currency or the currency of denomination. 
However, it is the level of convergence which will determine the 
exchange risk, not the greater use of the ECU. Only the near-
elimination of realignments could provide a measurable decrease in 
transaction costs. 
5.3 Britain's "Hard ECU" Proposal for Europe 
How would monetary policy be conducted in hard ECUs? 
According to the British Government's proposals, the quantity of 
"hard ECUs" would depend on how much the peoples of Europe decide to 
surrender their national currencies for hard ECU notes or balances 
with a newly-created "European Monetary Fund". However, it should 
be highly questionable, here, whether the peoples of Europe would 
want to convert any of their national monies into it because of its 
redundancy in transactions. Even supposing that large-scale 
conversions did take place, could a sensible "monetary policy" still 
be imagined? One difficulty is that the EMF could not control the 
quantity of its own liabilities because the EMF can issue "hard 
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quantity of its own liabilities because the EMF can issue "hard 
ECUs" only if it has already received national-currency backing 
(Congdon, 1990). 
On the other hand, the British Government has not yet made 
clear whether the "hard ECU" is to be legal tender or not. If the 
hard ECU were not to be a legal tender, banks could ignore any so-
called "policy actions" emanating from the EMF, including any 
putative "interest-rate decisions" taken by it. In the case that 
the "hard ECU" might be granted legal tender status from the outset, 
implied invasion of sovereignty would be as deep as anything 
envisaged by the Delors proposals. 
As Congdon (1990) argues in his article, the preference for 
the existing currencies does not stem only from the convenience of 
having prices in one unit, but also from the inertia due to the 
inheritance of past contracts expressed in the national currency. 
As a result "the very notion of a 'parallel currency' in which two 
currencies and central banks are supposed to co-exist, is a 
contradiction in terms and a currency is a currency, because it is 
the only one in being." 
6. CONCLUSION 
The ideal European currency would be the German mark. But 
national feelings and lingering memories in other European countries 
make this impossible. The next best route to a common currency 
would be to set on the achievements of the EMS and strengthen them 
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currencies become interchangeable, allowing a common money to emerge 
by an evolutionary process. This evolutionary route would largely, 
and inevitably, depend on economic convergence and the acceptance of 
the loss of sovereignty implicit in the elimination of the exchange 
rate as an adjustment instrument. To this end, regional policies, 
in the effort to approximate the member countries' economic 
position, together with the political enthusiasm towards the 
ultimate goal of the EMU would be of vital importance. 
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CHAPTER II 
OPERATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE ERM 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter it is aimed to review the ways in which the 
ERM operates with its participating currencies as well as the 
influence which has so far been imposed by the ERM on the member 
countries involved. It is also attempted to draw some assessments 
on the possible benefits and losses of the very objective of 
creating a "European Monetary Union" (EMU) in the nearest possible 
future, as proposed in the Delors Report, within the framework of 
the EC. 
1. THE EXCHANGE RATE MECHANISM OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: 
A Review of the Literature 
The ERM is only one part of a wider system of cooperation 
between the central banks of the EC which forms the European 
Monetary System (EMS). EMS consists of four distinct elements: 
- The Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) 
- The European Currency Unit (ECU) 
- The European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF) 
- The Very Short-Term Financing Facility (VSTF) 
Although the system also provides credit facilities to help smooth 
temporary balance-of-payments problems (for example, through the 
VSTF and the Medium Term Financial Facility), its focal point is the 
"exchange-rate mechanism". The EMS formally came into operation in 
March 1979, with all Community Member States participating, but the 
United Kingdom did not initially join the ERM (Bank of England, 
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1991). Following their accession Greece, Spain and Portugal are 
all now EMS members, though participation in EMS is not a condition 
of EC membership. Spain joined the ERM in June 1989, and more than 
a year later the United Kingdom became the ERM's newest participant 
in October 1990. Greece and Portugal are, still, outside the 
mechanism under discussion. 
2. OPERATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE ERM 
The Exchange Rate Mechanism links the exchange rates of all 
Community currencies, with the exception of the Portuguese escudo 
and the Greek drachma, to each other and to the European Currency 
Unit (ECU), so each participating currency establishes a central 
parity against the ECU. Member currencies can fluctuate only 
within the permitted margins of ±2~% (±6% in the case of Spain and 
the United Kingdom), around these central parities. For example, 
Sterling has joined the ERM at the level of 2.95DM and 9.82FF 
(French franc) with a permitted fluctuation band of ±6%. This 
means that the pound can not be more than 6 per cent above the 
weakest currency in the system, or more than 6 per cent below the 
strongest. When the pound rises 6 per cent above its central 
parity against the weakest currency, then that currency is 6 per 
cent below its central parity against the pound, and just the 
opposite when the pound falls against the strongest one. The 12 
per cent total band is the maximum variation against another 
currency which the pound's exchange rate (and the same rule for the 
one of Spanish peseta, of course) could show at different times. 
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At the time of writing, November 1990, the pound could rise to DM 
3.13 against the D-mark, or 6 per cent above the central parity of 
DM 2.95, but it cannot fall to DM 2.78, or 6 per cent below. 
Because the pound is 1~ per cent below its central parity against 
the peseta - the strongest currency - it can not fall by more than 
4.3/4 per cent, which means DM 2.87, if other currencies maintain 
existing rates against each other. Additionally there is a 
"divergence indicator", which aims to measure the relative extent of 
each currency's divergence from its central ECU parity. When a 
currency reaches 75% of its maximum ECU divergence limit (the 
"divergence threshold"), the central bank is presumed to take 
action, and all the central banks are obliged to intervene intra-
marginally to support bilateral parities in the case of any currency 
reaching the edge of its parity bands. 
Intervention is conducted by using official foreign exchange 
reserves or unlimited amounts of credit facilities through the VTSF 
- which is available between central banks for this purpose - to buy 
one's currency when it is weak or using one's currency to buy 
foreign exchange reserves or repay credit facilities when it is 
strong. Intervention to raise a currency tends to increase short-
term interest rates, and intervention to lower a currency tends to 
decrease them. The effect on interest rates can be reduced by 
redeeming or issuing treasury bills or government bonds in the 
context of "open market operations". Alternatively, the 
authorities can use the "discount window" to raise or lower interest 
rates in order to keep their currency within its bands. [The 
"discount window" refers to the loans made by the Central Bank to 
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the commercial banks to tide them over very temporary shortages of 
liquidity. For example, if the inter-bank borrowing rate for 
overnight money might otherwise double]. 
Much of the original EMS blueprint was motivated by a desire 
to counteract some of the less favourable features implicit in the 
earlier Bretton Woods fixed exchange-rate system; such as asymmetry, 
capital immobility and destabilising realignments. 
2.1 Operational Asymmetries in the ERM 
In any exchange-rate system there must exist a "numeraire" or 
nominal anchor determining the actual level of prices in the system 
"because exchange rates, by themselves, define only 'relative 
prices' in the system" (Mundell, 1969). Under the Bretton Woods 
system, gold acted as the legal - de jure - numeraire. In the ERM, 
the ECU (as a weighted basket of the participating currencies) was 
originally intended to be its numeraire, with the ERM parity net, 
thereby defined relative to ECU parities; policy adjustment between 
ERM member countries should be "symmetric". For this purpose a 
special institutional device - "divergence indicator" (Dl) - was set 
up to assist such symmetry of adjustment. The aim of this action 
was to remove many of the operational asymmetries which had been 
revealed under the Bretton Woods regime and which often had forced 
adjustment upon only the weak currencies in the system. 
In practice, in a quite different way, the Deutschemark is 
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now known as the de facto nominal anchor in the ERM, just as the 
dollar became the same under the Bretton Woods. Consequently, ERM 
members have found themselves constrained more often by bilateral 
limits relative to the strongest currency (usually the DM) than by 
the divergence threshold. 
There is some confusion in economic studies regarding this 
so-called "German leadership" hypothesis. A number of empirical 
studies suggest that, in opposition to a strong form of German 
leadership proposition, there is some reciprocal influence from non-
German ERM members upon policy in Germany particularly from France 
and Italy (Cohen and Wyplosz, 1989; Artis and Nachane, 1990; 
Fratianni and von Hagen, 1990; Weber, 1990). This conclusion 
proved true of the relationship between a range of monetary policy 
instruments (short and long-term interest rates and money supplies). 
The clearest evidence of an asymmetric functioning of the ERM 
has been found by studies considering the (offshore) large interest 
' 
rate adjustments (responses to the expectation of a realignment) 
observed among non-German ERM members relative to those seen in 
Germany in an attempt to dampen realignment pressure. These 
observations suggest that the ERM has indeed worked in an asymmetric 
style, with Germany often being used as the focal point for the 
operation of monetary policy, but there has not been absolute German 
leadership of the system (de Grauwe, 1989; Glavazzi and Giovannini, 
1990). 
One school of thought believes that the ERM's asymmetric 
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operation has been "intentional", in the sense of its emergence as a 
result of the policy preferences of participating countries. 
Specifically, it has been suggested that non-German ERM members 
could be able to "import" Germany's credibility in countering 
inflation by following the Bundesbank's monetary policy through an 
exchange-rate peg with the Deutschemark, explaining why high-
inflation countries might accept voluntarily some dependence upon 
German monetary policy (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1988). 
Others have stressed the potentially systematic nature of 
asymmetries within semi-fixed exchange-rate mechanisms, (Wyplosz, 
1989) with the average inflation of the system receding naturally 
towards that of the country with the most contractionary stance. 
The feeling behind this is that, under a fixed exchange-rate regime, 
the countries building up their stock of reserves the fastest will 
be those with the most restrictive monetary stance. Conversely, 
those countries following the most expansive monetary policy will be 
losing reserves the fastest. Given that a country's stock of 
reserves is finite, the burden of adjustment is more often placed 
upon the expansionary/weak currency country (whose stock of reserves 
is being exhausted) than upon the contractionary strong currency one 
(whose reserves are being added to). The weak currency country 
will therefore be forced to tighten its policy to hold the exchange 
rate fixed, with the strong currency country isolated from this 
policy adjustment. 
currency standard. 
The result is convergence on the strong 
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Mastropasqua et al.(1988) indicated that Germany plays a 
negligible role in intra-marginal interventions involving the ERM 
currencies (which comprise the vast majority of total intervention) 
and that any movement in reserves in Germany are fully sterilised, 
with the opposite generally being true among other ERM countries. 
These observed trends show a potentially important role for the 
adjustment mechanism, with Germany, as the inflation leader 
targeting nominal interest rates and the others largely targeting 
foreign exchange reserves. 
As a result, it seems highly likely that the asymmetric 
operation of the ERM has emerged from both inherent and intentional 
reasons. Nevertheless, the ERM played a considerable role in 
assuring a disinflationary formation for the currencies in the 
system, with low inflation currencies near the top of the system 
exerting discipline upon high inflation currencies placed near to 
the floor. This configuration has been actually observed during 
much of the latter half of the 1980s (Bank of England, Quarterly 
Bulletin, February 1991). 
2.2 Capital Mobility 
The second feature of the Bretton Woods system which EMS 
protagonists have sought to counteract is capital immobility. The 
United Kingdom formally abolished its exchange controls in 1979. 
More recently, largely under the impetus of the 1988 Capital 
Liberalisation Directive, France and Italy removed remaining 
exchange controls and Belgium abolished its dual foreign exchange 
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market in 1990, at the same year with France and Italy. Although 
some exchange controls remain in Spain, Portugal, Ireland and 
Greece, they are, now, in much-relaxed form compared with the 1970s. 
Regarding potential covert capital controls within the EC, some 
progress has already been made towards removing remaining indirect 
discriminatory restrictions upon freedom of "cross-border" capital 
flows (the existence and role played by capital controls in the ERM 
countries is analysed by, among others, Giavazzi and Giovannini, 
1990; and for the UK by Artis and Taylor, 1989). 
De Grauwe (1989) and Giavazzi and Giovannini (1990) show how 
capital controls enabled the non-German ERM countries to maintain a 
relatively high degree of monetary independence during the early 
1980s despite asymmetries in the system's operation, allowing a 
combination of behaviour in the domestic money and euro-currency 
markets. 
These two empirical observations suggest that capital 
controls may have acted as a "stabilising" device upon exchange and 
interest rates of some ERM members during the system's turbulent 
formative years, preventing excessive speculative capital flight 
"speculative attack" from countries facing devaluation (the 
elements of this "speculative attack" scenario in anticipation of a 
realignment, in the absence of capital controls, are given in 
Drifill, 1988; Obstfeld, 1988 and Wyplosz,1989). In practice, 
realignment procedures in the ERM were modified so as to reduce the 
probability of discrete market exchange-rate movements and hence of 
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speculative attack, allowing for the more widespread use of (intra-
marginal) intervention in pre-emptive and coordinated interest-rate 
actions between members, markedly after arrival of the Basle-Nyborg 
Accord in November 1987. Finally, it is likely that increased 
financial market credibility, associated with the success achieved 
in boosting inflation convergence within the ERM bloc, has acted 
further to discourage speculative attack in recent years. 
2.3 The Realignment Process 
EMS participants, finally, have aimed to guard against 
dramatic parity realignments which occurred under the Bretton Woods 
system, in part by adopting a more symmetric approach to realigning 
their currencies than was seen in the earlier "semi-fixed" exchange-
rate regimes. The ERM has experienced twelve realignments in its 
twelve-year history, seven of which occurred in the system's first 
four years in operation and the last of which, in January 1990, had 
the sole purpose of enabling the Italian lira to move to the narrow 
band. The last general realignment of the currencies in the ERM 
emerged in January 1987. However, as can be seen in Table 2, 
realignments have been few in number, have not always included the 
major currencies, have usually been small and have become less 
frequent, especially since 1983, over the period. 
Padoa-Schioppa (1985) observes that while early realignments 
were de facto unilateral decisions, from around 1982 the realignment 
process became more collective. Giovazzi and Giovannini (1990) 
isolate the differential interest rate response of member countries 
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Table 2 Realignments of EMS Currencies (~er cent changes) 
Dates of 24 30 22 5 22 14 21 21 7 
realignments Sept Nov Mar Oct Feb Jun Mar Jul Apl 
1979 1979 1981 1981 1982 1982 1983 1985 1986 
Belgian franc 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -8.5 0.0 +1.5 +2.0 +1.0 
Danish krone -2.9 -4.8 0.0 0.0 -3.0 0.0 +2.5 +2.0 +1.0 
German mark +2.0 0.0 0.0 +5.5 0.0 +4.25 +5.5 +2.0 +3.0 
French franc 0.0 o.o 0.0 -3.0 0.0 -5.75 -2.5 +2.0 -3.0 
Irish punt 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -3.5 +2.0 o.o 
Italian lira 0.0 0.0 -6.0 -3.0 0.0 -2.75 -2.5 -6.0 0.0 
Dutch guilder 0.0 0.0 0.0 +5.5 0.0 +4.25 +3.5 +2.0 +3.0 
Source: R. Barrell (1990), noas the EMS Changed Wage and Price Behaviour in Europe?a 
Economic Review, November 1990, No.139, p.67. 
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National Institute 
in anticipation of a realignment and demonstrate this as an evidence 
of some form of German leadership in the realignment process. 
Indeed, realignment consultations may have set up one effective 
channel through which Germany exerted its counter-inflationary 
influence over other ERM members in the mid-1980s by limiting the 
number of devaluations within the system. 
A particular feature of the more recent ERM realignments, 
from the "speculative attack" perspective, is the observation that 
they have been free from speculation "non-provocative" 
(Artis,l989) - that is the shift in the bands has been overlapping, 
with the new band set without disturbing the existing market rate. 
An innovation of the EMS in this regard acts as a device in avoiding 
the opportunity for the market to make a "one-way-bet". The 
difference is illustrated in Figure 44. In the case of the 
one-way-bet realignment sketched in Figure 44b, the discrete 
disturbance of the market rate yields huge gains to speculators, if 
correctly foreseen. For example, if a currency is allowed to slide 
to the bottom of its band so that it can only be expected to be 
devalued by, say 5 per cent, the gross gains from correctly 
anticipating the day on which this takes place exceed, in annual 
interest rate terms, a rate of 1,500 per cent (5x365). 
Speculators could benefit from this situation by borrowing the weak 
currency to buy the strong one in anticipation of devaluation, 
thereafter redeeming the loan in cheaper currency. In this case 
interest rates in the weak currency country would, indeed, have to 
be very high to challenge the huge gains in prospect. Hence, the ERM 
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technique of changing the central rate and thus the bands around the 
current market rate in a "timely" realignment could be considered as 
a substantial improvement upon the Bretton Woods system which 
effectively offered speculators a one-way-bet on currency. 
In practice, EMS realignments have not always been "timely" 
-Kenen (1988) estimates the proportion to be just over 70 per cent -
and exchange controls have also played a role in deterring 
speculation. The abolition of these controls will therefore put a 
higher premium on the practice of the non-provocative realignment 
procedure described above. 
3. EXCHANGE-RATE STABILISATION IN THE ERM 
In empirical studies concerning the system's role in 
fostering exchange-rate stability, closely related to the EMS's 
original objective of promoting monetary stability, the distinction 
typically made is between high-frequency ("nominal" exchange-rate 
"volatility") and low-frequency ("real" exchange-rate 
"misalignment") deviations from the exchange-rate bases, following 
Williamson (1983,1985). 
3.1 High-frequency measures of exchange-rate stability 
Early empirical studies concentrated on descriptive measures 
of volatility (as measured by, for example, the standard deviation 
of the percentage change in the exchange rate), using real, nominal, 
and/or effective exchange rates over a variety of time periods and 
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frequencies (Ungerer~ al.,1983; Padoa-Schioppa, 1985). 
A recent and authoritative example of this kind of approach 
is provided by Ungerer et al (1986), in a study for the IMF, which 
is shown in Table 3. The results quoted in this table are for 
nominal bilateral exchange rates against ERM currencies, the 
exchange rates being weighted together according to the pattern of 
weights provided by the IMF's multilateral exchange-rate model 
(MERM), which is standard for this type of application. Two 
concepts of stability are, here, stability of the actual level and 
stability of the (log) change-weighted average of variability of 
bilateral nominal exchange rates against ERM currencies. As can be 
seen from Table 3 for both levels and log changes, the index of 
variability rises for the three main non-ERM countries and falls for 
the three main ERM countries. Including, in addition, the smaller 
ERM countries in the coverage and a set of other developed countries 
in the non-ERM average, the result remains the same: where 
volatility falls sharply for the ERM countries between the pre-EMS 
and the EMS period, it rises for the non=participant countries over 
the same period. 
More recently, a number of empirical studies have attempted 
to set some measures which, effectively, explain exchange rate 
"uncertainty" (unanticipated changes in currency prices): called 
"conditional" variability approach. The evidence from these 
studies is generally in keeping with that from earlier results 
(Ungerer et al.,1983 and 1986; Padoa-Schioppa, 1985): the ERM has, 
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substantially, contributed to stabilise both real and nominal intra-
ERM bilateral exchange rates, but has had little effect upon the 
stability of member's global effective exchange rates. These 
observations may be considered consistent primarily with "internal", 
rather than "external" exchange-rate stabilisation. 
3.2 Interest Rate Stability 
A related question is whether lower intra-ERM exchange-rate 
volatility has been achieved at the cost of greater short-term 
interest rate variability (Batchelor,1883). Vinals (1990) reports 
this "to have been an important concern for the Spanish authorities 
prior to joining the ERM." In practice, the experience of many 
countries on joining the ERM has been that interest rate variability 
has increased initially, but that this increased uncertainty has 
gone away over time as financial market credibility has been 
attained. Most empirical studies strengthen this evidence in 
suggesting that there has been no observable increase in short-term 
interest rate uncertainty among ERM members in the post-1979 period 
(Ungerer et al.,1986; Artis and Taylor,1988). However, Ungerer et 
al.(1986) point out that there is less evidence of the ERM having 
stabilised "long-term" interest rates among its members. 
3.3 Low-frequency measures of exchange-rate stability 
There is some disagreement in the literature about how best 
real exchange-rate equilibrium is to be defined. For example, 
Wren-Lewis et al.(1990) have recently investigated the practical 
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usefulness of classical purchasing power parity exchange-rate theory 
but using as their equilibrium exchange-rate benchmark Williamson's 
concept of the fundamental equilibrium exchange-rate (FEER), i.e. 
Table 3 Exchange-Rate Variability Against ERM Currencies 1974-85a 
Period Means 
Levels Log changes 
1974-8 1979-85 1974-9 1979-85 
France 31.6 15.9 16.8 
Germany 29.2 16.3 14.7 
Italy 36.0 19.3 19.3 
Average ERMb 24.8 15.1 14.8 
Japan 44.5 48.1 21.1 
UK 32.7 37.8 16.8 
USA 34.7 55.7 18.8 
Average 
non-ERMc 34.5 35.9 17.2 
Notes: a) Weighted average of variability of bilateral nominal 
exchange rates against ERM currencies (their log change), 
monthly data, IMF MERM weights. Variability is measured 
by the coefficient of variation for levels, and by the 
standard deviation for log changes (in both cases x 1000). 
Period means are unweighed. 
b) Including all ERM countries. 
c) Includes Japan, United Kingdom, United States, Australia, 
Canada, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. 
Source: H.Ungerer et ~.(1986) "The European Monetary System: 
Recent Developments", occasional paper no.48, IMF, Table 7, 
p.35. 
7.6 
7.0 
8.8 
7.3 
21.7 
20.9 
27.4 
17.9 
that real exchange-rate which is capable of supporting internal and 
external balance in the medium term. In addition, only recently 
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have studies sought to formalise the link between sluggish 
adjustment of real exchange-rates to their equilibrium values and 
inter-sectoral factor movement. Consequently, it is not yet 
possible to form a view as to whether the system does contribute 
actively or passively, to exchange-rate misalignments among the 
members or not. 
4. MACROECONOMIC CONVERGENCE IN THE ERM 
Within the academic literature, however, there is still some 
debate as to whether the (inflation) convergence undergone during 
the 1970s is specific to the ERM "arrangements" or whether it is a 
more general feature of the EMS "period" in which there were 
determined shifts towards the control of inflation in both ERM and 
non-ERM countries (Fratianni and Von Hagen,1990). 
4.1 The EMS credibility hypothesis 
The literature supporting the view that the ERM has exerted a 
strong and independent influence upon members' counter-inflationary 
stance typically stresses the disciplining role played by Germany 
vis-a-vis other ERM members; particularly the "reputational" 
benefits that could emerge if high inflation countries fix their 
nominal exchange-rate to that of the country with the highest anti-
inflation credibility. This is called the "EMS credibility 
Hypothesis" (Collins, 1988; Giavazzi and Giovannini, 1988/1990; 
Giavazzi and Pagano, 1988). Analytical models of this hypothesis 
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have usually been presented in a game-theoretic framework, often in 
the spirit of Barra and Gordon (1983). 
Equilibrium inflation in the Barro-Gordon framework is 
determined by the credibility of a policy-maker's commitment to 
price stability, i.e. where actual and expected inflation the 
decisions of the authorities and of price sector agents (agents in 
financial and labour markets) respectively coincide. High 
inflation countries can "import" credibility by fixing their nominal 
exchange-rates relative to the lowest inflation currency, thereby 
pre-committing themselves to an anti-inflation strategy and hence 
setting a credible constraint upon their policy "operations". This 
will result, provided that this commitment is credible, in lowering 
the threshold of inflationary expectations among agents, recouping 
any "inflationary bias" which might otherwise emerge (Kydland and 
Prescott, 1977) and consequently lowering the equilibrium 
inflation in the game. This result is directly similar to Rogoff's 
(1985) observation that "inflation inefficiencies can be offset by 
handing control over to a 'conservative' central bank with a 
declared anti-inflation strategy." This is a clear shift in policy 
"preferences" of the authorities rather than constraining the policy 
actions. 
A number of authors have stressed the important 
role played by the 'real' exchange rate as a 
disciplining device upon high inflation countries, 
given that any adverse movements in relative 
inflation will automatically result on a worsening 
of competitiveness under a fixed nominal exchange 
rate regime. 
(Fratianni and Von Hagen, 1990) 
The reason behind this is that the "real" rate of exchange the 
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nominal rate corrected for relative prices, thereby an index of 
competitiveness governs an economy's competitiveness, hence a 
sharp change, for example, a large appreciation in the real rate 
will cause a large fall in competitiveness, perhaps followed by 
protectionist pressures which could threaten the reversal of the 
process of removing internal tariff barriers. By reflecting this 
"inner logic", Table 2 shows that whereas the real rates of exchange 
of both the United Kingdom and the United States have undergone 
large changes in the 1980s, changes in competitiveness of the EMS 
economies, namely France, Germany and Italy (with the exclusion of 
the UK), have been more muted. This evidence points that, 
possibly, the ERM might have contributed to reducing the extent of 
exchange-rate "misalignments", which are deviations of real rates of 
exchange from equilibrium levels. 
The ERM practice of "under-indexing" realignments, 
readjusting the nominal central rate by less than is needed to 
compensate fully for the cumulative inflation differential, has 
added to the discipline imposed through this real exchange-rate 
channel. This has meant both that the autonomous inflationary 
drive provided by a realignment in high inflation countries has been 
muted, and that realignments have proved more costly in terms of 
competitiveness (and hence acted as more of a discipline) than fully 
accommodating parity adjustments. In the expression of the game 
theory, under-indexed ERM realignments might, therefore, have acted 
as a punishment mechanism upon imprudent policymakers, prompting a 
monetary/fiscal policy adjustment in these countries to help prevent 
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the continuation of losses in competitiveness. This feature is 
likely to characterise accurately the policy responses of many ERM 
members, (in particular, the French experience following the March 
1983 
and 
ERM realignment, with its aftermath of a package of 
monetary austerity measures was implemented), 
budgetary 
as they 
acclimatised to the disciplines of the system, especially after 
1983. 
As a counterpart to the under-indexing of realignments, the 
anchor (lowest inflation) country would make absolute gains in 
competitiveness during any transitional phase of inflation 
convergence which in turn provides a rationale for the anchor 
country's participation in the system. However, more reasonably, 
it has been suggested that it is the desire for stabilisation, 
rather than absolute gains in competitiveness which better explains 
Germany's interest in participating in the ERM. Consequently, 
there is clear evidence of the ERM having helped stabilise German 
competitiveness with European partners by reducing the volatility of 
the German real effective exchange-rate after 1979 
(correspondingly, a number of commentators have noted a weakening of 
the Dollar-Deutschemark polarisation between the periods before and 
after the inception of the ERM, i.e. Giovazzi and Giovannini, 1990; 
Haldane and Hall, 1991). 
Finally, no single model has yet been invented to explain 
both the divergence of ERM inflation differentials up to around 1983 
and the convergence thereafter. This observation supports the view 
that there have been changes both to the functional characteristics 
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of the ERM, for example, a shift towards a more asymmetric regime of 
greater capital mobility and infrequent realignments, and to the 
policies of its members over time. 
4.2 The EMS credibility hypothesis and inflation convergence: 
empirical evidence 
Several attempts have been made to verify, in empirical 
terms, some of the implications of the "EMS Credibility Hypothesis". 
For example, Giavazzi and Giovannini (1988) find evidence of 
inflation expectations having undergone some downwards reversion 
after around 1983, though this structural shift is not statistically 
significant. Kremer (1990) finds relatively strong evidence of 
inflation expectations in Ireland, having followed the United 
Kingdom's prices before 1979, but having been more closely related 
to the price behaviour of ERM partners thereafter. Ireland has 
been following a similar course with France by adopting a monetarist 
policy towards inflation, but a monetarism based on the exchange 
rate, and now has an inflation rate of around 5 per cent. In a 
similar line, Artis and Nachane (1990) find a significant role for 
German inflation expectations in the price equations of other ERM 
members, while the same is not true either of non-ERM members or of 
ERM members in the pre-ERM period. In general, these studies point 
towards there having been some adjustment of inflation expectations 
during the EMS period in the direction suggested by German monetary 
policy, which was achieved some time after entering the ERM whereas 
agents "learnt" the true policy preferences of the authorities as 
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they adapted to th~ new regime. 
On the other side, a number of studies have attempted to 
capture credibility shifts indirectly, by calculating the output (or 
unemployment) costs of disinflation: these costs are lower when 
credibility which attaches to a disinflation is higher because of 
the effects of credibility in lowering inflation expectations (and 
hence in lowering real wages). 
As can be seen from Table 4, during the period of 1980-88, 
inflation has fallen in the United States and the United Kingdom 
(during this period the UK was not a participant of the ERM) as well 
as the group of some ERM countries. A "quick" indicator of the 
costs of disinflating is the ratio of the cumulative rise in 
unemployment to the reduction in inflation the so-called 
"sacrifice ratio". Table 4 gives estimates at three intervals for 
this ratio. As presented in Table 4, it can be seen that Germany 
has the highest sacrifice ratio of all, presenting, at first sight, 
an inconsistent evidence with the credibility hypothesis under 
discussion. But one must consider that it is the non-German 
members which are supposed to reap the benefit of Germany's extreme 
inflation aversion by targeting the Deutschemark. However, Table 4 
also displays that the sacrifice ratios for France and Italy are 
lower than those for the United Kingdom, being quite consistent with 
the hypothesis. It is the USA, on the other hand, which seems to 
have done best of all. While this might be treated as a special 
case, it is clear that the evidence, itself, is far from being 
unambiguous. Relatedly, De Grauwe (1989) finds no evidence of the 
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ERM having lowered the output costs of disinflation relative to 
countries outside the ERM pointing to an implicit rejection of the 
ERM Credibility Hypothesis. However, once acquired, policy 
credibility within the ERM may then have proved more robust than 
under a floating exchange-rate regime because of the additional 
Table 4 Inflation and the wsacrifice Ratiow 
Consumer price inflation %p.a. 
USA Germany France 
1980 11.0 5.8 13.3 
1981 9.3 6.2 13.0 
1982 6.0 4.8 11.5 
1983 3.5 3.2 9.7 
1984 3.9 2.5 7.5 
1985 3.1 2.1 5.7 
1986 2.1 -0.5 2.5 
1987 3.7 0.3 3.2 
1988a 4.1 1.0 2.7 
Sacrifice ratiosb 
1980-4 0.86 4.09 1.43 
1980-6 0.66 3.37 1.51 
1980-8c 0.51 5. 77 2.33 
Notes: a) 1988 data partly estimated 
b) The ratio of the cumulative increase in unemployment to 
the difference between inflation in 1980 and inflation in 
the terminal year (1984,1986,1988). 
c) Unemployment data for 1988 are average of the first three 
quarters 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, December 1988. 
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UK 
16.2 
11.4 
8.6 
5.0 
4.8 
5.2 
3.6 
4.2 
5.1 
1. 73 
2.33 
3.18 
Italy 
20.2 
17.9 
15.9 
14.8 
11.4 
9.3 
6.1 
4.9 
4.8 
0.83 
0.95 
na 
constraints placed upon member countries. 
In general, much of the empirical evidence to date has found 
it difficult to disentangle statistically the global disinflation 
level of the 1980s from that which may have been ERM-inspired. 
4.3 Convergence of other macroeconomic indicators: empirical 
evidence 
The results in the report presented by Ungerer et al 
(1983,1986) indicate that progress has been made towards convergence 
of monetary policies and inflation rates among ERM members during 
the EMS period, but that less progress has been made towards an 
equilibrium of relative fiscal and external positions (broadly 
similar conclusions are reached by Cohen and Wyplosz (1989) and 
Weber (1990), using slightly more sophisticated analysis). This 
lack of convergence of some real indicators points that significant 
differences may have persisted between members during the EMS 
period. Indeed, it is these differences, for example, divergences 
in the relative external positions of ERM members which give rise to 
the adjustment mechanism for using exchange rates as a means of 
fostering convergence between high and low inflation countries. 
Finally, even though one may expect that policy differences among 
member countries could be avoided in static equilibrium, it is 
difficult to ignore those differences during the dynamic transition 
to that equilibrium. 
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5. THE nNEW EMSn AND THE nEXCESS CREDIBILITYn PROBLEM 
A number of commentators have highlighted an apparent 
"paradox" which has occasionally emerged within the ERM in more 
recent years, for example, in Spain and Italy during periods in 1989 
and 1990 (Artis and Dupuy, 1990; Giavazzi and Spaventa, 1990; 
Vinals, 1990). The paradox is characterised by high-inflation 
currencies operating near the top of their bands and low-inflation 
currencies operating near their floors, the opposite to what is 
expected from the "classic" ERM conformation of currencies. 
The emergence of such a paradox has been related directly to 
increased financial integration, especially to capital 
liberalisation among the ERM bloc. Giavazzi and Spaventa (1990) 
show the narrowing of the differential between variability of on-
shore and off-shore interest rates in France and Italy after 1987 to 
illustrate this enhanced capital mobility, indicating that this is 
due more to a reduction in off-shore interest rate variability than 
to an increase in the volatility of on-shore rates; which is taken 
as evidence of a stabilisation of exchange rate expectations in the 
ERM. They believe that this regime shift in the ERM financial 
markets credibility, resulting from enhanced financial integration, 
is to be the essence of the "New EMS". 
The effect of this enhanced exchange-rate stability and 
financial integration has often been to stimulate large-scale 
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capital inflows into countries with the highest nominal inflation 
and interest rates and offering fastest growth. For Spain and 
Italy the result was a rapid swelling of reserves as their 
currencies moved towards the top of their ERM bands. These large 
increases in reserves often proved difficult to sterilise fully, 
including monetary relaxation in these high interest rate/high-
inflation countries (for example, Spain sought to impose selected 
administrative controls on capital inflows during 1989 because of 
the difficulties involved in full sterilisation of increases in 
reserves). 
Since enhanced financial integration now limits 
the scope for realignments for fear of sowing the 
seeds of future speculative attack, it is possible 
that parity adjustments may be less well equipped 
to defuse such instabilities currently than was 
the case during the early 1980s. 
(Bank of England. Quarterly Bulletin, February 
1991) 
A formal explanation of the paradox is provided in Artus and 
Dupuy (1990), Giavazzi and Spaventa (1990), and Miller and 
Sutherland (1990). Their common conclusion was that short-run 
inflation instabilities can emerge only when expectations in the 
financial market are incompatible with those in the labour market; 
in particular when there exists "excess credibility" (of monetary 
policy) in financial markets relative to that in labour markets. 
Hence, the likelihood of instability is greater when wage-bargainers 
are less forward-looking relative to participants in financial 
markets, i.e. the ERMis less credible in labour than in financial 
markets. 
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While differential credibility in two markets is possible in 
the short run, inconsistent expectations between them (and hence 
instabilities) are not contingent in steady-state. The real 
exchange rate will act as an additional stabilising channel over the 
long run; therefore excess credibility problems are likely to be 
temporary. Giavazzi and Spaventa illustrate that excess 
credibility problems may actually "accelerate" convergence towards 
equilibrium by stimulating inflation at the beginning of the 
adjustment process and hence shifting competitiveness losses toward 
the early stages of a disinflation. The external adjustment costs 
of disinflation, i.e. current account deficits, emerged in the 
transitional period of inflation convergence may therefore be lower 
if a country "suffers" an initial excess financial market 
credibility problem than would be the case otherwise. 
6. SUMMARY 
In general, the ideas and opinions of academics and 
policymakers on the operation and performance of the ERM have not 
yet matured and remain diffuse. This uncertainty in the literature 
possibly reflects the evaluation of the system itself having been 
fragmented and episodic. The ERM's operational framework, in 
particular, does not seem to have been constant over time: the 
system now functions in a largely asymmetric style, rather than 
symmetrically as intended; capital mobility between ERM members is 
much greater recently than during the system's formative years; and 
ERM realignments are now both infrequent and non-provocative, unlike 
the early 1980s. Policies of the ERM member countries during the 
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1980s have also been subject to frequent and often marked variation. 
Correspondingly, no standard framework for analytically modelling 
the system has emerged. 
On the other hand, limited degrees of freedom and somewhat 
disparate historical experiences of member countries have implied 
that conclusions from empirical studies have rarely proved certain. 
But, empirical evidence that the ERM has stabilised bilateral 
exchange rates between members (in the sense of reducing short-term 
volatility) and that the system has contributed effectively to the 
process of inflation convergence among ERM countries is relatively 
clear cut. Finally, with time, data, and further experience of the 
regime, it is likely that more conclusive outcomes will be obtained, 
rather than through elaborate econometrics. 
7. OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE EMS 
7.1 The ECU: 
since we examined the ECU in the first chapter, it is mentioned 
again here only shortly, including the participation of the Spanish 
currency, peseta, in the ERM of the European Monetary System, on 17 
June 1989. 
The European Currency Unit (ECU) replaced the "European Unit 
of Account" in 1981. It is the accounting currency of the 
Community which is used in producing the EC's budget, paying grants 
and even for calculating staff salaries. It forms part of each 
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Member State's national foreign currency reserves. It is also 
available in travel cheques, though it is not, yet, a coin in your 
pocket, and it is receiving larger acceptance amongst financial 
institutions throughout the world as a denomination for financial 
instruments, such as ECU bonds. 
The ECU is calculated by reference to certain proportions of 
each Community currency, contained in a so-called "basket". The 
actual proportion is weighted according to the size of each Member 
State's economy, which are defined as the weighting coefficients 
shown on Table 1, with the German D-mark forming its strongest 
component. The amounts are recalculated every 5 years. The level 
of proportions that each ECU contains set in September 1989 are as 
follows: 
Table 5 The Amounts of National Currencies in the Composition of 
the ECU 
German mark 0.624 Irish punt 0.009 
Dutch guilder 0.219 Italian lira 151.8 
Belgian franc 3.301 Pound sterling 0.087 
Luxembourg franc 0.13 Greek drachma 1.44 
Danish krone 0.198 Spanish peseta 6.885 
French franc 1. 332 Portuguese escudo 1.393 
Source: Commission of the EC, 1989 Background Report. 
The figures above simply provide the amount of each national 
currency which is taken into account in counting the value of the 
ECU. Participation of the Spanish peseta in the ERM did not change 
the central rates and intervention rates of each national currency 
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within the EMS, and had no agri-monetary consequences. 
7.2.The European Monetary Cooperation Fund 
The EMCF is the means by which cooperation is provided 
between the central banks of each Member State. Eventually it is 
to become a European Central Bank, politically independent of Member 
States but maintaining very close links with national monetary 
authorities. 
The Board of the EMCF consists of governors of the national 
central banks. It issues ECUs to each Member State in return for 
the deposit with it of 20% of each Member State's gold and dollar 
currency reserves, although actually, no money physically changes 
hands. These exchanges take place on a three-monthly basis, but 
allow the ECU to be used in intercentral bank accounting, i.e. in 
settling debts emerging from the buying or selling of particular 
currencies within the ERM. 
7.3. The Very Short-Term Financing Facility 
The VTSF, as an integral part of the ERM intervention 
mechanism, is a means of financing rapid assistance often required 
by the participating Member State's central banks on foreign 
exchange markets in order to maintain ERM currencies 
permitted margins. 
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within 
Each central bank in the ERM provides automatic unlimited 
credit facilities to the other Member States' central banks to 
finance intervention either once currencies reach permitted margins 
or, subject to prior agreement, before the limits are reached. 
Repayment is made fairly soon after the credits are used, though 
this may be delayed in certain circumstances. 
8. BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE EMU 
The purpose of this section is to review the possible 
benefits and costs of the European Monetary Union in the light of 
the recent work of the European Commission, "One Market One Money" 
(October,1990) and to evaluate them by taking into consideration 
various opinions on the subject, as well as using some empirical 
evidence. 
According to the Commission: 
1. The elimination of currency transactions costs could save as 
much as 13 to 19bn ECU yearly (0.3 to 0.4% of Community GDP), 
accounting for larger gains for small, open economies (0.9% 
of GDP) than for larger economies (0.1 to 0.2% of GDP). 
Together with other gains which are difficult to figure, 
total gains from the removal of currency transactions are 
expected to be at least 0.5% of GDP per year. 
2. The EMS would completely eliminate nominal exchange rate 
variability which recently has averaged 0.7% per month for 
ERM currencies and 1.9% for non-ERM currencies (each currency 
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against all other EC currencies). It would also eliminate 
uncertainty (which interest rate premiums show to be 
considerable even where actual exchange rates have been 
stable). 
3. Efficiency gains may also be obtained by improving the 
internal market, for example, by strengthening the measures 
in the fields of competition, energy, transport, research and 
development, environment and taxation policies. For 
example, calculations for Germany suggests that, the removal 
of subsidies could improve efficiency by 0.9 per cent of GDP. 
4. The combination of the 1992 programme and the EMU could be 
promising not only for "static" efficiency gains but also 
"dynamic" gains (i.e. higher sustainable rate of economic 
growth). There are expectations of a moderate reduction in 
the riskiness of investment (e.g. exchange rate uncertainty) 
which could have a significant growth effect in the long run. 
5. Reductions in uncertainty will allow a reduction in the rate 
of return on investment asked by shareholders, which in turn 
fosters investment and growth. Only a modest reduction in 
this rate of return of 0.5 percentage points could well 
amount to a gain in output accumulating to 5 per cent of GDP. 
6. Price stability is itself advantageous for efficient resource 
allocation. Low inflation is associated with low 
variability of inflation, and therefore of relative prices. 
The economic literature suggests that a 1 per cent decrease 
in relative price variance could lead to an increase of 0.3 
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of a percentage point of GDP in real output for instance. 
7. Lower inflation will mean lower inflation tax (seignorage) 
revenues for high inflation countries. In considering the 
present situation of inflation rates, this would mean a 
yearly loss, say during a period of 5 years, of some 1 per 
cent of GDP for the governments of Greece and Portugal and 
less than 0.5 per cent for Spain and Italy. 
8. Gains for interest payments on public debt and allocation of 
capital could come from the equalisation of real interest 
9. 
rates. Imperfect credibility of exchange rate commitments 
meant a real interest rate differential of 1 to 2.5 per cent 
for EMS countries relative to Germany on average over the 
period of 1985-1989. Hence, the equalisation of real 
interest rates could compensate inflation tax losses in the 
high inflation countries through gains, during the transition 
to EMS, on the interest payments averaging between 2 and 5 
per cent of GDP. 
EMU would lower the costs of economic shocks. Simulation of 
the shocks over the past two decades under alternative 
exchange rate regimes estimates that the EMU with a single 
currency might, compared to the EMS of the mid-1980s, have a 
reduction in inflation fluctuations of one-fourth (0.6 to 1.5 
percentage points less variation) and of output growth 
fluctuations by one-fifth (0.3 to 0.7 percentage points less 
variation). 
10. Financial flows will be available to cushion the effects of 
economic shocks. Monetary union will remove external 
financial constraints, and national and Community budgets 
73 
will also help absorb shocks. 
Impacts on the international systems: 
11. As an international currency, the ECU would allow a saving in 
the Community's exchange reserves of about 160bn ECU 
(200bn$), increase the share of ECU-denominated assets in the 
world financial portfolio by 5 percentage points and increase 
the invoicing in ECUs (with 10 per cent of EC trade). This 
increased use of the ECU would provide for a decrease in 
transaction costs with third countries (0.05 per cent of the 
EC GDP) and bring international seignorage revenues from a 
possible long-run accumulation of some 28bn (35bn$) in ECU 
notes outstanding abroad. 
12. Finally, the EMU should facilitate international coordination 
and also the establishment of a balanced tri-polar regime. 
9. ASSESSMENTS OF THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE EMU 
The calculations and suggestions of various academics and 
economists are approximately consistent with those in the 
Commission's work ("One Market, One Money", Oct.1990) on the 
quantification of the benefits and costs of the EMU. 
In their recent study Daniel Gras and Niels Thygesen (1990) 
suggest that total potential savings in transaction costs should 
regarding to the intra-EC trade which accounts for about 20 per cent 
of GDP on average, should be in the region of 0.25-0.5 per cent of 
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the EC's GDP, close to the Commission's estimation of 0.5 per cent 
of the GDP. They argue that a single currency would significantly 
reduce the scope for discriminatory national pricing, through the 
elimination of information costs and of incentives for price 
discrimination inherent in the continued use of a number of 
currencies. They strongly stress, that an additional 2 per cent of 
the EC's GDP could be attainable. In their recent questionnaire 
study, Ernst and Young (1990) also suggest that the addition of a 
single currency to the 1992 programme would have major effects. 
Samuel Brittan and Michael Artis (1989), note that the transaction 
cost saving on trade might amount to \ per cent of GDP, quoting the 
margins of \-1 per cent for commercial transactions and 2\-3 per 
cent for tourist transactions for the Community given by Eltis 
(1989) in a recent NEDO paper. They also suggest that the 
existence of exchange rate uncertainty militates against the 
efficient allocation of capital and impedes the operation of an 
integrated European capital market; hence, the removal of exchange 
rate uncertainty should increase the net flows of capital within 
Europe. An important source of gross flows of capital (each-way 
flows of portfolio investment) would be eliminated by EMU, for those 
which are stimulated by exchange-rate risk spreading would no longer 
be required. As a difference, Samuel Britton and Michael Artis 
estimate (uncertainly) the gains from elimination of currency-
exchange transaction costs to be 1\ per cent or more of the GDP, 
possibly in an over-pessimistic way. 
In dealing more briefly with the costs of a single currency, 
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Gras and Thygesen (1990) stress the matter of political costs in 
surrendering the exchange rate adjustments as an instrument of 
monetary policy. They point out that a government would find a 
realignment of its exchange rate desirable if its economy were to 
experience shocks different from those to which its partners in the 
union are exposed, since, whether they are external or domestic, 
accommodation through · a realignment may require lower costs of 
adjustment than the alternate way of a necessarily more protracted 
realignment in the national price level, with its associated output 
costs. If European governments anticipated that such 
differentiated shocks were likely to emerge in the future, they 
would be taking a serious risk by accepting a commitment in the 
strongest form, i.e. by joining a single currency area. Although 
there are important differences in the industrial structure across 
member states, these shocks tend to be cancelled out as most 
economies are based on a number of different sectors. Even if this 
recognition is widely shared, they suggest that governments are 
correct in perceiving that their ability to conduct stabilisation 
policies is further restrained by undertaking exchange-rate 
commitments that go beyond those in the present EMS. 
Then they question if this cost will be offset by benefits: 
The EMS experience suggests that this is the case. 
Governments that wish to retain the freedom to 
realign pay a price. Agents in the national 
markets for goods, labour and financial assets 
will assume that the freedom of manoeuvre will 
eventually be used. They will tend to settle 
down to a more rapid rate of increase of prices 
and wages than if the exchange rate were 
definitively removed as an instrument. They will 
add a risk premium to the required return on 
assets denominated in the domestic currency. If 
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the exchange rate in fact remains fixed, there 
will be temporarily higher inflation and lower 
output than in the case of a definitive 
commitment. If the currency is devalued, the 
critical perceptions of private agents will have 
been borne out and a non-inflationary reputation 
will be much harder to build up in the future. 
(Gros and Thygesen, 1990) 
And they conclude by stressing that the success in converging 
inflationary expectations and interest rates will depend crucially 
upon the extent to which firms, households, labour unions and 
financial market participants can be convinced that the exchange-
rate commitment will not be withdrawn, in other words "there is no 
substitute for complete EMU and single currency in this respect." 
9.1 Evaluation of the Costs of Fixing Exchange Rates/Adjustment 
without Exchange Rate Changes 
According to the Commission's recent paper,"One Market, One 
Money" (1990): 
1. The main cost of the EMU is the loss of the national monetary 
and exchange rate instrument, but this cost should not be 
exaggerated since changes will remain possible for the 
Community as a whole in relation to the rest of the world. 
2. Changes in real exchange rates (competitiveness) remain 
possible and desirable within EMU, "This is why wage and 
price flexibility is a necessary condition of success." 
3. EMU will reduce the incidence of those country-specific 
shocks that warrant real exchange rate changes as a result of 
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changes in industrial structure and wage bargaining. Also 
and shocks resulting from exchange rate instability 
uncoordinated monetary policies will be eliminated, and so 
the variability of output and inflation will be reduced. 
4. Financial flows will be available to absorb economic shocks 
and national and Community budgets will also help absorb 
shocks. 
Both exchange rates and monetary policies can be seen as 
shock absorbers. Their use can mirror the structural differences 
between economies, both in absolute advantages arising from 
natural endowments like oil reserves - and in wage and price 
behaviour, which may take some time to remove. 
Barrell(1990) suggests that the unified market does not mean 
the loss of the control of monetary policy. Policy makers can 
still choose the inflation rate that they see as desirable and they 
have to accept the exchange rate consequences. In the case of 
accepting the effects of an inflationary shock, the costs to each 
country will vary depending on differences in the speed of response. 
In his analysis based on GEM - National Institute's world model 
(1990), Barrell argues that there are currently large differences in 
structure among European economies, in particular in relation to the 
speed of response of prices to shocks and in the degree of impact of 
overseas prices on the domestic price level. In particular Italy 
and the UK react more rapidly to inflationary shocks than France and 
Germany do. Given, also, that they have higher inflation rates, 
Barrell (1990) envisages that the union will impose progressively 
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greater effects on output and prices in order to remove these 
differences. 
In his synthetic monetary union Barrell (1990, Table 6) shows 
that it is relatively costless to unite France and Germany over the 
period of 1991 quarter 1 and 1999 quarter 4 assuming that the 
Bundesbank's policy is adopted by the ESCB with negligible inflation 
being a major policy target. The slightly tighter fiscal stance in 
France lowers the level of output and in the transition to inflation 
convergence there is a loss of competitiveness against Germany. 
The process of adaptation is more costly for the UK in terms of lost 
output, and even more costly for the Italian economy (however, 
Barrell (1990) points out that, over the period of 1980-1988, the 
fall in inflation differential through the ERM operation cost 
700,000 jobs in France and almost 1 million in Italy). He assumes 
that in order to lower inflation and to keep it within certain 
bounds in the long run Italian growth would have to be held 0.75 per 
cent below capacity for some years. This, obviously , represents a 
very high price to pay in order to get inflation down to German 
levels, rather than keeping it 1\ to 2 per cent higher. 
In his simulation models on the effect of an external shock, 
here it is an oil price shock, Barrell (1990, Tables 7 and 8) finds 
that abandoning the exchange rate as a shock absorber in a monetary 
union could lead to worse consequences in response to shocks than 
there would be without a union. In the light of his findings, he 
strongly stresses that only a serious attempt to understand and then 
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reduce the structural differences would allow the economies of 
Europe to reduce the costs of abandoning independent shock 
absorbers. 
In a similar study, Patrick Minford and Anupam Rastogi (1990) 
(Liverpool Research Group working paper) suggest that the EC is 
handicapped as an optimum currency area because of the absence of 
labour mobility and the existence of large structural differences 
between members. As an outcome of their simulations of Liverpool 
models, they claim that the UK would be better off outside the EMU 
than being inside it by reasons of losses in output and employment, 
resulting from tightening the fiscal and monetary policies 
throughout the Community. 
Daniel Gras and Niels Thygesen (1990) question the argument 
that the joint monetary policy pursued by the ESCB could be expected 
to be less inflationary than the average performance of the 
participants in a decentralised framework. To this end, they, in 
line with Delors' proposals, suggest that two prerequisites should 
be given. The first is to grant the ESCB a statutory mandate to aim 
at price stability. In this case, access to direct central bank 
credit and other forms of monetary financing for national government 
deficits is to be excluded, except for open market operations in 
government securities at the discretion of the ESCB. Decisions 
related to intervention in third currencies would be made on the 
sole responsibility of the ESCB, in accordance with Community 
exchange-rate policy. The second is to assure the independence of 
the ESCB from the instructions from national governments and the 
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Table 6 Effects of the Uniona 
Year Balance ofd 
payments 
3-month US dollar 
Germany 
1 -0.1 
2 0.2 
3 0.4 
4 0.5 
5 0.6 
6 0.6 
7 0.8 
8 0.9 
France 
1 -0.3 
2 -0.3 
3 -0.4 
4 -0.5 
5 -0.6 
6 -0.7 
7 -0.8 
8 -0.9 
Italy 
1 -0.4 
2 -0.5 
3 -1.4 
4 -2.0 
5 -3.2 
6 -4.2 
7 -4.8 
8 -5.6 
UK 
1 -0.4 
2 -0.3 
3 -0.3 
4 -0.8 
5 -0.7 
6 -1.2 
7 -1.0 
8 -1.4 
0.0 
0.1 
0.1 
0.2 
0.2 
0.2 
0.2 
0.3 
-0.1 
-0.2 
-0.4 
-0.6 
-0.8 
-1.0 
-1.3 
-1.6 
-0.2 
-0.4 
-0.8 
-1.2 
-1.6 
-2.1 
-2.3 
-2.7 
-0.1 
-0.5 
-1.0 
-1.3 
-1.5 
-1.6 
-1.7 
-1.6 
-1.6 
-1.7 
-2.7 
-3.4 
-4.6 
-5.4 
-5.6 
-7.0 
2.4 
1.7 
1.3 
1.0 
0.1 
-0.9 
-2.2 
-4.2 
2.9 
-0.5 
2.9 
-2.0 
4.3 
-1.2 
-5.0 
-8.6 
3.3 
0.1 
-4.0 
0.5 
-3.8 
3.0 
-1.5 
8.6 
interest 
ratee 
Notes:a) Difference from base b)In percentage terms 
c) Rate of change d) In US dollar billion 
e) Percentage points 
Source: R. Barrell (1990) "European Currency Union and the EMS" 
National Institute Economic Review, May 1990,p.62. 
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exchange 
ratec 
0.0 
0.0 
0.1 
0.1 
0.2 
0.2 
0.2 
0.2 
-1.0 
-1.0 
-1.0 
-1.0 
-1.0 
-1.0 
-1.0 
-1.0 
-1.9 
-1.7 
-1.7 
-1.7 
-1.7 
-1.7 
-1.7 
-1.7 
-3.0 
-2.5 
-2.0 
-2.0 
-2.0 
-2.0 
-2.0 
-2.0 
0.0 
0.0 
-0.1 
-0.1 
-0.2 
-0.2 
-0.2 
-0.2 
+1.0 
+1.0 
+1.0 
+1.0 
+1.0 
+1.0 
+1.0 
+1.0 
+1.9 
+1. 7 
+1. 7 
+1. 7 
+1. 7 
+1. 7 
+1. 7 
+1. 7 
+3.0 
+2.5 
+2.0 
+2.0 
+2.0 
+2.0 
+2.0 
+2.0 
Table 7 Shocks with a Monetar~ Union: Oil Price Risea 
Year GDPb Domestic Unemploy CEDe Balance 
demandb mente of paa-
ments 
Germany 
1 0.3 0.0 -0.1 0.6 -9.0 
2 0.7 0.1 -0.2 0.6 -8.4 
3 0.9 0.2 -0.3 0.4 -2.8 
4 0.9 0.1 -0.4 0.3 0.4 
5 1.0 0.0 -0.5 0.4 -0.9 
6 1.1 -0.1 -0.6 0.4 -3.2 
France 
1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.9 -9.4 
2 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 1.1 -7.5 
3 -0.1 -0.5 0.0 1.0 -4.4 
4 -0.1 -0.6 0.0 1.0 -2.9 
5 -0.2 -0.6 0.0 1.0 -3.3 
6 -0.2 -0.7 0.0 1.2 -3.3 
Italy 
1 0.1 -0.4 0.0 0.6 -8.9 
2 0.3 -0.2 0.0 1.1 -7.4 
3 0.4 -0.5 -0.1 0.9 -4.0 
4 0.3 0.6 -0.1 0.7 -3.7 
5 -0.2 -0.6 -0.1 0.6 -4.0 
6 -0.2 -0.7 -0.1 0.7 -5.8 
UK 
1 0.2 -0.1 -0.0 0.4 -1.0 
2 0.5 -0.6 -0.1 1.7 5.5 
3 0.4 -1.0 -0.1 1.8 14.4 
4 0.1 -1.4 -0.1 1.4 20.2 
5 -0.2 -1.7 -0.0 0.9 22.9 
6 -0.2 -2.0 0.0 0.5 26.4 
Notes: a) Difference from base b) In percentage terms 
c) Rate of change d) In US dollar billion 
e) Percentage points 
Dollar rate and interest rate figures for France,Italy and the UK 
are the same as those for Germany. 
Source: ibidem,p.63. 
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Dollar 3-month 
ratec intereste 
0.6 0.3 
2.5 0.6 
0.0 0.4 
-2.2 0.3 
-1.9 0.3 
-0.4 0.4 
Table 8 Shocks Without a Monetary Union: Oil Price Risea 
Year GDPb Domestic Unemploy CEDe Balance Dollar 3-month 
demandb mente of paa- ratec interest 
ments ratee 
Germany 
1 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.6 -8.2 0.6 0.3 
2 0.6 0.1 -0.2 0.5 -7.2 2.5 0.6 
3 0.7 0.1 -0.3 0.3 -1.3 0.0 0.4 
4 0.6 -0.1 -0.3 0.2 1.8 -2.2 0.3 
5 0.6 -0.2 -0.4 0.3 0.5 -1.9 0.3 
6 0.6 -0.2 -0.4 0.3 -2.4 -0.4 0.3 
France 
1 0.1 -0.1 0.0 1.1 -11.5 5.6 0.4 
2 0.2 -0.3 0.0 1.6 -8.9 8.2 1.2 
3 0.3 -0.6 0.0 1.6 -2.8 4.3 1.5 
4 0.0 -0.9 0.0 1.5 1.3 2.9 1.6 
5 -0.2 -1.2 0.0 1.7 2.5 3.9 1.7 
6 -0.4 -1.5 0.0 1.8 4.3 5.2 1.9 
Italy 
1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.6 -9.9 4.2 0.3 
2 0.7 -0.1 -0.1 1.5 -8.6 7.0 1.0 
3 1.0 -0.5 -0.2 1.5 -3.0 5.7 1.4 
4 1.1 -1.0 -0.4 1.4 0.0 6.9 1.4 
5 1.2 -1.2 -0.4 1.5 3.0 8.7 1.4 
6 1.1 -1.6 -0.4 1.5 6.6 9.8 1.5 
UK 
1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.4 -0.8 1.5 0.0 
2 0.3 -0.6 -0.1 1.5 7.5 -0.9 1.5 
3 0.0 -1.0 -0.1 0.9 12.9 -2.9 1.0 
4 -0.2 -1.4 0.0 0.7 18.0 -4.9 1.0 
5 -0.4 -1.5 0.0 0.0 19.2 -3.8 1.0 
6 -0.2 -1.6 0.1 -0.1 19.6 -1.5 1.0 
Notes: 
a) Difference from base b) In percentage terms 
c) Rate of change d) In US dollar billion 
e) Percentage points 
Source: ibidem 
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Community authorities. In supporting this second case, they claim 
that an independent central bank does not face the "temptation" to 
create surprise inflation or lower the real value of public debt. 
They illustrate the idea by emphasising the consequences of much of 
the empirical works on the impact of various dimensions of central 
bank independence, displaying that there is a link between political 
independence and low inflation (Alesina, 1989). 
10. CONCLUSION 
It is quite clear that besides large gains to be obtained from 
a monetary union there is also a strong case for substantial costs 
to occur, especially (and more heavily) in the weaker countries. 
In this context it is essential for the fulfilment of economic 
convergence of the European economies to pursue a sound and just 
regional policy and fiscal policy coordination throughout the 
Community. 
On the other hand, monetary convergence does not occur unless a 
strong commitment is made to the ultimate objective of fixing 
exchange rates and having a single currency and institutions that 
will ensure the credibility and surveillance of the system. That 
is why an accelerated move toward the EMU is likely to be more 
successful. 
In addition, events like the linking of the currencies of 
Austria, Norway and - informally - Switzerland, to the D-Mark 
84 
without being members of the Community strengthen the view that 
policy makers have lost faith in exchange rates as a tool of 
economic management and inflation is not, any more, regarded as an 
alternative to unemployment by some countries - bringing about a 
stronger case for the EMS than it was a few years ago. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted here that the German economy 
is in trouble. It is the rapid rise in broad money supply which 
left, according to the Bundesbank's latest report, an excessive 
money growth of about 5 per cent for the year January 1990 (Norman, 
1990). This would inevitably call for a substantial increase in 
German interest rates as well as the inflation rate, making, 
probably, monetary convergence among the ERM participants somewhat 
easier. 
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a) a timely realignment 
exchange rate 
f//77J bands 
e = exchange rate. 
R = date of realignment. 
t = time. 
Figure 44 Exchange-rate Realignments 
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CHAPTER III 
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROBLEMS OF THE 
RECENTLY JOINED MEMBER COUNTRIES 
(SPAIN. PORTUGAL AND GREECE) 
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INTRODUCTION 
This chapter deals with structural consequences of a customs 
union on participating countries in general, and on the poorer and 
most recently joined Mediterranean countries in the EC in 
particular. However, it is felt obliged, here, to point to the 
lack of up-to-date study on the difficulties which new member 
countries have been facing following their accession to the EC. 
1. TARIFF CHANGES AND ADJUSTMENT 
Removal of the tariffs and other barriers on trade between 
the member countries of a customs union leads to an increase in the 
amount of trade. According to the customs union theory there are 
two sources of this increased trade; "trade creation" and "trade 
diversion". If the common external tariff (GET) - the alignment of 
national tariffs on trade with the non-union countries - results in 
a reduction in duties, external trade creation may be expected, that 
is lower-cost non-union production replaces higher-cost domestic 
production in the union market. On the contrary, an increase in 
duties may lead to "trade suppression" as higher-cost union 
production displaces lower-cost non-union supplies because of the 
discriminatory impact of the CET. 
"Trade diversion" has no direct consequence, initially not 
involving a change in the amount of domestic production and no 
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movement of resources is required. There might be an indirect 
effect if, for example, a country from whom imports are reduced 
takes retaliatory action against the home country. 
The main source of adjustment problems that newly 
participating member countries will face is "trade creation", where 
resources are displaced from domestic production and may become 
temporarily unemployed as a result of increased import penetration. 
This will be particularly likely if the resources are highly 
specific to a particular industry, if the industry is regionally 
concentrated (like Spain, Italy), if factor markets are not 
flexible, and if economic growth is slow (Greece). Redeployment of 
resources will be costly for those involved in terms of temporary 
loss of earnings, relocation, job search and retraining expenses 
(Greenaway and Milner, 1986). 
"Trade creation" takes a number of forms with differing 
adjustment implications; inter-industry trade creation entails the 
closure in whole or part of the industry in one member country and 
the corresponding expansion of industry in a partner country. The 
structure of industry in the two countries becomes more divergent. 
"Intra-industry trade creation" involves a two-way expansion of 
trade in a particular product as the national industries concentrate 
on a narrower, but more complementary product range. Two analyses 
suggest that labour adjustment problems may be less acute with 
intra-industry than with inter-industry trade creation. Firstly, a 
group or package of job skills may be more easily transferable where. 
a job change occurs within the same industry than where there is a 
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change of industry. Secondly, to the extent that industries tend 
to be geographically concentrated, a job change is less likely to 
involve relocation when there is intra-industry trade creation than 
when trade creation is inter-industry. 
On the other hand, the effect which customs union formation 
may have on the growth rate is important because workers who were 
displaced through greater competition from imports will be more 
likely to find alternative employment speedily if the economy is 
growing rapidly than if entry to a customs union is accompanied by 
economic stagnation or contraction. 
2. STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PATHS FOR THE LEAST DEVELOPED MEMBER 
STATES OF THE COMMUNITY 
2.1 Inter-industry scenario 
In this scenario, the removal of non-tariff barriers allows 
the southern countries to increase the level of their Community 
exports of those products in which they currently have a comparative 
advantage, i.e. labour-intensive sectors such as clothing and 
footwear, resulting in an increase in the level of inter-industry 
specialisation of these countries (namely, Spain, Greece and 
Portugal). This process would be reinforced by relocation of some 
manufacturing investment away from the north towards the southern 
countries. Surveys of European companies have demonstrated that 
such relocation would only affect a limited number of sectors but 
that they would be particularly relevant for traditional industries 
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where labour costs account for a large proportion of 
production costs (IFO survey of German firms). 
total 
Another policy open to the concerned Member States under this 
scenario consists of increasing product quality in traditional 
sectors (upgrading). Italian success in the footwear and quality 
clothing industries indicates this development route. Similarly, 
in Portugal and Spain, a modernisation of traditional industries 
such as footwear and clothing can be observed. The purpose of this 
strategy is to develop "non-cost" competitive factors such as 
quality, design and brands and to produce more sophisticated 
products in order to compete with producers from less-developed 
countries. It will also require a fostering of management skills, 
improving professional training and the modernisation of productive 
capital. 
2.2 Intra-industry scenario 
Under the second scenario, it is assumed that the southern 
members will progressively transform their current industrial 
specialisation patterns by seeking to strengthen their position in 
high-tech industries where higher rates of demand growth can be 
expected. Thus, there would be a reduction in inter-industry 
specialisation in the southern members for those sectors where they 
have comparative advantages and an improvement of their performances 
in sectors where they have traditionally been net importers. This 
dual evolution would correspond with an increase in their level of 
intra-industry trade with the rest of the Community. 
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The relocation of EC investment can encourage this 
restructuring process by introducing more modern production 
processes and by contributing to the increased specialisation of 
these countries on proper markets with higher technological content. 
As to trade diversion, in the importing country this would 
affect trade policy formation to the extent that there are potential 
reciprocity/retaliation effects. The importing country might be 
concerned that a contraction of imports from a traditional supplier 
could affect exports to that country because of commercial policy 
retaliation or balance of payments effects. 
3. SPAIN'S ACCESSION TO THE EC 
In the case of Spain, the economic reform programme of the 
early 1980s which set the basis for an acceleration of national 
economic growth, together with the fall in the oil price which 
coincided with the entry of Spain to the EC, played an important 
role in moderating the adjustment problems of EC membership for 
Spain. "Dynamic" effects from customs union formation mainly 
include encouraged investment effects and economies of scale 
resulting from the enlarged market and increased 
(Marques Mendez, 1987). 
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competition 
3.1 Manufacturing industry 
A history of heavy protection has left Spain with an economy 
which was the least open to industrial trade of any EC member 
country in the first half of the 1980s; with its imports of 
manufactured goods amounting to only 11.0 per cent of the GDP, the 
next lowest country being Italy with 14.4 per cent. The relatively 
closed nature of the economy was reflected also in the low level of 
industrial exports, totalling 10.9 per cent of GDP against the EC 
average of 21.7 per cent (R.C. Hine, 1989). 
The future expansion of EC-Spain trade in manufactures seemed 
likely to arise mainly from trade creation rather than trade 
diversion. Any negative impact on non-EC suppliers of manufactured 
goods was to be limited for two reasons; first, the EC had, already, 
some concessions in the Spanish market under the 1970 agreement, so 
the removal of tariffs on EC exports would have a lesser impact. 
Secondly, Spain's tariff on non-EC imports had to be aligned with 
the much lower "Common Customs Tariff" rendering the Spanish market 
more accessible to non-EC countries. The total reduction in the 
nominal tariff facing EC and non-EC suppliers was similar - almost 
10 per cent - with marked variation between products. On the other 
hand, the EC's Value Added Tax (VAT) replaced Spain's cascade type 
tax which gave rise to over-generous discount of taxes on exports 
in fact an export subsidy - and this change could have negative 
effects on Spanish exports. 
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The scope for trade creation in industrial products stems not 
just from the high level of protection in Spain prior to EC entry 
(Table 9), but also from the general similarity of the structure of 
industry in Spain and the EC. The result obtained from data (UN 
1983, Commodity Trade of Spain) on the share of gross value added 
(GVA) at factor cost - as a measure of the size of a particular 
industry in each of 82 industries calculated for France, 
W.Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK in 1983 showed that the patterns 
of industrial specialisation in Spain and three of its four 
principal EC partners widely resemble each other. However, the 
bilateral comparisons for Germany implied that Spain was further 
away from the German norm than France, Italy or the UK (Eurostat, 
1989). On the other hand, the trade data, between Spain and the 
Ten, demonstrate that shortly before joining the Community over 45 
per cent of Spain's trade in manufactured goods with the EC was 
accounted for by the two-way exchange of items in the same three-
digit SITC group with individual EC members. Thus, the trade data 
based on shares of GVA in the period 1975-83 3 , reinforced the 
evidence obtained from the industry surveys that the pattern of 
specialisation in Spain and the other EC members (except Portugal) 
was largely similar, meeting Grubel and Lloyd's 4 requirement for a 
trade-creating customs union. 
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Table 9 Customs Union Enlargement and Adjustment 
Average Nominal Customs Duties on Industrial Products, EC and Spain, 
1985 
Chapters Spanish Imports EC Imports 
from from 
Third EC Spain Third 
Countries Countries 
26 Ores 0.30 3.70 0.00 0.00 
25 Minerals 3.37 2.28 0.33 0.87 
47 Wood pulp 4.32 2.13 0.11 0.28 
27 Petroleum 6. 72 3.94 1.19 2.97 
31 Fertilizers 9.15 7.97 1.87 4.67 
49 Books 9.62 7.38 1.08 2.69 
29 Organic chemicals 10.65 7.96 3.08 7.70 
33 Essential oils 11.56 8.60 2.13 5.32 
57 Other fibres 12.15 5.31 1.90 4.76 
28 Inorganic 12.76 9.57 2.57 6.42 
chemicals 
73 Iron and steel 12.80 11.70 4.87 4.92 
products 
30 Pharmaceuticals 13.25 12.00 2.59 6.47 
38 Other chemicals 13.40 10.04 2.49 6.22 
52 Metal articles 13.47 5.38 2.10 5.25 
48 Paper 14.28 14.24 3.34 8.36 
37 Photographic 14.71 13.28 1.63 4.08 
products 
90 Instruments 14.83 11.13 2.36 5.94 
32 Dyes 14.88 11.13 2.36 5.91 
84 Machinery 14.95 11.92 1.58 3.96 
50 Silk 16.00 12.07 1.64 4.11 
40 Rubber 16.65 11.74 1.33 3.32 
39 Plastics 17.92 13.37 3.37 8.42 
36 Explosives 18.42 12.66 4.75 6.88 
35 Glues 18.65 14.73 3.64 9.10 
34 Soap/detergents 18.66 13.29 2.38 5.96 
59 Rope and twine 18.92 17.04 2.56 6.39 
85 Electrical 19.46 16.23 2.02 5.06 
equipment 
56 Discontinuous 20.03 15.03 3.51 8. 77 
filaments 
54 Flax/linen 21.02 8.40 2.24 5.61 
62 Domestic goods 21.74 16.16 3.70 9.24 
94 Furniture 23.86 17.60 1. 70 4.25 
55 Cotton 24.75 19.12 2.35 5.88 
51 Continuous fibres 24.86 18.65 2.69 6. 72 
58 Carpets 26.60 19.80 3.22 8.06 
87 Motor vehicles 26.64 20.20 3.44 8.60 
60 Knitwear 27.06 20.44 4.70 11.74 
97 Toys 29.07 21.77 2.45 6.13 
61 Clothing 31.18 23.37 4.36 10.89 
Source: J.M. Alvarez and E. Bonet (1985) "Efectos de la Union 
Aduanera" Papeles de Economia Espanola,25,p.87. 
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However, Spain has remained relatively weak in the advanced 
technology industries, although the government has been trying to 
attract new industries like information technology. A systematic 
difference between the composition of Spanish industry and that in 
the other main EC countries can be seen clearly if, for example, 
industries are ranked according to relative wages paid. Compared 
with the four countries; for Germany, France, Italy and the UK, 
Spain had a broad concentration of GVA in the low-wage industries 
like leather and footwear (Eurostat, Structure and Activity of 
Ind.1982-83, 1987). This was also clear in the composition of 
Spain's trade with the Community. 
Industries like footwear, textiles and clothing, steel and 
shipbuilding have undergone substantial job losses since the 
beginning of the 1970s, mainly because of technological change and 
sluggish demand, but growing competition from the NICs has added to 
the adjustment pressures. Producers in the Ten initially feared 
that Spain's low wages were going to put them at a competitive 
disadvantage when the EC's trade barriers were to be lifted on 
Spanish goods. (A third of the tariff lines in footwear have 
nominal rates of duty over 20 per cent in the Common Customs Tariff 
(CCT), and two-thirds of clothing duties are 13 per cent or more 
data from 1989 - representing considerable restrictions to trade 
even with a 60 per cent preferential tariff cut). 
Before EC entry in 1986, Spain had nominal tariffs of 10-20 per 
cent for most product areas (Table 9). Effective protection was 
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enhanced in some industries by selective duty exemptions on some 
inputs and by lower duties on raw materials. Increased 
competition, thus would come from both EC and non-EC suppliers. 
For example, in textile and clothing, Spain can expect growing 
competition in low-cost products from Portugal as well as from 
countries benefiting from the EC's Generalized System of Preferences 
and the Lome Convention, which is likely to result in a negative 
impact on Spain's trade balance. On the other hand, multinational 
companies which made some two-thirds of Spain's manufactured exports 
and operating in Spain, possibly to evade the high tariff barrier, 
might tend to concentrate their resources elsewhere in Europe when 
the EC-Spain barriers were to be removed. Beside this, it should 
be added that Spain has a large number of attractions as both a 
market and production base with a well-educated labour force, and 
considerable growth potential which was averaged at 4,7 per cent 
from 1986 to 1989, compared with the EC average of 2,4 per cent for 
1990 (European Economy, 1990) . 
The loss of protection, both tariff and non-tariff, is likely 
to be quite heavy particularly in terms of an expected upsurge in 
imports and many casualties among Spain's industrial ventures. 
Given its amazing and exceptionally high unemployment rate - which 
stood at 20,4 per cent averaging from 1986-88 (Table 10) - "Spain is 
considered particularly ill-placed to suffer a rash of factory 
closures." 
97 
Table 9 Spain: Macroeconomic Performance 
1983-85 1986-88 1989 1990 1991a 1992a 
GDP growth rate 2,0 4,7 4,9 3,5 2,5 3,2 
(% change) 
Total domestic demand 0,7 7,1 7,7 5,3 3,1 3,8 
(% change) 
Employment (% change) -1,4 2,6 4,1 2,7 1,5 1,8 
Unemployment rate (%) 20,1 20,4 17,0 15,8 15,6 15,0 
Inflation (%) 10,5 6,4 6,6 6,8 6,6 5,5 
Balance of current 0,5 0,2 -2,9 -3,8 -4,0 -3,9 
account (%) of GDP) 
a Estimations 
3.2 Entry Arrangement for Manufactured Goods 
The negotiations on Spanish entry did not cause any 
significant modification of EC policies affecting industry (the 
Common Commercial Policy (CCP), competition policy, research and 
development sponsorship in advanced technology industries and 
policies for problem sectors, like steel). The main concession 
given to "sensitive industry" groups in Spain was an extended 
transition period of seven years - as a compromise against Spain's 
request for 10 years - on tariffs, coupled with a slow phase-out of 
Spain's quota restrictions in view of both the extent of dismantling 
of protection entailed, and the delay which Spain was expected to 
face before benefiting substantially from the agricultural 
arrangements. Hence, by 1 January 1993 all customs duties, quotas 
and other similar measures have been scheduled, as below, to 
disappear on EC-Spain trade (as a percentage of the base duties 
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those actually applied on 1 January 1985): 
Table 11 Tariff Schedule 
1.3.86 
1.1.87 
1.1.88 
1.1.89 
90% 
77,5% 
62,5% 
47,5% 
Source: R.C. Hine (1989), "Customs Union 
Enlargement and Adjustment: Spain's 
Accession to the EC", Journal of 
Common Market Studies,28(1). 
1.1.90 
1.1.91 
1.1.92 
1.1.93 
35% 
22,5% 
10% 
0% 
Additionally, Spain accepted to open a reduced tariff quota 
for cars for the first three years of the transition from January 
1986 to January 1989 (R.C. Hine, 1989). On intra-EC trade, quotas 
are scheduled to end on 1 January 1992, so that they would initially 
continue to restrain the increase of imports, reinforcing the effect 
of the tariff transition. On the other hand, there are tariff-free 
quotas on certain types of clothing, and monitoring of Spanish 
imports of pulp and paper, iron and steel from Portugal. 
For iron and steel products, Spain agreed in 1984 to reduce 
its annual rolled steel capacity to an amount not exceeding 18 
million tonnes at the end of a three-year restructuring programme 
which was to be carried out parallel to that in the Ten (Spain is 
the tenth largest producer of steel in the world) 7 . Meantime, 
Spain's exports had been subject to quantitative restrictions. For 
textile and clothing, a combination of administrative and quota 
controls were scheduled to apply during the transitional period. 
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With regard to the possible measures to ease the adjustment 
problems of EC entry, for industrial goods the main reliance has 
been placed on the transition period of Spain which was agreed to be 
2 years longer than the general previous enlargements. During this 
time, some safeguard measures have been provided by quotas and other 
general safeguard clauses (Article 379 of the Accession Treaty). 
Spain was also going to get financial assistance from the EC's 
structural funds, which consist of the European Regional Development 
Fund, the Social Fund and the Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee 
Fund (AGGF), even though their contribution to Spain does not appear 
to be sufficient in relation to the size of the country's adjustment 
problems. 
3.3 Agriculture 
Before 1986, Spain was entirely outside the CAP; the 1970 
trade agreement had excluded almost all agricultural products. 
Agricultural arrangements were of great importance for Spain during 
the negotiations because of the large proportion of the population 
engaged in agriculture - about 17 per cent overall and much higher 
in some of the regions in 1986 - even though farming's contribution 
to GDP was small. On the Community side, Spain's agricultural 
output was of substantial importance accounting for 16.5 per cent of 
Community's total agricultural production (except Portugal) and 
competing especially with products from the EC's Mediterranean zone, 
with its concentration of low-income farmers. 
For Spain, the CAP seems to be a process for pushing up farm 
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incomes in the short term coupled with expanding production and 
trade, especially in fruits and vegetables, wine and olive oil. It 
has been estimated that the initial application of EC support prices 
would have increased the total value of farm production in Spain by 
14.1 per cent, even assuming no change in the amount of production 
(Commission of the EC 1987). 
As to dairy products for which prices in Spain were above 
those in the Community, it has been estimated that an immediate 
application of EC prices would reduce the value of final production 
by 7.4 per cent in Galicia, in the northwestern part of the country 
where the bulk of Spain's milk production is concentrated. So, in 
the northwest where farm incomes were already very low, price 
reductions in the EC would depress them further in a region with few 
alternative job opportunities. 
Concerning olive oil and wine, the support costs in these 
sectors were likely to increase substantially with Spanish 
membership of the EC. In the case of olive oil, the opening of the 
Spanish market to substitute oils and fats could lower consumption 
of olive oil in Spain, beside providing a price incentive by the EC 
support prices. Rising support costs might lead to demands for 
further production controls in the Community, making the adjustment 
problems severe for Spain in areas where there are few alternatives 
to the cultivation of olives and wines. 
Hence, for Spain one of the main difficulties in adapting to 
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the CAP has been related to the regional diversity of its 
agriculture so that farmers in the regions adversely affected by the 
CAP can not easily switch to products in stronger demand. 
3.4 Entry Arrangements for Agricultural Goods 
In order to minimise the adverse impact of the enlargement, 
with the fear of negative effects particularly in the Ten, the EC 
agreed to avoid some adjustments by making some changes to the CAP 
prior to Spain's entry, providing additional support for producer 
groups (Commission of the EC, 1986:22). 
The EC provided for a long transitional period - 7 years in 
general - for Spanish agriculture to be gradually integrated into 
the CAP, with an immediate adoption by Spain of the CAP support 
system of border measures and intervention buying. Existing 
barriers to trade between Spain and the Ten were lifted on entry but 
the price alignment was going to be gradual. For fruit and 
vegetables, a longer - 10 years - transition period was provided, 
with an initial standstill period of 4 years to allow the basic 
mechanisms of the EC market organisations to be set up. National 
import restrictions were going to remain in force during that 
standstill period, but during the second stage there would be a 
gradual alignment on CAP. Spanish exporters were not able to sell 
to the EC below certain minimum prices before 1996. For olive oil, 
a ten-year transition period was provided with an initial standstill 
of 5 years. 
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The EC established "indicative export ceilings" allowing a 
certain steady progress regarding 
(Commission of the EC, 1986:31). 
traditional trade flows 
The EC established direct financial assistance to individual 
farmers seeking to adjust or to assist local development schemes, 
like the farm structural reform programme and special funds to the 
less favoured areas, contributing to the cost of drainage projects 
or more generally providing for some "compensatory allowances" to 
farmers usually in the form of headage payments on livestock, and 
lastly, the "integrated Mediterranean Programme" to assist regional 
development in the Southern part of the Community8 . 
Thus even though full entry into the CAP and consequently 
unprotected access to the EC market does not come, in most cases, 
until 1993 and despite major infrastructural investments lasting 
during 1988-92, the costs of the substantial adjustment procedure 
could be heavy for Spain with its relatively uncompetitive and 
higher-priced agricultural products and its many small-sized farms 
compared with the EC standard (R.C. Hine, 1989). 
As a conclusion, the entry terms for agriculture mirror 
Spain's weak bargaining position in the negotiations against the 
farmers from France, Italy and Greece - who were claimed to be most 
affected by the enlargement - so that they ruled out full access of 
Spanish agriculture to European markets until 1996. 
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3.5 Initial Outlook of the Membership 
Over the first two years of membership, the flow of foreign 
direct investment into Spain doubled, encouraged by Spain's gradual 
access to the EC market and high domestic growth prospects (Table 
12). 
Table 12 Foreign Investment in Spain by Country 1 
(Pta bn, unless otherwise indicated) 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
West Germany 18.9 20.7 26.9 28.9 104.5 
Belgium 1.0 1.6 3.4 3.9 11.5 
France 8.0 29.3 15.6 28.8 25.1 
Netherlands 16.3 10.5 18.4 20.0 30.5 
Italy 2.0 4.5 4.3 6.3 25.3 
UK 10.3 10.9 20.7 18.3 28.0 
Switzerland 35.4 14.4 22.5 21.7 21.1 
USA 42.3 18.5 35.0 62.3 32.1 
Japan 3.5 4.2 15.6 14.1 9.9 
Other 24.7 24.3 75.4 35.8 52.0 
Total of 
above 162.4 138.9 237.8 240.1 314.9 
in $mn 1,478 968 1,479 1,412 2,242 
Spain a 20.4 19.3 33.0 40.0 86.0 
Total 182.8 158.2 270.8 280.1 400.9 
NB: Data are from notifications to the Direccion General de 
Transacciones Exteriores. Since some projects are delayed, 
foreign direct investment on a cash basis shows different 
annual totals - though the difference should disappear over 
time. 
a - Capital increases or takeovers by subsidiaries of foreign 
companies established in Spain. 
Sources: Banco de Espana; Ministerio de Economia y Hacienda, 
Direccion General de Transacciones Exteriores. 
104 
1987 
26.8 
33.5 
50.1 
122.5 
67.1 
45.4 
61.0 
40.1 
33.3 
60.5 
540.3 
4,375 
187.0 
727.3 
1982-87 
Cumulative 
1982-87 
Pta bn % 
226.7 14 
54.9 3 
156.9 10 
218.2 13 
109.5 7 
133.6 8 
176.1 11 
230.3 14 
80.6 5 
272.7 17 
1634.4 100 
11,954 
385.7 24 
2020.1 124 
In manufactured goods, Spain's exports to the EC rose 
slightly while imports from the EC increased much more dramatically 
- especially in machinery and transport equipment (Table 13) - over 
the first three years (1986-89). After the rising complaints from 
Spanish industrialists about the huge import penetration to the 
country, some limits were placed on urea, as well as steel imports 
in 1986. 
Table 13 Changes in Spain's Trade by SITC Sections 1984-5 to 1988 
SITC sections Percentage change in ECU value 
1984-5 to 1988 
Change in net 
trade 1984-5 
to 1988 
(billion ECU) 
EC non-EC Total 
X M X M X M 
0,1,4 Food, +57 +245 +21 + 35 +41 + 78 0.5 
beverages 
2 Raw +64 + 5 +45 + 11 +58 5 + 0.7 
materials 
3 Mineral -58 - 26 +33 - 58 -31 - 56 + 6.2 
fuels 
5 Chemicals +61 + 79 +19 + 46 +37 + 69 1.2 
6 Manufact- +36 +128 -29 + 99 - 4 +119 3.6 
ured goods 
chiefly 
classified 
by material 
7 Machinery +58 +158 +16 +134 +45 +151 7.7 
and 
transport 
equipment 
8 Miscellan- +57 +131 +17 +105 +33 +120 1.0 
aneous 
manufactured 
articles 
5-8 Manufact-
ured goods 
Total +52 +134 - 4 +106 +24 +125 - 13.5 
X - exports; M - imports; exports f.o.b.; imports c.i.f. 
Source: Eurostat, Monthly Trade Statistics 
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Since 1984-85, Spain has switched from being a substantial 
net exporter of manufactured goods to being a net importer, bringing 
about its deteriorating effect in the trade balance in manufactures 
which accounted for 13.5 billion ECU by 1988. Relative unit labour 
costs fell in comparison with the EC average (-2.2 between 1986-88, 
-1.8 in 1989 -as percentage change). The negative impact on 
manufactured goods trade was considerably offset by increasing 
revenues from tourism and by the fall in the oil price. 
Spain's trade balance in agricultural products did not 
experience any dramatic change over the first three years of the 
membership. Imports were buoyant, growing by 245 per cent between 
1984-85 and 1988, confirming the expectations on intensification of 
trade following the EC entry. Nevertheless, imports from outside 
the Community have not declined. 
3.6 Results 
The main adjustment problem for Spain is related to 
industrial capacity in that enterprises might need more than the 7-
year transition period to adjust to external competition, as 
observed from its initial experience. 
In agriculture Spain could press for an intensification of 
support arrangements for "Mediterranean" products such as citrus 
fruit and olive oil on the basis that farmers' incomes in the south 
are below the EC average and that the allowance of support for 
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Mediterranean products is less than that for "northern" products 
like milk and beef (Tsoukalis, 1981). But this, on the other side, 
could carry some potential danger in a form that would raise the 
burden on the EC's budget leading to further demands for restraining 
the production level which would be more costly for Spain with its 
already rampant unemployment rate. Hence, if the future pattern of 
specialisation will tend to be of a more inter-industry nature, 
especially in the context of the 1993 internal market, adjustment 
problems for the new member countries are expected to be heavier. 
On the monetary side, without introducing an effective policy 
for moderating incomes, the peseta's entry in June 1989 into the 
ERM, bringing about the constraints imposed on monetary policy, 
meant that budgetary policy has to bear the brunt of the adjustment. 
The labour market still has to cope with problems of labour 
immobility (spatial and sectoral), and the relative high costs of 
redundancy and retraining which does not match the demands of 
enterprises. These rigidities partly explain the high unemployment 
rate in Spain. On the other hand, the high proportion of temporary 
jobs created in recent years could indicate a greater fragility in 
the Spanish economy. 
In response to the challenges of the internal market and the 
EMU, Spain has to foster its competitiveness, increase domestic 
saving and remain attractive to foreign capital which will ensure 
the continuation of a high rate of growth during the catching up 
process with the rest of the Community. 
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4. PORTUGAL 
Portugal joined the European Community in 1986 - in the same 
year with Spain. At the time of accession its inflation rate was 
12 per cent and unemployment rate was 8.7 per cent. In the years 
following its entry to the Community, Portugal had a higher growth 
rate than the other Community member states which was averaging at 
4.7 per cent from 1986 to 1990, aided by growing foreign investments 
and assistance provided by the EC funds. But it is still a 
relatively poor country; traditional sectors from agriculture to 
textiles are inefficient, productivity is among the lowest in the 
EC, particularly in agriculture. There are, in general, four areas 
in need of fundamental structural change: agriculture, industry, 
social welfare and education. 
Portuguese agriculture employs about 10 per cent of the 
active population with a contribution to the GDP of only 6 per cent. 
The problem in the agricultural sector stems partly from, the size 
of the farms which are divided into an excessive numbers of tiny 
plots mainly in the north, and inefficient huge cooperative farms 
mainly in the south. 
subsidies. 
Most farmers survive with the assistance of 
Portuguese manufactured goods are, generally, of lower 
quality and produced by inefficient methods which are compensated by 
the lowest labour costs in the Community, Portugal's largest market. 
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This comparative advantage is being increasingly eroded as 
competition from other EC and non-EC producers becomes more intense 
and as wages rise nearer to those in European partners. Most 
Portuguese companies are not yet prepared for the extensive 
competition after 1992, performing with old production and 
management methods and low wages. A large number of small and 
medium-size companies are likely to close because of the lack of 
capacity to modernise themselves, which will lead to enormous job 
losses. 
One of the main problems of Portugal is related to the 
educational system. Illiteracy is between 15 and 20 per cent of 
the population which is very high by EC standards. The quality of 
the labour force in Portugal is in crucial need of improvement. 
Another problem area in the Portuguese economy is the 
overwhelming weight of the state, particularly in the financial 
sector where it controls about 80 per cent of activity. 
Privatisation is the basic instrument for the government to diminish 
the burden of the State and open the economy to market forces even 
though the progress has been slow. 
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5. GREECE'S ACCESSION TO THE EC 
Greece's decision to join the EC was taken in 1961 and under 
Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome, she became an associate member of 
the EC as from 1st October 1962 after signing the relevant agreement 
in 1961. She was given a twenty-two year transitional period 
before full membership to allow time for domestic industries to be 
prepared for the competition to be faced once duties were eliminated 
or reduced to EC levels. 
H~wever, following the military coup in Greece in 1967, all 
the financial and political provisions of the associate membership 
were suspended until the restoration of its democratic rule in the 
summer of 1974. In the meantime, the tariff reduction provisions 
remained in force. By 1968 Greece had attained complete duty free 
access for all its exports to Europe. By 1977, two-thirds of the 
EC's exports to Greece were also duty free and Greece had adopted 
most of the EC policies towards third countries. 
After the restoration of democracy in 1974, the Greek 
Government signed the accession treaty in May 1979, which became 
fully effective from 1st January 1981, with a final five-year 
transition period granted up to 1986 during which time it would 
abolish the rest of the import duties on EC industrial goods. Over 
the same period Greece was to complete the adaptation of its tariffs 
towards third countries with those of the EC including those 
concerning the textile and artificial fibres agreements. Secondly, 
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a transitional period of five years was granted over the 
liberalisation of capital and investment activity with an extra two 
years added for the movement of labour. Greece was to join 
entirely the European Monetary System (EMS) by 1988 and introduce 
the VAT by 1984. Thirdly, over a flexible five to seven-year 
period Greece had to harmonise its agricultural policies and prices 
with those of the EC by ending state subsidies and by introducing 
the CAP rules (support, guaranteed prices, etc.). 
However, following full membership, Greece was left with a 
number of forthcoming risks. Firstly, on the front of industry, 
the complete removal of tariffs on industrial imports by 1986 would 
engender sudden competitive pressures on Greek industries which 
appeared to be still unready or unable to compete with their EC 
partners. Secondly, the agricultural sector, particularly meat and 
dairy production was relatively weak and would be an easy target for 
EC import. On the other hand, the expected accession of Spain and 
Portugal would put further pressures on traditional Greek 
agricultural exports such as fruit and olive oil. Thirdly, there 
was uncertainty about the net impacts of trade with the Community on 
Greece's balance of payments, after considering the trade diversion 
following the removal of tariffs and the various funds from the EC. 
Hence Greece, under the ruling Pasok Government led by A. 
Papandreou, started to impose, after pronouncement of the 1982 Greek 
memorandum agreed by the EC, additional controls on industrial 
imports from the EC over a further five year period and postponed 
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the introduction of VAT until 1986 instead of 1984. This was 
because Greece's contribution to the EC budget was to be based on 
VAT receipts and it would have made some domestically produced 
import substitutes more expensive, hence aggravating the competitive 
pressures. 
5.1 Initial Impacts of the Accession 
Although there is a lack of up-to-date information on the 
overall effects of such a radical change on the Greek economy, some 
forecasts could be drawn by looking at the initial implications 
posed during the first few years of the full membership. 
First of all, it is useful to point out the state of major 
sectors of the Greek economy at the time of the entry. Initially, 
the productivity of Greek farmers was much lower than that of their 
EC counterparts, with the average size of a Greek farm being about 8 
acres whereas it was 42 in the EC (Fagris, 1988); there was similar 
evidence in the rate of mechanisation and fertilizer use per acre. 
For peaches, citrus fruits, currants, tobacco and olive oil, which 
have been Greece's key export items, both competitive and structural 
problems were at stake. 
However, given that the majority of Greece's manufactured 
exports involve food products and textiles, these goods were likely 
to face growing competition; firstly, from the highly standardised 
and heavily advertised food products within the EC, and secondly, 
from third country imports into the EC. Similar problems face the 
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exports of yarn, garments and footwear industries 9 . 
In the case of the steel industry, Greece had to close one of 
its steel smelters as a result of the general international surplus 
of steel capacity. According to the findings of the study 
undertaken by the Institute of Economic and Industrial Research in 
Athens, the overall comparative structure of Greek industry in terms 
of the composition of industrial output was found to have certain 
similarities with the industries of other EC members, but in the 
case of productivity Greece lagged behind a number of countries by a 
factor of 30-40 per cent (Fagris, 1986). On the other hand, in 
relation to the size of the enterprises, it has been found that the 
key characteristic of Greek industries was the lack of large units -
where there was a clear correlation between the size of firms and 
their markets. In terms of specific sectors, the removal of 
tariffs was expected to be felt more on edible oils and margarine, 
flour, drinks, garments, shoes, paper products, rubber, plastics, 
glass, metal pipes, tin products, electrical motors and tools. In 
the area of common tariffs towards third countries, the most 
sensitive (exposed) sectors were canned goods, edible oils, flour, 
textiles and garments. 
As to financial inflows provided by various EC funds, during 
the years 1981-1983 Greece received from the agricultural price 
support fund of FEOGA 131.2 billion drks, excluding any sums payable 
by FEOGA for restructuring or redirecting farming activities, etc. 
The annual inflows were equal to about 11 per cent of the gross 
113 
agricultural production or about 13 per cent of value added in 
agriculture. The major part of these payments were received by the 
tobacco sector (27.4%), vegetables and fruit (25.5%), cotton (15.1%) 
and rice (12.4%). But as a result of the distribution of these 
funds, only 15 per cent of these payments went directly and 
exclusively to the actual producers of the goods 10 , increasing the 
gains available to wholesalers rather than to producers. During 
the same period (1981-83) adding net inflows from other EC funds, 
like Regional Development Fund (RDF), Social Funds (SF), etc., to 
the trade costs Greece benefited from a positive inflow, as shown in 
Table 14. 
Table 14 Net Benefits to Greece of the Application of CAP,1981-83 
(first ten months of 1983) billion drks 
1981 1982 1983 1981-83 
Trade costs -10.3 -11.4 -10.4 -32.1 
Other inflows 10.1 39.9 65.5 115.1 
Net effect - 0.2 28.5 55.1 83.0 
Source: Oikonomikos Tahydromas 7.6.84 p.25 
In the trade scenario the most striking aspect of trade 
diversion was experienced in agricultural imports, as demonstrated 
in Table 15, recording a tremendous increase by 91 per cent from the 
EC, but a decline by 50 per cent from the rest of the world (Bank of 
Greece, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Apr.1984). Hence the overall 
deficit in the agricultural trade of Greece with the EC increased, 
especially in meat and dairy products (Table 16), during the period 
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of 1981-1984. 
Table 15 Import of Industrial and Agricultural Products, 
Current Prices, 1979-1983 
(first ten months of 1983), $1ml 
Agricultural imports from: 
Year EEC 
1979 311.1 
1980 362.2 
1981 704.3 
1982 907.8 
1983 772.0 
Industrial 
Year EEC 
1979 3,247.4 
1980 3,168.9 
1981 3,313.7 
1982 3,253.1 
1983 2,583.8 
Source: Oikonomikos Tahydromos,2.2.84,p.9. 
The figures in this table exclude imports of 
fuel and vehicles. 
Rest of world 
593.7 
529.2 
266.2 
316.2 
218.5 
imports from: 
Rest of world 
1,384.4 
1,626.6 
1,450.8 
1,479.6 
1,040.9 
Although the Greek industrial sector enjoyed some protection 
until 1989, it still has a long way to go, especially in the sector 
of high technology, added to the crucial need to increase its 
competitiveness. In agriculture, adjustment requires consolidation 
of small farms into large farming units. 
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Table 16 Agricultural Trade Balance, Current Pices, Million drks, 1979-82 
Year 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
Imports 
from 
12,089.5 
EEC 
16,494.7 
37,932.1 
61,744.5 
Exports 
to 
19,416.8 
23,556.3 
29,625.6 
42,234.6 
Imports of 
animal/dairy 
products 
(% of total 
imports) 
6,479.1 
(53.5) 
9,476.3 
(57.4) 
22,238.8 
(58.6) 
40' 881.1 
(66.2) 
Rest of the World 
Imports 
from 
24,024.2 
24,420.1 
19,005.0 
24,236.5 
Exports 
to 
24,051.9 
33,951.5 
34,067.8 
42,548.4 
Source: P.Kolyris in Oikonomikos Tahydromos, 7.6.84,pp.25,26. 
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Trade Balance with 
EEC Rest of the World 
+ 7,327.3 - 27.7 
+ 7,061.6 + 9,531.4 
- 8,306.5 +15,062.8 
-19,509.9 +18,311.9 
5.2 Recent Developments in the Greek Economy 
In terms of income per head, Greece lags behind the Community 
at only 75 per cent of the average - as all of Ireland and Portugal, 
large parts of Spain and Italy, and N.Ireland. Adding to this, the 
Greek economy is in serious disequilibrium in many areas, like the 
very high rate of inflation of about 20 per cent (Graph 117a) in 
1990, compared with the EC average of 4.6 per cent - budget deficits 
at more than 18 per cent of GDP and the level of gross public debt 
approaching 90 per cent of GDP (Table 17). On the other hand, the 
immediate effect of the new economic policy which was implemented in 
May 1990, with the aim of correcting the large fiscal imbalances and 
setting the foundations for a more medium-term oriented 
restructuring of the economy, was a further worsening of most recent 
trends (slow down in output, acceleration in inflation). 
The Gulf Crisis is expected to aggravate further the 
macroeconomic situation on all fronts. In addition, during the 
period between 1985 and 1989 the volume of manufacturing investment 
fell by 18 per cent in Greece, whilst it rose by 79 per cent in 
Spain and 43 per cent in Portugal over the same period, explaining 
the relatively slow in growth of industrial production in Greece 
during 1988-89 (6%) compared to the 17 per cent increase in Spain 
and 19.5 per cent rise in Portugal. Turning back again to the 
possible effects of the Gulf Crisis, convergence with the rest of 
the Community countries is highly likely, at least in the short-term 
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Graph 117a Greece: Inflation Compared with Community Average! 
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1 Deflator of private consumption. 
2 Commission forecasts (November 1990). 
Table 17 Greece: Economic Policy Indicators 
1983-85 1986-88 1989 1990 1991 
Money growth 25.5 22.2 24.1 18.5 16.0 
(Z change) 
Short-term interest 16.4 16.9 18.7 20.0 20.5 
rate 
Long-term interest 17.5 16.6 20.6 23.5 23.0 
rate 
Competitiveness 118.5 102.4 116.4 122.9 126.5 
(1980=100) 
Budget deficit -10.7 -15.8 -18.5 -18.6 -17.1 
(Z of GDP) 
Gross public debt 53.3 72.2 85.1 89.5 94.3 
(Z of GDP) 1 
Nominal wages per 22.3 14.4 18.8 18.0 16.7 
head (Z change) 
Real wages per head 3.6 -2.3 3.8 -2.1 -1.5 
(Z change) 
1 central government. 
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1992 
13.0 
18.0 
21.2 
127.3 
-14.9 
97.4 
13.2 
1.6 
to be more difficult to attain for Greece since it is more 
vulnerable to oil price shocks than most other Community countries 
because of its high energy and oil dependence - 67 per cent in terms 
of net imports as proportion of total consumption in 1987 (although 
Spain has 61%, and for Portugal the figure is 96%) 
(Nat.Inst.Economic Review, May 1990). 
6. CONCLUSION 
All of Greece, Portugal and large parts of Spain - as well as 
Ireland, large parts of Italy, Corsica, the overseas departments of 
France and Northern Ireland - are included under the category 
defined by Objective I of the EC Structural Funds by which the sum 
available to these parts of the Community doubled in 1988 for the 
period 
Table 
1989-1993 to the amount of 38,300 million ECU, as 
18. Hence the structural funds - which consist 
shown on 
of the 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund 
(ESF), and the Guidance Section of the European Agricultural 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) - as well as the external trade 
policy of the Community can well influence the adjustment paths of 
the southern Member States. 
Continued protection vis-a-vis less developed countries could 
prompt these countries to keep a specialised inter-industry 
structure. In contrast, a greater opening up of the Community 
market would lead these countries to concentrate their 
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specialisation on growth sectors. In the short-term, the first 
scenario (inter-industry development) requires less effort and 
carries lower adjustment costs for the Southern States but in the 
longer term, it appears more reasonable to suggest that the second 
scenario, namely the intra-industry trade creation, could be more 
effective in allowing these countries to catch up, notably by 
providing for larger technological transfers as well as 
improvement in the level of investment in human capital. 
Table 18 Structural Funds Appropriations for the Period 1989-1993 
Objective Amount (Million ECU1 ) 
1. Regions lagging behind in 
development of which -
Community support frameworks 
Community initiatives 
2. Regions in industrial decline 
3 & 4. Long-term unemployment and 
vocational integration of 
young people 
5a.Adaptation of agricultural 
structures 
5b.Development of rural areas 
Transitional measures and innovation 
Total 
1At 1989 prices 
36,200 
2,100 
Source: Commission of the European Communities (1990). "The New 
Structural Policies of the EC". European File, No.7,p.10. 
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38,300 
7,205 
7,450 
3,415 
2,795 
1,150 
60,315 
an 
Notes to Chapter Three 
1. See Hine, C. Robert (1989) "Customs Union Enlargement and 
Adjustment", Journal of the Common Market Studies,Vol.28,No.1, 
pp.1-27. 
2. Data source: Eurostat, "Structure and Activity of Industry" 
various issues (Lux:CEC). The Finger-Kreinin Index was used to 
measure the similarity of industry structures: 
S(ab)={I1 minimum[x1 (a),x1 (b)]} where x1 (a) is 
share of GVA in industry in country a; see J.M.Finger and 
M.E.Kreinin (1979) "A Measure of Export Similarity and its 
Possible Uses", Economic Journal (89), Dec,pp.905-12. 
3. Source: Commodity Trade of Spain (1983) UN. 
4. Grubel and Lloyd (1975) suggest that trade creation gains from 
customs union formation stand to be greatest "the more 
competitive or similar are the lists of the member countries' 
tradable differentiated goods produced before the union and the 
more production of these differentiated goods is subject to 
economies of scale." 
5. See: European Economy, 1990, No.46,pp.49 "National Economies". 
6. The EC had pressed for a more rapid reduction in the highest 
duties but this was not accepted, except for cars. However, 
Spain by switching to VAT in 1986 had to abolish its 
compensatory levy on imports which had provided a substantial 
hidden protection (Donges and Schatz, 1985) see R.C. Hine 
1989,p.14. 
7. Source: Tsoukalis (1981) "European Community and Mediterranean 
Enlargement." p.178. 
8. The measures mentioned are financed out of the Guidance section 
of the EAGGF. However, only about 6 per cent of the EAGGF's 
expenditure is under the Guidance section. 
9. There is some evidence that the price elasticity of demand for 
exports of tobacco, electrical goods and some other industrial 
goods is less than one as well as that for all exports from 
Greece have a prime elasticity approximately equal to one. 
These estimates show that the Greek exports have to compete 
primarily via quality, standardisation and marketing rather than 
by price alone. 
10. Production subsidies were paid directly to farmers in the cases 
of wheat and edible oils. Exports, processing, and tobacco 
subsidies were paid, not to the actual farmers, but to exporters 
and middlemen and, in particular, producers of juices, tinned 
foods etc. (Source: Oikonomikos Tahydromos, 14.6.1984,p.20). 
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CHAPTER IV 
DEVELOPMENT PATH OF TURKEY IN THE 1980s 
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!.STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND STABILISATION POLICIES IN THE 1980s 
Introduction 
In January 1980, Turkey adopted a comprehensive economic 
adjustment programme whose main directions have been pursued without 
interruption for a decade, though with varying outcomes from time to 
time. Around 1986 the Turkish programme was frequently quoted as 
an example of successful structural reform in a developing economy, 
in terms of balanced and dynamic economic performance which it has 
displayed from the start in 1980. Despite a sluggish world 
conjuncture Turkish export volumes had been growing at an annual 
average rate of almost 30 per cent between 1980 and 19851 , whereas 
world trade rose only a modest 3 per cent a year. In the meantime, 
the external current account deficit, which reached 5.4 per cent of 
GNP in 1980, fell to about 2 per cent in 1985 whereas the rate of 
inflation decelerated from three-digit figures - almost 110 per cent 
to about 30 per cent in 19862 . However, from 1987 onwards, 
macroeconomic performance became more complicated as a result of 
policy-induced acceleration of domestic demand. Longer-term 
expectations for sustaining high growth became less certain in the 
presence of a highly growing external debt - which rose from $31.2bn 
at the end of 1986 to an estimated $38.3bn at the end of 1987, 
equivalent to 56.6 per cent of GNP 3 , and of persistent deficiency in 
manufacturing investment. 
Although the reform in question is not yet completed, we will 
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try to display; first, the development of the macroeconomic 
indicators over the last twenty years in the OECD area, then the 
main areas of structural reform pursued in Turkey since 1980 and the 
effects of the reform on industrial development, and finally the 
interaction between structural adjustment and stabilisation of the 
economy. 
2. STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY 
Diagram 124a compares growth rates and per capita GDP levels 
at purchasing power parities in OECD countries from 1970 to 1987. 
Throughout this period, Turkey appears as the country with the 
lowest income per capita, though its growth performance has usually 
been higher than the average. But following the first oil-price 
shock, in the second half of the 1970s, Turkey's rate of growth 
became one of the lowest in the OECD area. Whereas a number of 
OECD Member countries applied appropriate adjustment policies during 
the period in order to cope with the real income effects of the oil 
price rise, Turkish authorities continued - as has been usual, and 
also the major failure of the recent Ozal governments - expansionary 
policies which were incompatible with the changed external 
environment. The resulting shortage of domestic savings which was 
compensated by increased foreign borrowing in the Euro-markets 
imposed on Turkey a balance-of-payments crisis in 1977, when the 
foreign debt service could no longer be secured, coupled with the 
world recession. 
In January 1980, as part of the new economic policy, adoption 
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of a market-oriented approach comprising the setting of realistic 
interest rates and of a competitive exchange rate helped exports to 
rise dramatically and hence reduce the burden imposed on the economy 
by the external constraints (Diagram 126a). As can be seen from 
Diagram 126b, improvements in the external position of the economy 
in the early 1980s were combined with a decline in the share of 
gross investment in GNP, just reaching again, the levels attained in 
the mid-1970s, after 1985. However, despite the increase in 
aggregate investment, investment in manufacturing has declined 
constantly since the second half of the 1980s (Diagram 126c). As a 
result of the existence of excess physical capacity and unutilised 
productivity reserves in the early 1980s, capacity utilisation, in 
manufacturing rose by 15 points with a 2~-3 per cent growth in 
capital productivity during the period 1980-87 (OECD, 1989-1990). 
3. MAIN AREAS OF THE STRUCTURAL REFORM 
Tables 19-21 present indicators of the relative size of 
external transactions, financial markets and the public sector in 
Turkey, compared with Greece, Portugal and Spain during the period 
from 1975 to 1987. Apart from a common trend of dramatic increases 
in foreign trade for all four economies, the degree of integration 
of Turkey in international product markets is particularly 
significant by the end of the period, considering the small volume 
of its foreign trade at the beginnings of the 1980s. Table 20 
shows the structure of financial markets. There is still a large 
difference between Turkey and the other countries as indicated by 
the relatively low ratios for outstanding equities and government 
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securities to GNP in Turkey. This is not the reflection of lower 
public sector deficits, but of the large degree of monetarisation of 
the Turkish deficit. Turkey - unlike Greece, Portugal or Spain 
did not experience strong growth in the share of general government 
in GNP, although the share of publicly financed capital formation in 
total investment has been strikingly larger than in the other three 
countries. When investments of SEEs - State Economic Enterprises -
are added to those of general government, they accounted for more 
than 50 per cent of total investment in the economy in 1987 (Table 
21). 
Table 19 The Size of External Transactions 
Per cent of GDP/GNP 
Exports Imports Imports & Exports 
Turkey 
1975 9.3 14.3 23.5 
1980 10.7 16.2 26.9 
1985 25.0 26.9 52.0 
1987 24.8 26.2 50.9 
Greece 
1975 16.9 26.9 43.7 
1980 20.9 26.2 47.1 
1985 21.2 32.8 54.0 
1987 22.9 29.5 52.4 
Portugal 
1975 20.4 32.8 53.2 
1980 27.4 42.0 69.4 
1985 37.3 41.4 78.7 
1987 34.2 40.0 74.2 
Spain 
1975 13.6 17.3 31.0 
1980 15.8 18.1 34.0 
1985 23.4 21.2 44.6 
1987 19.7 19.5 39.2 
Source: OECD, Trade Statistics 
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Table 20 The Size of the Financial Sector 
Per cent of GDP/GNP 
Claims on the Government Private debt Equities Total 
banking system securities instruments 
Turkey 
1975 30.5 8.0 0.6 1.1 40.2 
1980 24.2 3.5 0.6 1.0 29.3 
1985 35.8 6.0 0.3 1.6 43.7 
1987 40.0 9.0 0.5 1.2 50.8 
Portugal 
1975 91.1 29.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1980 108.5 28.7 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1985 118.5 39.7 2.7 n.a. n.a. 
1987 106.6 56.6 5.1 39.72 208.0 
Spain 
87.91 1975 8.0 3.1 5.4 104.4 
1980 82.5 8.8 6.7 11.2 109.2 
1985 79.4 29.9 4.2 24.5 137.9 
1987 62.1 34.5 7.3 28.4 132.3 
1 1976 
2 Outstanding shares in the secondary market 
Source: Data submitted by national authorities 
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Table 21 The Size of the Public Sector 
Per cent of GDP/GNP unless otherwise stated 
Turkey Greece Portugal Spain 
1975 1980 1985 1987 1975 1980 1985 1987 1977 1980 1985 1987 1975 1980 1985 1987 
General Government 
Total outlays 24.6 28.5 26.7 30.7 26.7 30.5 43.7 42.9 30.8 33.8 42.7 46.2 22.8 32.6 41.5 40.4 
Current receipts 25.7 25.1 24.7 26.2 27.4 30.4 34.6 37.2 30.5 31.4 36.0 35.8 24.8 30.0 34.5 35.8 
Balance 1.1 -3.4 -2.0 -4.5 0.7 -0.1 -9.1 -5.7 -0.3 -2.4 -6.7 -10.4 2.0 -2.6 -7.0 -3.6 
Share in total 25.2 29.3 27.3 30.0 13.6 10.5 23.5 18.7 11.3 14.4 14.2 10.7 9.9 8.2 18.9 17.2 
investment 
Share in total 8.4 10.0 9.9 9.3 8.2 8.9 9.9 10.1 9.3 10.7 13.2 13.8 7.7 10.5 13.4 13.8 
employment 
State economic 
enterprises1 
Value added 8.6 8. 8 11. 7 11. 3 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 10.0 13.0 17.6 14.3 n.a. 9.0214.0 n.a. 
Share in total 23.6 27.4 30.9 23.7 n.a. 12.7 19.0 11.7 20.0 18.3 17.0 13.8 n.a. 22.02 21.0 n.a. 
investment 
Share in total 3.9 4.5 5.2 5.5 n.a. 3.5 4.5 n.a. 4.5 5.2 4.7 4.4 n.a. 5.026.0 n.a. 
employment 
1 Figures for Spain represent shares in non-agricultural value added, investment and employment. 
2 1982. 
Source: Data submitted by national authorities. 
-132-
3.1 Trade Reform 
Two principal features of the Turkish structural reform 
programme, which was initially introduced by the Demirel Government 
in January 1980, but pursued with more momentum by Ozal governments 
since the collapse of military rule from September 1980 to the 
resumed democratic elections of December 1983, have been trade 
liberalisation and export promotion. In 1980, the Turkish lira was 
devalued by 33 per cent, many quotas on imports were replaced by 
tariffs, and substantial tax rebates were granted for exporters. 
In the period from 1980 to 1984, quotas were almost completely 
abandoned and replaced by tariffs, and export subsidies were 
increased in order to offset the bias against export activity 
incited by import restrictions. From May 1981 onwards, the Turkish 
authorities proceeded to daily adjustment of the nominal exchange 
rate, which consequently led to gradual depreciation of the real 
effective exchange rate averaging 6 per cent a year in the period 
1982-87. 
In 1984, export subsidies were cut back, and Turkey began to 
rely more on exchange-rate policy for trade promotion. However, 
there was a serious setback to exports in 1986, mainly caused by the 
real appreciation of Turkish lira when the authorities intervened to 
control the degree of nominal depreciation in the national currency. 
The fall in exports prompted the first Ozal Government to 
reintroduce export tax rebates which progressively drove exporters 
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to the abuse of export incentives through over-invoicing, or 
"fictitious exports" in the following years. Hence, in 1989 export 
tax rebates have been gradually withdrawn and replaced by 
preferential credits to exporters via the newly established 
Eximbank, together with tighter controls over the allocation of 
credits. Later in 1989, many tariffs on imports of industrial 
supplies and finished products were reduced. 
In August 1988, a system of partial market setting of the 
official exchange rate was introduced, basically making the exchange 
rate freely negotiable between authorised parties for transactions 
above a minimum margin - above $50,000 in 1988. Moreover, since 
January 1989, commercial banks have been given authority for 
engaging in overseas trading of Turkish lira in selected countries. 
However, the partial freeing of the exchange rate has again been 
associated with a slowdown of devaluation of the Turkish lira, 
caused by mainly strong inflows of foreign exchange through growing 
tourism revenues. The real appreciation was one of the elements 
which caused growth rate of exports to reduce substantially, apart 
from the other factors such as the decline in demand from Middle 
East countries. 
Especially in the last half of the 1980s, the reduction or 
dismantling of commodity-specific tariffs was associated with the 
simultaneous introduction of special levies for the benefit of 
various Funds for the subsidising of exports and various social 
expenditures. Although this has contributed to reducing diffusion 
of nominal and effective protection across industries, the level of 
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nominal protection is still high in Turkey which taxes exports with 
higher input prices as well as compelling the Government to allocate 
various heavy subsidies to exporters (Table 22). 
Table 22 The Structure of Nominal Protection 
Per cent 
Taxes 
Customs duty 
Municipality tax2 
Stamp dut! 
Wharf tax 
Production tax 
Value-added tax 
Surcharges 
Housing fund 
Support and price stabilisation fund 
Resource utilisation support fund4 
Infrastructure fund 
1. Commodity specific. 
2. Per cent of the applicable custom duty. 
1983 
c.s. 
15 
1 
5 
c.s. 
c.s. 
3. Per cent of the sum of the cif value, custom duty, municipal 
tax and customs clearing expense. 
4. On imports with acceptance credits or against goods. 
5. Raised from 4 to 8 per cent in August 1988. 
Source: Data submitted by the Turkish authorities. 
1 
1988 
c.s. 1 
15 
10 
5 
c.s. 
c.s. 
85 
6 
c.s. 1 
1989 
15 
10 
5 
c.s. 
c.s. 
10 
6 
4 
On the other hand, unlike other developing countries such as 
Taiwan and Korea (Table 23), Turkey has not yet succeeded in 
diversifying its exports over a wider range of products that, 
according to standard measures, have a relatively high labour 
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Table 23 Trends in Trade of Labour-Intensive Manufactures to 
Industrialised Countries 
Per cent 
Share of labour-intensive 
manufactured exports in 
total non-fuel exports 
1965 
Taiwan 45.5 
Korea 51.1 
All develop- 16.0 
ing countries 
Turkey 8.7 
Greece 29.0 
Portugal 66.1 
Spain 23.4 
1975 
78.9 
79.2 
33.7 
26.8 
47.2 
63.1 
41.9 
1985 
85.6 
78.7 
52.8 
51.5 
52.9 
66.7 
38.7 
1986 
85.0 
78.2 
55.2 
57.6 
55.6 
69.0 
39.2 
Share of textile and 
clothing in labour-
intensive manufacturers 
exports 
1965 
13.4 
19.3 
17.8 
1.5 
5.6 
16.5 
8.5 
1975 
28.0 
35.8 
28.2 
4.1 
26.7 
35.6 
7.9 
1985 
15.9 
28.5 
24.1 
38.9 
35.4 
43.9 
6.2 
1986 
15.6 
26.3 
24.9 
43.7 
39.1 
44.6 
6.5 
Source: A. Yeats "Shifting Patterns of Comparative Advantage: 
Manufactured Exports of Developing Countries", World Bank 
Working Paper, No.165,1989. 
content. The overwhelming and growing importance of textile and 
clothing sector in Turkish exports is in contrast to world trade, 
where the share of these products has declined from 1975 due to the 
growing importance of other items such as electronic equipment and 
electrical machinery whose labour-intensity ratio has increased over 
time. This suggests weakness in the industrial structure and 
dramatic ineffectiveness in finance, organisation and management 
skills on the part of investments to respond to emerging 
international opportunities. Furthermore, this poor performance of 
Turkish industry has been fostered by a relatively high degree of 
protection and the absence of competition in the domestic market, as 
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well as by the modest level of foreign direct investment in the 
country despite the relatively favourable legislation and 
administrative practice in force. 
3.2 Reform in the Financial Sector 
Before the beginning of the last decade, the Turkish economy 
had all the characteristics of financial repression: intermediation 
costs were high, credit was rationed, capital markets were 
underdeveloped, and ex-post real interest rates were negative. 
Hence, initially, interest-rate ceilings on time deposits were 
abolished in July 1980, in an effort to encourage savings and 
deposits in the banking sector and facilitate channelling of 
loanable funds towards productive investments. Another objective 
of the authorities was also to reduce the degree of leverage of 
larger corporations in the private sector and to force inefficient 
firms to improve their operations. However, in the absence of 
proper supervisory control of the banking system, this led to rapid 
credit expansion at higher and higher interest rates, and ended up 
with the so-called "broker crisis" of 1982. 
The events that led to the financial crisis of 1982 appears 
to be worth recalling in order to understand better the then 
deficiencies in the government's financial policies and the 
developments that followed. When interest rates were freed in 
principle, the major banks began setting interest rates collusively. 
This caused a number of smaller banks to elude the cartel by selling 
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newly introduced financial instruments - Certificates of Deposit and 
bonds - to brokers and via these to the public, at interest rates 
two to five percentage points higher than the market rate. Coupled 
with the absence of an efficient regulatory authority, Turkish banks 
were, to a large extent, under-capitalised and therefore highly 
sensitive to default of their clients. Accordingly, when several 
larger firms were unable to discharge interest payments on their 
bonds or to their creditor banks, the system had undergone a 
liquidity crisis and bankruptcy for the brokers, together with no 
legal framework for dealing efficiently with non-performing loans. 
The cost of the rescue operation through the rapid provision of 
liquidity by the Central Bank and official arrangements to solve the 
outstanding claims on banks is estimated to have been as high as 2.5 
per cent of GNP. 
After this highly costly outcome of the faults in 
Government's financial policies, market interest rates on deposits 
were again determined by the monetary authorities, which allowed key 
deposit rates to yield a positive real return most of the time, 
manipulating the term structure of interest rates in an effort to 
dampen the dynamics of inflation. In order to strengthen the 
regulatory power of the monetary authorities, a closer scrutiny of 
the activities of the banking sector and a deposit insurance scheme 
were introduced. The banking law of 1985 introduced uniform 
accounting standards; from 1987 banks were audited externally. In 
1987, also, the Central Bank started open market operations in 
Government securities, with the initial objective of building up a 
portfolio of securities necessary for conducting these operations, 
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though they were used mainly to slow down monetary growth during the 
last quarter of the same year. Other measures undertaken were 
unification and reduction of the legal reserve and liquidity ratios, 
reduction of taxes on financial transactions, and the opening of an 
interbank money market in 1986 (OECD 1990, p.92). 
As to the steps taken towards extending the range of the 
reform to external transactions, foreign direct investments and 
domestic capital markets: firstly, foreign banks were authorised to 
open branches in Turkey; foreign exchange transactions were 
simplified and transferred from the Central Bank to commercial 
banks. Secondly, in 1984, residents were allowed to open foreign-
currency accounts with banks and make payments, cash withdrawals and 
transfers abroad. Restrictions, however, were introduced on 
commercial bank's external transactions in 1986 and early 1988 in an 
attempt to reduce speculative pressure against the Turkish lira. 
Thirdly, regulations concerning profits and capital transfers, and 
reinvestment of funds in Turkey by foreign citizens were 
substantially eased. 
in 1986. 
Finally, Istanbul Stock Exchange was reopened 
In order to strengthen further the liberalisation of capital 
movements: from July 1988, foreign investors were admitted to the 
Turkish capital market, and starting from June 1989, foreign 
investment funds were allowed to operate. 
gold market started operating in April 1989. 
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Finally, an official 
These changes had several consequences. Lowering the 
reserve requirement for domestic deposits and the changes introduced 
in the portion of government securities that could be held towards 
the liquidity requirement led to an increase in the reserve money 
multiplier which could have been compensated by lowering the 
growth in reserve money. As this was not the case, in September 
1987 only reserve requirement ratio, then in the wake of the 
instability in the financial markets at the beginning of 1988, both 
reserve and liquidity requirement ratios were further increased, 
from 10 per cent in July 1987 to 16 per cent in December 1988, and 
from 12 per cent to 27 per cent respectively (Turkish Review, Autumn 
1988). This was contrary to the medium-term objective of the 
Government which was to reduce the cost of funds to banks by 
lowering the reserve and liquidity requirements. It would also be 
essential to reduce the expansion of reserve money either by curbing 
the public sector borrowing requirement or by relatively larger 
financing via financial markets, such as open market operations. 
However, the unsophisticated nature of Turkish security 
markets has restrained the use of open market operations which 
were started by the Central Bank in February 1987, as stated above -
in conducting monetary policy. In order to increase the 
effectiveness of the Central Bank in influencing the reserve 
position of banks, a new branch of the interbank market was created 
in March 1988. The reserve ratio on foreign exchange deposits was 
also increased to 20 per cent in July 1987, with a view to 
controlling their expansionary effect on the money supply. 
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On another front, the rapid increase in government securities 
outstanding has imposed a heavy burden on the government budget. 
New stock started to be auctioned at market-determined interest 
rates in May 1985 in order to finance the excess public sector 
borrowing requirements. Furthermore, fluctuations in prices from 
one auction to another negatively affected the secondary market. 
Thus, the method of auctioning government securities was changed in 
the beginning of June 1988: the Government no longer announces the 
amounts to be sold in the auction, but only the maximum acceptable 
yield. 
The financial reform appears to have been successful in 
prompting private financial savings, as well as increasing the depth 
of financial markets. But the ultimate goal of the reform, i.e. to 
channel a greater flow of savings towards productive investment has 
still a long way to go. Because of the insistence on expansionary 
policies pursued by the ruling "Motherland Party" (ANAP) especially 
in the second half of the 1980s, a large percentage of excess 
private savings in capital and money markets has been absorbed by 
the highly expanded public sector borrowing requirements, curbing 
the way for these savings to be used in more productive investments 
undertaken by the private sector. 
Table 24, displays the changes in the composition of 
financial assets. First, and quite naturally, the rise in interest 
rates generated a major shift from cash to time deposits, indicating 
the responsiveness of the market to yield differentials in favour of 
the rentier class and big industrialist groups who own most of the 
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private banks 4 . 
Table 24 The Comnosition of the Stock of Financial Assets 
Per cent of total 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Banking sector 82.5 85.8 86.7 84.5 82.8 81.9 81.3 78.7 
Currency 16.7 11.2 11.3 11.6 9.7 8.3 7.8 7.7 
Sight 37.4 27.7 25.4 29.5 20.0 18.1 19.8 20.2 
deposits 
Time deposits 13.7 26.7 33.1 28.4 38.6 40.6 36.5 27.8 
Official 14.6 20.2 16.9 14.6 10.0 8.6 8.1 9.3 
deposits 
Foreign 0.5 4.5 6.3 9.1 13.7 
exchange 
deposits by 
residents 
Government 12.0 9.8 8.9 9.1 11.6 13.8 14.9 17.8 
securities 
Government 8.6 6.5 5.3 7.6 7.0 8.5 8.3 8.1 
bonds 
Treasury 3.4 3.3 3.5 1.5 4.5 4.0 4.5 6.5 
bills 
Income sharing 0.1 1.2 2.1 3.2 
certificates 
Private 5.5 4.4 4.4 6.4 5.6 4.3 3.8 3.5 
securities 
Debt 2/2 1.7 1.4 1.3 0.9 0.7 0.8 1.1 
instruments 
Equities1 3.3 2.7 3.1 5.1 4.7 3.6 3.0 2.1 
Memorandum item 
Stock of 29.3 38.1 41.9 41.0 41.2 43.7 46.2 50.8 
financial 
assets/GNP 
1. Quoted at the Istanbul Stock Exchange. 
Source: Data submitted by the Turkish authorities. 
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Second, there has been a rapid rise in foreign exchange 
deposits, which is the indication of currency substitution risks to 
which countries with lax and inflationary monetary and fiscal 
policies are exposed. 
Third, the share of outstanding private bonds and equities in 
the total stock of financial assets has notably decreased between 
1980 and 1986, because they did not expand as quickly as other 
financial assets, in particular Treasury Bills and Income Sharing 
Certificates. Debt instruments and shares of the corporate sector 
have thus been by-passed by the process of financial deepening, 
whereas the reform has increased the importance of inflation guards, 
such as foreign currency holdings. 
The dominance of the banking sector in financial markets has 
been strengthened. Through the introduction of modern banking 
techniques, efficiency has increased; the quality of the personnel 
vastly improved; a new generation of young, independent and 
innovative managers have taken over; and most importantly, the 
customer has been recognised as the focal point of all activities 
(Briefing, Jan.1990). On the other hand, bank intermediation in 
Turkey is inefficient by international comparison: operating costs 
and gross earnings margins are much higher than in other OECD 
countries (Diagram 143a), and there is a large spread between 
deposit and lending rates, indicating the high costs of financial 
intermediation and lack of competition. 
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Diagram 143a Indicators of Efficiency of the Banking Sector 
Per cent of intermediated assets, 1987 
0 Turk~y 
~ Spain. Portugal. Greec~ 
II OECD rJver:Jg~ 1 
Operating costs Interest margins 
1. The OECD average has been calculated with data of the 
following countries: United States, Japan, Germany, France, 
Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Austria, Finland, Norway and 
Switzerland. 
Source: OECD Bank profitability 1988; Turkish Bankers' 
Association, Annual Reports, OECD Secretariat 
calculations. 
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Gross earnings 
Another problem concerning the high dependence of 
corporations on bank loans is the inflexibility of the liability 
structure of firms. As long as banks and private firms cannot be 
made less dependent one on another and thus less exposed to changes 
in the costs of borrowing and lending, a high interest rate level 
would continue to carry the risk of undermining the stability of the 
Turkish financial system, together with its chronically 
inflationary rate. 
high 
Some of the weaknesses of the Turkish banking sector have, 
remarkably, been reduced as a result of regulatory, as well as 
operational, developments over the last decade. There are now 
uniform accounting practice, external auditing, higher capital 
standards, introduction of the deposit insurance system, retail 
banking services and other financial alternatives such as leasing 
and factoring, and provisioning against non-performing loans. 
However, capital markets are still largely in need of further 
improvements due to the limited role of equity capital in Turkish 
corporate financing. Socio-cultural factors, like the large 
presence of family-owned firms and passive attitudes created by the 
history of easy bank lending have played a considerable role in 
discouraging the equity participation. Another factor, as stated 
before, is the high degree of interlocking between large firms and 
commercial banks. On the demand side, portfolio shifts towards the 
stock market have also been restrained by the recent strong increase 
of government debt instruments floated in the market which is at 
present heavily dominated by Treasury bills, government bonds and 
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income sharing certificates (Table 25). 
Finally, information asymmetries between managers and 
stockholders, with little emphasis on research, could be considered 
as another effective element in reducing households' incentives to 
invest in equity markets. 
Table 25 Financial Assets 1 New Issues 
Per cent of total 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Banking sector 89.3 88.8 76.9 79.9 80.6 80.1 74. 
Currency 5.3 11.3 12.6 6.6 6.0 6.7 7. 
Sight deposits 17.1 20.5 43.2 4.3 14.9 23.4 20. 
Time deposits 40.7 47.0 12.5 55.6 44.0 28.1 13. 
Foreign exchange 2.2 11.1 9.4 14.7 21. 
deposits by 
residents 
Government 7.3 6.8 10.1 15.8 17.3 17.3 22. 
securities 
Government bonds 4.1 2.9 15.2 6.09 11.0 8.0 7. 
Treasury bills 3.2 3.9 -5.1 9.4 3.3 5.5 9. 
Income sharing 0.4 3.1 3.7 5. 
certificates 
Private securities 3.3 4.4 13.0 4.4 2.1 2.7 3. 
Debt instruments 1.2 0.6 0.9 0.2 0.3 1.1 1. 
Equities1 2.1 3.8 12.1 4.1 1.8 1.6 1. 
Memorandum item 
Security issues/ 1.9 1.5 2.2 3.1 3.2 3.0 5. 
GNP 
Total new 18.2 13.3 9.3 15.5 16.4 15.3 19. 
issues/GNP 
1. Quoted at the Istanbul Stock Exchange. 
Source: Data submitted by the Turkish authorities. 
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With the words of Mr. RUstU Sara~oglu, the Governor of the 
Central Bank: 
Changes in financial markets in the past few years 
have enhanced the ability of the Central Bank to 
undertake defensive actions to offset seasonal or 
temporary shortages or surpluses of reserves and 
money supply. However, the monetary policy still 
remains very much constrained by public sector 
borrowing requirements and preferential credit 
extended through its rediscount facilities. The 
liberalization and development of financial 
markets have also made the conduct of monetary 
policy more difficult. Due to uncertainties 
created by new instruments, the measurement of 
liquidity in the system and the demand for money 
the relationship became more complex ... and 
necessitated more coordinated and consistent 
policy actions by the Central Bank. 
In the future, the proper functioning of financial 
markets will very much depend on appropriate 
policy signals and the performance of the economy, 
especially on the inflation front. These 
parameters will become all the more crucial if 
Turkish markets are to be integrated with the 
world's financial markets. 
(Sara~oglu, 1988) 
3.3 Reform in the Public Sector 
Major objectives of the public sector reform in Turkey were 
the broadening of the tax base, the greater decentralisation of 
public finance and investments, the improvement of the operation of 
the State Economic Enterprises (SEEs/Kit'ler) and their eventual 
privatisation. The reform of the tax structure was considered 
necessary in order to increase fiscal revenues and to reduce "fiscal 
drag" caused by years of steep inflation. The reinforcement of the 
fiscal autonomy of local administrations and the attainment of 
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greater flexibility in the allocation of investment expenditures 
encouraged making resource allocation more efficient. And finally, 
the main objective of the reform of the isolated SEEs sector was to 
reduce their sizable financial losses generated by years of 
overstaffing, bad management and delayed price adjustments. 
When the tax reform programme was started, public revenues 
were strongly biased towards income taxes, but were becoming 
increasingly inelastic to changes in output and income because of 
the failure in adjusting income tax rates to the periods of steep 
inflation with the resulting increase in evasion. There was also a 
lack of policies aimed at widening the base of taxes on goods and 
services. The "fiscal drag" had gradually eroded incentives to 
save and work, and led to strong inequities: wage-earners (of whom a 
large percentage of the total were accounted for by minimum-wage 
earners) provided almost two-thirds of revenues from income 
taxation, i.e. almost 30 per cent of total tax revenues 5 . In 1980, 
public authorities rearranged income tax brackets, whilst initially 
raising the basic rate to 40 per cent, then progressively reducing 
to 25 per cent in the period of 1981-86. This was accompanied by 
upward adjustment of income-brackets and by measures aimed at partly 
reducing the tax burden on fixed-income earners such as the 
introduction of tax rebates up to a determined limit, at the end of 
1983, against proof of purchase of basic commodities and services. 
Corporate taxes were set at a uniform rate for all private firms, 
which was first set at 50 per cent in 1981, cut to 40 per cent 
during the following four years, and raised again to 46 per cent in 
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1986. Moreover, in order to reduce collection lags, the system of 
advance payments of corporate taxes was introduced in the same year 
(1986). And finally, the structure of indirect taxes was 
substantially changed in January 1985 so as to apply a 10 per cent 
value-added tax, modelled on VAT schemes as applied by many European 
countries, replacing previous duties and production taxes on 
particular groups of commodities and services. 
The policy changes introduced towards the SEEs between 1980 
and 1987 have been subject to freeing expansion plans, intensifying 
supervision and approximating operation conditions to those of the 
private sector, by raising sales prices to cover production costs, 
thereby cutting budgetary transfers, and borrowing from commercial 
banks at preferential rates - which were eventually withdrawn in 
The management of publicly owned enterprises according to 
private efficiency principles was also considered as a preliminary 
step towards privatisation which was legally authorised since 1986. 
Decentralisation of public finance and rationalisation of public 
investment programmes were pursued, on the one hand by fostering the 
fiscal autonomy and increasing the resources of local governments, 
and on the other hand creating a number of extra-budgetary funds 
(EBF) financed by indirect taxes such as import surcharges on 
certain goods, and by selling participations to the public. These 
funds are not subject to the full spectrum of budgetary control 
procedures and have been particularly active in orienting public 
investments towards infrastructural and mass housing projects. 
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However, the deterioration of the financial situation of the 
SEEs led to a rise in their borrowing requirements which amounted to 
4.3 per cent of GNP in 1987 compared with 3.3 per cent in the 
previous year (Table 26) 7 . This induced the government to monitor 
more cautiously the budgets of municipalities and EBFs, notably the 
Public Participation Fund and the Mass Housing Fund, leading to 
transferring back to the central government of almost 30 per cent of 
fiscal revenues previously reserved by some of these funds through 
the budgetary law approved the same year. 
Table 26 Public Sector Borrowing Reguirement 
Per Cent of GNP 
1984 
Central Government 5.3 
State Economic Enterprises 2.3 
Local Governments -0.2 
Revolving Funds -0.4 
Extra-Budgetary Funds -0.5 
Total 6.6 
Source: State Planning Organisation. 1988 based on revised 
projections of May 1988. 
1985 1986 
2.8 3.6 
3.1 3.3 
-0.2 0.1 
-0.4 -0.4 
-0.5 -2.1 
4.7 4.5 
1984-88 
1987 1988 
4.2 2.2 
4.3 2.4 
0.4 0.3 
-0.2 0.0 
-0.5 0.7 
8.3 5.7 
Almost one half of the total financing requirement of the 
SEEs was accounted for by TEK (the Turkish Electricity Authority) 
and PTT (Post Office, Telephone, Telegram Company) in 1987. All in 
all the SEEs accounted for over two-fifths of total fixed 
investments by the public sector8 . Their losses were induced by 
delayed price adjustments to the high inflation, poor management 
based on outdated technology, excess employment. Financing their 
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losses further fuelled the inflation and led to the drive towards 
their privatisation introduced by the Ozal government in 1986. 
Of particular importance among the general government's 
infrastructural public investment schemes is the GAP (Southeastern 
Anatolia Project), consisting of a series of dams and plants which, 
upon completion in the early 90s, would increase the surface of 
irrigated land by 48 per cent, and electricity production by 68 per 
cent. The effects on agricultural output are expected to be quite 
substantial for products such as cotton (+118%), rice (+84%), 
oilseeds (+73%), fruits (+51%), vegetables (+28%). Most 
importantly, the GAP project with 14bn$ budget - equal to one-fourth 
of total public infrastructural investments in Turkey - is destined 
for helping to reduce regional imbalances, which are characterised 
by strong disparities in incomes and hence migration flows. This 
policy is consistent with the EC's regional policies in catching up 
with the more developed Community zones (Cankorel, 1989). 
In order to increase public revenues, a wide range of 
indirect (especially value-added) tax rates was increased in the 
second half of 1988, and the Government was authorised to adjust VAT 
rates, to those applied by EC member countries. Further 
improvements in tax collection were pursued mainly by allowing the 
Ministry of Finance to compound penalty interest payments for 
overdue taxes, and to enforce compulsory closures of enterprises 
which systematically evaded fiscal obligations, as well as by 
computerising the local tax administration. 
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As a result of these efforts, tax revenues have slightly 
increased relative to GNP in the period of 1980-87, but this rise 
has been almost entirely offset by the increase in current transfers 
to SEEs, low income earners and exporters. As shown by Table 27, 
the tax reform together with the containment of inflation has 
succeeded in significantly reducing the share of personal income 
taxes in total revenues which had peaked at the beginning of the 
decade. The reduction of several tax concessions and the reform of 
the system of taxes on goods and services undertaken since 1985 have 
induced greater reliance on indirect taxes. The share of revenue 
from corporate taxes also increased significantly - although not 
sufficiently because of the still high level of tax-evasion during 
the period. In the context of the process of decentralisation of 
public finance, the share of local administrations in total tax 
revenues has increased, in particular after 1984. Overall, as can 
be observed from Diagram 152a, the Turkish tax structure has moved 
closer towards that of other OECD countries, even when account is 
taken of the large share of "other tax revenues" in Turkey at the 
end of the period mainly for special levies, hence indirect taxes 
for the extra-budgetary funds (EBFs) 9 . 
Nevertheless, the ratio of tax revenues to GNP is the lowest 
in the OECD area reflecting the limited possibilities for the 
Turkish authorities to provide an adequate volume of basic services 
aimed at improving the standards of living, and at strengthening the 
qualification of the Turkish labour force. The rising costs of 
servicing the public debt have also reduced budget flexibility; for 
example a reduction in defence outlays did not result in any 
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Diagram 152a The Tax Structure in Turkey and the OECD 
As percentage of total tax revenues 
OECD-1980 Turkey-1980 
OECD-1987 Turkey-1987 
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flE T a x e s o n g o o d s a n d s e r v i c e s ITJJ S o -c i a l s e c u r i t y 
contributions 
~Taxes on personal income ~Taxes on property 
~Taxes on corporate income ~Other 
Source: OECD Revenue Statistics of OECD Members, 1965-1988. 
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Table 27 The Structure of Tax Revenues 
Per cent of total 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Personal 43.5 40.7 39.3 39.2 36.6 27.5 26.6 24.9 
income tax 
Corporation 4.1 8.8 11.4 9.6 9.3 9.5 12.0 10.7 
tax 
Taxes on 5.4 5.5 5.2 4.9 4.7 4.6 3.3 3.2 
property 
Indirect 25.6 24.9 26.8 29.0 27.9 36.0 31.2 32.0 
taxes 
Other 7.4 7.0 3.6 2.2 4.1 8.1 13.3 13.3 
Social 14.0 13.1 13.7 15.1 17.4 14.3 13.6 15.9 
security 
contributions 
Collected by: 
Central 81.8 83.2 81.9 80.4 76.2 64.7 64.6 63.2 
government 
Local 4.2 3.7 4.4 4.5 6.2 6.7 9.6 9.2 
administration 
Social 14.0 13.1 13.7 15.1 17.4 14.3 13.6 15.9 
security 
institutions 
Special funds 0.2 4.3 12.2 11.7 
Memorandum item 
Tax revenues 21.7 23.4 22.4 20.7 17.8 19.7 22.8 24.1 
as percentage 
of GNP 
Source: OECD, Revenue Statistics 1965-88,Paris 1989, and data 
submitted by the Turkish authorities. 
increase - but in a decrease actually - in resources devoted to the 
basic services such as health and education. This was because of 
the seven-fold increase in interest payments, as can be seen from 
Table 28, during the period of 1980-87. In 1989, with a total 
$4lbn foreign debt (51% of GNP), Turkey had interest payments 
accounting for 9.4 per cent of its GNP. (The corresponding ratios 
154 
for Greece and Portugal in 1988 were 44.9 per cent and 42 per cent 
for debt, and 11 per cent and 7 per cent for interest payments10 ). 
The breakdown of expenditure by broad functions shows also that, 
parallel to the institution of EBFs, there was a significant 
increase in investment expenditure between 1985 and 1987, which was 
reversed by severe budgetary cuts undertaken in recent years. 
Transfer expenditures have now become the major component of public 
expenditure; interest payments, compensation for wage earners, 
subsidies to exporters and some allocations to SEEs, such as the 
Turkish Electricity Company (TEK), Turkish Railways, lignite and 
hard coal companies. 
Table 29 presents some performance indicators for the largest 
SEEs, drawn from the annual report on the 500 largest Turkish firms 
published by the Istanbul Chamber of Industry. The Table shows 
that the largest SEEs have experienced significant profit 
improvements between 1981 and 1985, but subsequently a decline as 
the all performance indicators. In 1987 more than one-fifth of the 
largest SEEs reported operating losses. There is no 
synchronisation between the largest public and private firms 
observed: when profits of the former increase, profits of the latter 
decrease, and vice versa. This might reflect the influence of a 
policy of price hikes for SEE products in the initial years of the 
programme and inadequate adjustment to inflation in 1986-87. 
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Table 28 The Structure of General Government Ex:Qenditures 
Per cent of total 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
General 35.0 34.5 31.8 35.1 33.8 26.9 22.2 25.4 
services 
Defence 16.6 14.0 14.0 12.7 12.6 12.2 11.8 12.0 
Other public 18.9 21.6 21.8 18.4 18.2 25.9 28.3 23.2 
services 
Health 3.9 2.8 2.9 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.2 
Education 12.6 11.5 12.4 11.1 10.7 9.9 9.8 10.0 
Interest 2.2 3.9 4.0 5.7 8.2 8.7 12.3 14.2 
payments 
Social 10.8 11.7 13.1 14.3 13.8 13.9 13.3 13.0 
security outlays 
Current 41.4 37.4 39.0 36.8 36.9 34.4 31.3 30.6 
expenditures 
Investment 20.4 23.1 23.1 18.4 18.0 21.5 25.4 23.4 
expenditures 
Transfer 38.2 39.6 37.9 44.8 46.0 44.1 43.3 46.0 
expenditures 
Central 81.3 81.5 80.2 78.0 78.7 73.5 68.4 65.1 
government 
Local 7.2 6.2 6.1 7.3 6.9 9.0 11.4 11.2 
administrations 
Social 11.5 12.3 13.7 14.7 14.4 14.3 13.9 13.5 
security 
institutions 
Special funds 3.2 6.3 10.2 
Memorandum item 
Total 28.5 27.3 26.4 27.7 25.0 26.7 29.5 30.7 
expenditures 
as per cent of GNP 
Source: DECO Secretariat calculations based on data submitted by 
the Turkish authorities. 
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Table 29 Summary Statistics on the Largest SEEs 
Public firms Public firms Private firms 
1980 1984 1985 1986 1987 1980-82 1983-85 1986-87 1980-82 1983-85 1986-87 
Per cent Average annual percentage change 
Profits/sales revenue 4.8 6.5 10.8 7.8 7.1 11.7 56.4 9.2 -21.4 -5.9 48.8 
Export/sales revenue 
-
9.1 8.0 4.9 6.9 
-
28.0 40.4 
- -0.1 2.8 
Rate of return on 16.2 20.6 26.8 9.6 18.5 25.6 22.4 -5.7 -13.9 4.2 54.1 
capital1 
Number of firms with 22.8 16.7 18.1 15.4 21.1 36.8 -21.1 37.2 17.4 22.6 -38.6 
negative profits 
(per cent of total) 
Compensation per - 41.6 56.8 - 29.5 101.8 
employee (1983=100) 
Manufacturing wholesale 27.7 36.4 21.8 26.8 43.6 40.2 
prices (SIS 1981=100) 
1. Profits over net fixed assets. 
Source: Secretariat calculation on data submitted by the Istanbul Chamber of Industry. 
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The limited growth of public revenues relative to GNP, and 
the large gap existing between Turkey and the rest of OECD and 
most of the EC - in terms of standards of education, health care, 
and basic infrastructures, indicate that it is certainly necessary 
to increase government revenues by further reforming the tax 
administration both to broaden the tax base and to reduce the very 
high level of tax evasion. Additionally, there is a clear need to 
reduce the basic income tax rate which amounts to 25 per cent of the 
gross wages of minimum wage-earners, and to increase the rate for 
the higher wage-earners. 
If one questions the role of EBFs in allocating public 
investment expenditures in the long run, it appears that they have 
been used as an instrument for remedying failures such as the 
practical absence of any private mortgage lending in Turkey. The 
"Mass Housing Fund" was a response to existing market deficiencies. 
Hence, through gradual reduction in the number and amount of funds 
and a tighter control and prioritisation of their expenditure, the 
functions of these funds need eventually to be reallocated to both 
the private and public sector. 
The reform of the public sector should be strictly in 
accordance with the target of reducing the public debt. 
framework of this prerequisite: 
Within the 
1. The process of fiscal decentralisation should not lead to 
loss of control over borrowing strategies of SEEs, EBFs and 
local administrations. Excessive external borrowing by SEEs 
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and more recently by municipalities has imposed a heavy 
burden on policies aimed at rationalising the public 
expenditure. 
2. The issue by EBFs of income-sharing certificates yielding 
real returns higher than those on other public sector 
liabilities ultimately reduces government revenues that would 
be otherwise available for reducing the debt. 
3. It would be misplaced to consider the process of 
privatisation of public firms as a way to obtain debt relief, 
rather than as a strategy to improve the functioning of 
markets through reforming their management and performance 
and hence attracting additional household savings to capital 
markets. 
Apart from the fairly understandable public opposition created by 
the bloc sales of shares of the SEEs to foreigners, only a small 
number of these sales has so far resulted in some improvements in 
the management and technological equipment of these public firms in 
spite of the government's determined, though incautious persistence 
on the issue. 
4. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE POLICY CHANGES UNDER ORTHODOX PROGRAMMES: 
INTERACTION BETWEEN STRUCTURAL REFORMS AND STABILISATION 
There have been positive developments in the Turkish economy 
during the 1980s: increased rates of capacity utilisation, positive 
GNP growth, increased exports, especially the substantial rise in 
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industrial component of exports from 35 per cent in 1979 to 78 per 
cent in 198911 . These were largely dependent on the availability 
of additional external finance in very large amounts; and the 
availability of the major portions of this external finance (via the 
intermediation of IMF) was in turn dependent on the adoption of the 
stabilisation programme. 
In the mid-1970s, the economy had an extremely weak export 
performance and a comparatively high and increasing degree of import 
dependence. These factors had led to chronic external deficits and 
an incapacity to sustain the import requirements of the economy for 
a warranted path of expanded reproduction from its national 
resources. Secondary elements of the structural deformations 
consisted of a prematurely large tertiary sector and, within 
industry itself, the existence of a relatively large but non-viable 
and weak sub-sector of consumer durables and a small capital goods 
sub-sector (Boratav, 1987). 
As a result of these fairly negative features the 
liberalisation process has been addressed first to foreign trade, 
then financial markets and capital markets, together with the 
gradual reform of the public sector from the beginning. 
After years of financial repression, the initial reaction of 
financial markets to liberalisation was a large increase in interest 
rates for deposits - banks were left free to set deposit interest 
rates and loan interest rates between mid-1980 and the end of 1983 
and private bond issues. Coupled with general euphoria in the 
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goods market after years of recession and trade reforms, speculation 
was encouraged which culminated in the "broker crisis (banker 
krizi)" in 1982, left a very heavy burden on the Central Bank in the 
same year. This could have been abated by a timely reform of 
banking and capital market regulation. As to the influence of this 
incident on income and wealth distribution, it is quite clear that 
the small rentiers whose wealth was wiped out were the principal 
losers. On the other hand many rentiers, particularly the "early 
comers" to the bonanza - as Boratav put it - managed to obtain 
extremely high interest rates for more than two years at the cost of 
the "late comers" whose savings and wealth disappeared without 
significant returns. Additionally, the unpaid "bad debts" to the 
moneybrokers and banks during this period - between mid-1980 and the 
end of 1983 - resulted in windfall gains for the firms and media 
engaged on these activities. 
The high government financing requirements and the resulting 
inflation have, in turn, impacted on the gradual liberalisation of 
currency markets. Removing controls on capital movements 
stimulated capital outflows during periods of high inflation and 
negative real interest rates. Then efforts by the monetary 
authorities to limit these outflows led to real interest rates well 
above the levels prevailing in international markets, yielding again 
large amounts for the big rentiers. With the tighter regulation of 
domestic credit flows, the partial lifting of capital controls led 
to stimulation of foreign borrowing by private and, even more, 
public firms. When interest rates on domestic assets have exceeded 
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those on foreign assets capital inflows have led to the appreciation 
of the exchange rate, which had been one of the underlying causes of 
the slowdown in the export performance since the second half of the 
1980s. 
Empirical analysis on the effective costs of borrowing for 
the business sector indicates that the high credit costs have been 
an important element behind the poor performance of 
industrial investment, also reflecting a significant 
element to the inflationary process (ibidem). 
private 
built-in 
In so far as weak investment had impeded shifts from the 
sheltered to the exposed sectors of the economy, high credit costs 
have created obstacles to the development of productive sectors, in 
particular in exports, and the broadening o the country's industrial 
structure. Moreover, the interaction of stabilisation and 
liberalisation policies tends to increase the price of non-
tradeables relative to tradeables and shift capital from competitive 
sectors to the sheltered sector of the economy. 
The initial "big bang" of trade reform included a sizeable 
real currency depreciation, excessive export subsidies to counter 
the greater liberalisation of imports. There was also a ban on 
employee lay-offs which shifted wage-costs from components of prime 
costs into overheads thus encouraging high rates of capacity 
utilisation. 
a significant 
immediately 
Finally, demand management via income policies led to 
contraction of internal demand which 
successful in encouraging exports. 
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proved 
Whereas 
agricultural exports in current dollars showed a modest overall 
progress of 21 per cent between 1978-79 and 1984, the increase in 
industrial exports in the same period was 7.3-fold with its share in 
total exports rising from 30.9 per cent to a striking 72.1 per cent 
in five years. By 1989, the share of agricultural products in 
total exports was 9 per cent and the share of industry together with 
agro-based industry was 89 per cent (Briefing, 1990). Adjustment 
was helped by the presence of large idle capacity in most 
manufacturing sectors, whose increased utilisation was also made 
possible by the availability of external finance which sustained a 
high level of intermediate goods' imports. On the demand side, the 
successful entry into the oil-rich Middle East and North Africa 
markets was an important factor behind the "export boom" of the 
1980s12 . 
However, apart from the distributional and allocational costs 
of excessive export subsidies, the problem of "fictititious exports" 
had been experienced during the mid-1980s due to over-invoicing by 
the exporters, encouraged by the "exorbitant" export incentive 
schemes; and there has been a decline in workers' remittances from 
abroad, one of the sources from which foreign exchange for 
"fictitious exports" was provided, by 40 per cent from 1981 to 1983 
(Boratav, 1987). 
Turkey could not sustain this bright picture in export 
performance in the last few years of the 1980s, especially after 
abolishing the excess tax rebates through VAT schemes provided to 
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exporters in 1988 and the implementation of unrealistic exchange 
rate policies in the face of much more rapidly rising domestic 
inflation rates, hence the over-valuation of Turkish lira. Apart 
from the financial constraints caused by high credit interest rates; 
there were also quality, capacity, technological equipment and 
demand constraints - i.e. quotas on Turkish textile exports imposed 
by the EC and the USA and declined demand in the Middle-East market. 
All these factors contributed to the relatively low level of Turkish 
export earnings compared with its huge and well-diversified natural 
resources. 
In his analysis on the trend and shares of the major 
components of imports from 1976-77 to 1984, Boratav (1987) indicates 
that the gradual process of liberalisation through its incidence on 
import competition worked against capital formation, in favour of 
consumption and current production requirements, coupled with 
uncontrolled and hence unnecessarily high levels of imports. He 
also argues that the same average growth rates could have been 
sustained with a lower level of imports (and of smaller external 
deficits). Alternatively, higher levels of capital accumulation 
could have been provided with the same import bill during this 
period. During the whole decade domestic absorption was suppressed 
by an incomes policy which significantly reduced the real income of 
fixed-income earners such as civil servants, workers. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
All these negative effects arose from the implementation of 
reforms and underline the importance of macroeconomic stability and 
synchronisation of all the relevant parts of a structural reform 
programme. Negative interactions between different areas of reform 
can be minimised by making private business firms and the government 
less dependent on the banking sector with the new, efficient markets 
to be created where private firms and the government could have 
access to loanable funds without necessarily passing through bank 
intermediation. Equity financing through capital markets would 
lower debt/equity ratios for firms and would reduce the 
destabilising effects of financial reform. Increased competition 
among banks would hasten improvements in the efficiency of the 
banking sector and eventually reduce the costs of financial reform 
by narrowing the spread between the borrowing an lending rates. 
Whatever the explanation of short-term movements of domestic 
inflation rates, the structural cause of growing monetary aggregates 
must be sought in the large, and not efficiently controlled, public 
sector deficits. Simulations conducted by the OECD in the 
framework of a public finance model of inflation for Turkey suggest 
that real growth of GNP at a target rate of 5 per cent together with 
a reduction of inflation rate from 60 to 20 per cent would require a 
very sharp cut, by 4 or 5 percentage points of GNP, in the public 
sector borrowing requirement, which was at a level of 9.7 per cent 
of GNP in 1990 (EIU, 1991) 13 . A further monetary contraction that 
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was not accompanied by a consistent fiscal policy would further 
exacerbate the low level of investment and lead to stagflation. 
Further steps to limit the central government's access to Central 
Bank financing would help to curtail the most important source of 
structural inflation, as well as strengthening the Central Bank's 
role in the control of inflation. 
As a result of unstable monetary and fiscal policies during 
the 1980s, the main objective of the financial sector reform has not 
yet been achieved. Channelling more savings towards fixed capital 
formation, has been thwarted by weak financial markets, and a 
vicious cycle has been established of high deficits leading to high 
interest rates and thereby still greater pressures on the public 
budget. High real interest rates, by lowering the overall rate of 
investment, in particular in the manufacturing sector, have reduced 
the speed with which the tradeable sector could expand. 
The impressive trade gains of Turkey for most of the 1980s 
until 1987 cannot disguise the continuing weaknesses in the 
structure of exports. Turkish comparative advantages in labour-
intensive production have not been fully exploited and the 
continuing specialisation in a few sectors, notably textiles and 
some agricultural products such as currants, citrus fruit, tobacco, 
had made Turkish industry more vulnerable to changes in the world 
demand, as well as to the protectionist measures adopted by other 
countries, particularly the USA and the EC. 
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Tax reform seems to have succeeded in giving some incentives 
to save and to work, but has not yet provided the tight supervision 
which would remedy fiscal inequities due to widespread tax 
avoidance, and therefore has not resulted in a substantial increase 
in government revenues. Further success in structural adaptation, 
notably full external liberalisation and the provision of a higher 
standard of public services, will crucially depend on reducing the 
large public sector deficits. The fight against inflation would 
also become less burdensome if the structural causes of the high 
public sector borrowing requirement could be removed. The major 
one being he existence of inefficient state enterprises due to lack 
of new technology and proficient management, lack of competition as 
a result of inappropriate incentive structures and government 
subsidies, and inadequate revenue largely arising from delays in 
adjusting their prices to rapidly rising inflation. The efficiency 
of monetary policy must be enhanced by greater independence of the 
Central Bank. Some progress in structural adjustment of the 
Turkish economy has been achieved in the last decade - though at the 
expense of low income groups and farmers. 
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CHAPTER V 
TURKEY-EC RELATIONS AND PROSPECT 
FOR THE 1990s 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, the stabilisation and structural 
policies introduced by Turkey since the second half of the 1970s, in 
contraction with the IMF, have been briefly studied. This chapter 
aims to review the evolution of relations between the EC and Turkey 
from 31 July 1959, the date when both Turkey and Greece applied for 
Associate Membership just 2 years after the signing of the Treaty of 
Rome which laid the foundations of the Organisation with its 
original six member states. The chapter covers the period up to 
Turkey's application for full membership in April 1987. The 
chapter analyses the reasons underlying Turkey's rejection from that 
organisation by an "Official Opinion" issued by the Commission of 
the EC in 1989, and the prospects for Turkey in the context of 
global development and welfare as well as in the Community. 
1. ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT 
Turkey applied to the Community to establish an association 
relationship within two years of the Treaty of Rome. This 
application which was welcomed by the Community and the Ankara 
Agreement laid the foundations for the EC/Turkey association signed 
on 12 September 1963. The Association Agreement which went into 
force on 1 December 1964 aimed at strengthening economic and trade 
relations between the parties, while (Article 2) "taking full 
account of the need to ensure an accelerated development of the 
Turkish economy and to improve the level of employment and the 
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living conditions of the Turkish people." In the Preamble of the 
Agreement, it is stated that the parties have decided to conclude 
the Agreement, "recognising that the support given by the European 
Economic Community to the efforts of the Turkish people to improve 
their standards of living will facilitate the accession of Turkey to 
the Community at a later date" (Bozer, 1987). The aims of the 
Treaty are to be obtained through a customs union, coordination of 
economic policies and gradual liberalisation in the field of 
services, free movement of workers, capital and right of 
establishment. Hence, Turkey signed the Association Agreement with 
the ultimate aim of becoming a full member of the Community in the 
future and the Community undertook various obligations intending to 
facilitate this aim. Turkey had no obligations during the 
Preparatory stage - which was designed in the Ankara Agreement to be 
followed by the Transitional Stage and the Final Stage - but the 
Community agreed to assist Turkey's economic development by 
providing commercial and financial facilities unilaterally. 
Article 28 of the Agreement states that "as soon as the 
operation of this agreement has advanced far enough to justify 
envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out 
of the Treaty establishing the Community, the Contracting Parties 
shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the 
Community. " This period was completed earlier than the five years 
foreseen in the Ankara Agreement. 
The implementation principles of the Transitional Stage are 
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specified in the Additional Protocol which was signed on 23 November 
1970 and went into effect on 1 January 1973. This Protocol, beside 
envisaging that the customs union be completed at the end of 22 
years - maximum date - also includes articles regarding the common 
agricultural policy (CAP), the free movement of workers from both 
sides and financial aid. 
The Agreement offered the prospect of ultimate free entry 
into the EEC of certain Turkish agricultural exports - due to be 
liberalised by 1995 - which were added in 1970 to all Turkish 
industrial products. The latter included most of the industrial 
products except "textiles", "machine woven carpets" and "petroleum 
products" (Wyles, 1980). As stated in the Additional Protocol 
(Annex 2) "cotton thread" which is not in final form for retail 
sale, "other cotton fabrics" and "machine woven carpets" made from 
wool or refined wool are subject to quantity restrictions. The 
permitted amounts have sometimes been increased due to a 
supplementary protocol, which was signed on 30 June 1973, and 
general preference systems (Karatas, 1986). The EEC does not levy 
customs duty on these items, provided that they are imported to the 
EC within the specified quantities; but a 25 per cent duty is 
applied to quantities in excess of the specified amounts. 
The Additional Protocol did not lay down a specific timetable 
about how free movement of agricultural goods would be ensured 
during the transitional stage, but during this period Turkey's 
agricultural 
Agricultural 
policy would be brought closer to the 
Policy (CAP). Furthermore, Article 35 of 
172 
Common 
the 
Additional Protocol states that both parties accord reciprocally 
preferential treatment to their agricultural exports; according to 
the Community paper Turkey did not implement this. provision until 
1988. 
However, according to the Additional Protocol which arranges 
the transitional period of Turkey-EEC Association, Turkey has been 
provided with some concessions by the Community for a number of 
agricultural products which were arranged by the EC Council 
decisions taken on 30 June 1980. According to this arrangement; 
i) customs duties (including previous concessional taxes) 
which were imposed on imports of agricultural products 
from Turkey to the EEC, would be lifted by 1 January 
1981 according to a pre-determined schedule 
comprises four phases; 
which 
ii) customs duties which were 2 per cent or lower than this 
rate would be reduced to nil on 1 January 1981; 
iii) customs duties which were at 2 per cent and higher than 
this rate would be reduced to nil within a specified 
period as shown below: 
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Table 30 
Date 
1.1.1981 
1.1.1983 
1.1.1985 
1.1.1987 
Reduction % 
30 
30 
20 
20 
Cumulative % Reduction 
30 
60 
80 
100 
Source: C.Karatas, 1986 Turkish Review, Autumn,Vol.l,No.5. 
As can be seen from Table 30, on 1 January 1987 the customs 
duties charged upon imported agricultural goods from Turkey were 
lifted. However, the concessions mentioned above were only related 
to Common Customs Tariff (CCT) and did not include the pre-levy, 
which EC countries impose in the process of imports from third 
countries, in the schedule arranged for reductions in customs 
duties. In this scheme annual quotas were imposed on products such 
as hazel-nuts and apricot paste which are among the few commodities 
Turkey has for long held comparative advantage and relied upon as 
foreign exchange earning sources. Exports of "tomato ketchup" and 
"tinned tomato" which are listed in CCT have also been restricted by 
the imposition of annual quotas (ibidem). Exports from Turkey 
conducted after the expiry of the specified periods would have been 
subject to Common Customs Tariff (CCT). 
At this point it would be useful to point out the obligations 
of the Community and Turkey arising from both the Ankara Agreement 
and the Additional Protocol. 
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1.1 Obligations of the Community 
a) Reductions of customs duties: 
After the Additional Protocol went into effect the European 
Community agreed to abolish customs duties and taxes with equivalent 
effects on industrial products from Turkey with the exception of 
textiles, machine-woven carpets and petroleum products, and the 
import of these products (exceptions) by the member countries is 
determined separately. 
b) Abolishing quantitative restrictions 
The Community also accepted to abolish quantitative 
restrictions (Article 24 of the Additional Protocol) and to 
consolidate this in favour of Turkey (except for raw silk and 
petroleum products). At the same time, it agreed to abolish 
customs duties and changes with equivalent effects on exports to 
Turkey. 
The Community has, however, since 1982 reintroduced 
restrictions on Turkish textile exports and Turkey has refused to 
negotiate a "voluntary restraint" agreement in the context of the 
MFA. Hence, the Community has conducted agreements with 
variousTurkish producers' associations, limiting their exports for a 
range of goods, mainly cotton yarn and cloth, acrylic and synthetic 
fibres, certain garments (European Parliamentary Working 
Paper,1988). 
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1.2 Obligations of Turkey 
a) Abolition of customs duties and quantitative restrictions 
Turkey will progressively abolish customs duties on products 
originating from the Community within a period of 12 to 22 years. 
According to a predetermined timetable, Turkey would also abolish 
quantitative restrictions on products imported from the Community; 
security deposits for imports, customs duties for exports and 
charges and quantitative restrictions with equivalent effects. 
b) Acceptance of the Common Customs Tariff 
Within period of 12 to 22 years, Turkey will harmonise the 
customs duties for third countries to the Community's CCT. 
Turkey achieved a tax reduction of 20 per cent in the 12-year 
list and 10 per cent in the 22-year list on its imports from the 
Community up to 1976, starting from 1971, but no measure was taken 
by Turkey during this period towards the harmonisation of its 
customs duties to the CCT. Consequently, due to severe economic 
problems, Turkey applied for the postponement of the liberalisation 
schedule vis-a-vis the Community in 1976, consistent with Article 60 
of the Additional Protocol (European Parliament Working Paper, 
1988). 
However, it was a general consensus in Turkey that the 
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current transitional agreements with the EC have not produced 
greater benefits for Turkey as a prospective full member. For 
instance, textile and clothing accounted for over 18 per cent of 
exports in 1982 - in 1990 over 30 per cent hence the quotas 
imposed by the Community constituted a considerable restriction for 
Turkey. The postponement of further tariff cuts was also prompted 
by the fear in Turkey that exports of agricultural products which 
constituted almost 58 per cent of the total in the early 1970s in 
1990 this ratio was 18 per cent of total exports - would have been 
set back because of restrictions imposed on them by the EC which 
were clearly against the spirit of free trade and expansion of trade 
between Turkey and the EC (for the detailed study of the impact of 
these restrictions on Turkish export and trade balance with the EC, 
the reader is referred to Karatas (1986) Turkish Review,pp.68-70). 
On the other hand, due to the Community's agreements with 
Mediterranean and ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries, 
the Turkish preferential margin for agricultural products has been 
significantly eroded. 
2. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR WORKERS IN THE ANKARA AGREEMENT AND THE 
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL 
Article 12 of the Ankara Agreement states that the 
contracting parties agreed to be guided by Articles 48,49 and 50 of 
the Rome Agreement for the aim of progressively securing freedom of 
movement for the workers between them. The Additional Protocol 
ensures the freedom of movement for workers to be secured, by the 
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decisions of Association Council within a 12 and 22-year period 
starting when the Ankara Agreement (1 December 1964) went into 
effect. 
However, these provisions were not implemented by the 
Community side due to both economic and political reasons. While 
the Council of Association decision No.2/76 aimed to start the first 
stage (1 December 1976-1 December 1980) which was entered into force 
in 1976, the same Council's Decision No.1/80, besides launching the 
second stage of freedom of movement of workers (1 December 1980 - 1 
December 1983) postpones the freedom of movement to a later date and 
only attempts to improve the legal status of those Turkish workers 
who were in the Community labour market already. Actually, Article 
6 of Decision No.1/80 states that a Turkish worker, taking apart in 
the legal market of a member state has the right: 
to renew employment permission if there is vacant 
employment, after working legally for one year and on the condition 
of working in that state and under the orders of the same employer. 
to apply for employment with an employer that is offered 
under normal circumstances and registered by the Employment Bureau 
of that state on the condition of having worked in that state 
legally for three years and giving priority to the workers of that 
state. 
to apply freely for any employment with remuneration after 
working legally for four years (Ylilek, 1987). 
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When the Association Council Decision No.1/80 is compared to 
basic Community Regulation 1612/68, it is fairly clear that the 
Turkish workers, with the condition of obtaining permission, were 
largely restricted by matters concerning time, type, place of 
employment and furthermore by giving priority to workers of that 
specific state. Additionally, Clause No.3 of the above regulation 
states that the application of the conditions of this article would 
be determined by national legislation; causing diverse practices 
between countries and even within a country when federal states are 
concerned. However, Article 7 of the Council of Association 
Decision No.1/80 also states that the dependents of a Turkish worker 
could only apply for employment after residing legally in that 
country for "5 years" while Community Regulation No.1612/68 - which 
is the EC's fundamental regulation in relation to the rights for the 
free movement of workers - does not state any restriction of that 
kind for dependents of a worker of a member state. 
Briefly, the Ankara Agreement and the Additional Protocol 
ensure that the freedom of movement for workers between Turkey and 
the Community would go into effect at the end of the 22-year period 
(December, 1986). But the freedom of movement stated in Article 36 
of the Additional Protocol could not be secured completely except 
for partial implementation of the first two stages. In the 
Article, however, it was stated that the "Association Council" was 
going to decide on the necessary methods concerning the application 
of the matter. In conclusion, the right exists but in order for it 
to be a binding commitment the Association Council should determine 
the application methods and, of course, consequently member states 
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must pass these through their national legislatures. 
However, on 24 November 1986, the EC Council made a different 
decision. Article 12 of the Ankara Agreement concerning freedom of 
movement was interpreted in such a way as to exclude the concept of 
freedom of movement for workers and ignoring Article 36 of the 
Additional Protocol. The Council tried to block the right of 
Turkish workers for freedom of movement - of a country which had, 
during the 1980s an unemployment rate of much less than half of that 
prevailing in Spain. 
This decision was, naturally, not agreed by the Turkish 
Government and the matter was taken to the Court of Justice. 
September 1987, the Court of Justice (case 12/86) found that, 
the provisions contained in the Association 
Agreement (Article 12) and in the Additional 
Protocol (Article 36) concerning free movement of 
workers did not, in the absence of implementing 
legislation adopted by the Association Council, 
produce direct effects and could not be invoked 
directly, by individuals before the Courts of 
Member States. 
(European Parliament Working Papers, 1988, Session 
Documents, A2-350/88). 
On 30 
Additionally, with the introduction in the 1980s of visa 
requirements for Turkish people travelling to most European states, 
further obstacles (instead of improvement) have been created towards 
the unification of Turkish guest workers with their parents. 
It has been understood that there are two major reasons 
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behind the reluctance shown by the European Community member states 
on the issue: 
a) Political reason: Greece opposes the freedom of movement for 
Turkish workers and claims that this would cause a threat to 
its national security (being a view which many Turks find 
consistent with Greece's unfounded and ill-placed propaganda 
and antagonism against its neighbouring country). 
b) Economic reason: especially after the petroleum crisis in 
1973, the need and demand for foreign workers declined and 
unemployment increased in European countries. Laws were 
made encouraging foreign workers to return to their countries 
and other laws that would assimilate foreign workers into 
their host society. Under these circumstances, provision of 
freedom of movement for Turkish workers induced 
opposition in particular from Federal Germany. 
3. RIGHT OF ESTABLISHMENT AND FREE CIRCULATION OF SERVICES 
great 
Article 13 and Article 14 of the Ankara Agreement state that 
the Contracting Parties agree to be guided by Articles 52 to 56 and 
Articles 58 to 65 of the Rome Agreement for the purpose of 
abolishing restrictions on freedom of establishment and freedom to 
provide services between them (Ylilek, 1987). 
However, Article 41 of the Additional Protocol expresses 
these two concepts: freedom of establishment and freedom to provide 
services together and states that the decisions concerning the 
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application will be taken by the "Association Council" especially 
taking into account the economic and social conditions of Turkey. 
No regulation has been set up between Turkey and the 
Community on these matters. At present Turkish workers are subject 
to different regulations on practising their professions in 
different member states. France, Holland, Belgium and Denmark 
allow enterprising Turkish workers to function independently under 
special conditions while Germany, which hosts the largest number, 
only permits Turkish workers to practise their professions in 
partnership with a German national and provided that the permit 
itself is issued in the name of that German partner. 
4. FREE MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL 
Article 20 of the Ankara Agreement states that the 
Contracting Parties will consult each other to facilitate movement 
of capital between Turkey and the Community, seeking all means of 
promoting the investment of capital in Turkey, from countries of the 
Community which can contribute to Turkish economic development. 
According to Article 53 of the Additional Protocol, Contracting 
Parties will not bring any new restrictions that would harm capital 
movements among themselves and current payments for debt servicing, 
and they will simplify the procedures on the issue as soon as 
possible. 
Since the entry-into-force of the Additional Protocol, no 
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progress in relation to the above regulations has been made between 
the Parties concerned. 
5. FINANCIAL COOPERATION 
The Community has dispersed, though the EIB (European 
Investment Bank), a total of 695 million ECU in loans 
(Eur.Par.Session Doc.,1988) in order to contribute towards the 
fulfilment of the aims of the Association and to increase the 
productivity of the Turkish economy throughout the period of 1963-
1977 through the first three financial protocols. In addition, a 
special aid of 75 million ECU was granted in 1980 and the last 19 
million ECU on 28 November 1988. However, apart from the 
inadequacy of the amounts as the contribution to improvement of such 
a vast country's economic and social level, a 600 million ECU worth 
of loans agreed through the "Fourth Financial Protocol" which was 
initialled on 19 June 1981, could not be released owing initially, 
to the Community's reservations about human rights problems during 
and after the 1980 military coup in Turkey, then to Greece's veto on 
the financial issues in relation to Turkey. 
6. NORMALISATION PROCESS AND THE APPLICATION OF TURKEY FOR FULL 
MEMBERSHIP OF THE EC 
When Greece announced in 1975 that it would apply for full 
membership of the Community at an early date, signals from some 
Western parliamentarians, especially the one from the then EC 
Commission Secretary-General, Emile Noel, "that Turkey should 
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immediately lodge its own application," did not draw much attention 
from the Turkish authorities at that time. Possibly, this was due 
to the prevailing climate of anti-EC feeling but mostly to widened 
doubts about the feasibility of a customs union in a domestic 
environment highly grasped by foreign exchange bottlenecks at the 
end of the same period. In 1980, the ultra-European foreign 
minister of the Demirel minority government, Hayrettin Erkmen, 
announced that Turkey would be applying for full membership, 
probably before the end of 1980; but by then it was too late. 
Because, at this time, a military coup took over the political life 
in Turkey on 12 September 1980 ruling out any chance of that kind 
for some years ahead. 
Thus, according to some academicians and politicians, Turkey 
missed a good opportunity by not applying at the same time with 
Greece as being another NATO member country in the Mediterranean 
region and as a result faced a Greek-Spanish-Portguese alliance 
against itself. Hence, Turkey lost much of its bargaining position 
in relation to the Community. 
However, with the return to a democratic system of elections 
held in December 1983, the new Ozal Government consequently 
expressed its will towards normalising the country's relation with 
the EC. On 16 September 1986, the Association Council met again 
for the first time since 1980. Following this, considering that 
the Association Agreement did not work as it was intended, and the 
Turkish economy was already committed to a much more liberal 
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evolution based on European terms and opened up to external 
competition to a larger extent, the Government decided that the best 
solution would be to proceed with an accession request and to 
reorganise the relations in a more definite manner. Hence, Turkey 
submitted on 14 April 1987 its formal application to join the 
Community under the terms of Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome, 
which states that the European Community is open to any European 
State which asks for it and accepts the terms unanimously agreed by 
its members. 
During the examination of the Turkish accession request by 
the EC from 27 April 1987, a high level ad hoc Committee meeting 
took place between the Turkish Government and the Commission in 
Brussels during November-December 1988. Turkey announced that it 
will proceed to the customs union with the Community in a much 
accelerated way so as to be completed by the end of 1995 according 
to the schedule below: 
a) 70 per cent tariff reduction in 12-year list; 
b) 60 per cent reduction in 22-year list, will be provided by 
Turkey on its industrial imports from the Community by the 
end of 1992; 
c) 60 per cent reduction will be ensured on its quantitative 
restrictions against the Community; 
d) 40 per cent harmonisation to the Community CCT will also 
be made by the same date. 
Consistent with this schedule, Turkey further reduced its 
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tariffs, starting again from 1988, on both of the lists in 1989 and 
1990, as well as securing a 20 per cent harmonisation to the CCT. 
7. COMMUNITY'S REPLY AND ITS ASSESSMENT 
The EC Commission issued an "Official Opinion" on the Turkish 
application in December 1989 which was later adopted unchanged by 
the Community's Council of Ministers. 
The eligibility of Turkish entry was once again confirmed, 
but the "Official Opinion" proposed that negotiations for an 
eventual possible Turkish accession should not begin until 1993 as 
regards the creation of "Common Market", and did not commit the 
Community to opening negotiations even after that date. The 
economic disparity between Turkey and the Community members as well 
as political reasons, such as the state of civil rights, the Cyprus 
problem and other disputes with Greece, were defined as the main 
reasons for this postponement (Briefing, 1990). 
However, it should be clear that those last reasons, namely, 
the Cyprus problem and other conflicts with Greece, are solid 
evidences of the impact of Greece's membership on defining the 
Community's attitude towards its relations with Turkey, violating 
the condition of Greek entry to the Community put into her accession 
agreement that "The Greek entry should not affect the relations of 
the Community with Turkey." (Barchard, 1985). 
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In the meantime, Turkey is exhorted to prepare the way for 
membership by reaching a full customs union with the Community 
(originally planned by 1995) backed by proposed enhanced financial, 
industrial, commercial and cultural cooperation - as well as in the 
field of research an development, science, etc. It should be noted 
here that no other country has so far achieved customs union with 
the Community in association status, without becoming a full member. 
Even the package of cooperation proposed in the Commission's 
"Report", including the release of 600 million ECU financial aid 
committed in the "Fourth Financial Protocol" since 1981, still 
remains unachieved due to lack of willingness on the part of the 
Community's Council of Ministers in passing it through their 
approval. 
However, while the Commission report did not include any 
certain date for initiating negotiations on Turkish accession in the 
future, it also did not rule such negotiations out "in the longer 
term." To do that, would have been a flat contradiction of both 
the 1963 Ankara Agreement and the existing Association Agreement. 
Even any suggestion by the Community for some looser form of 
integration with Europe would have further aggravated the damage 
done in Turkish public opinion, bringing about a serious risk that 
nationalist and/or extreme fundamentalist forces would obtain the 
upper hand in the country with all that could mean for 
democratisation (a 58-year process since the establishment of the 
Turkish Republic on 29 October 1923), economic liberalisation and 
foreign policy. 
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Underlying reasons behind such a reserved action are shown in 
the Commission's Report as below: 
First of all the Turkish application poses a challenge of 
considerable proportions both in terms of being - if it joined - its 
largest member state in land area, and more importantly, by the year 
2000 being its second largest, after the unified Germany of nearly 
77 million, in population (op.cit.). 
On the other hand, according to the Commission its present 
level of economic development is some way behind that of the member 
states that joined the Community most recently; as it was shown in 
Chapter III, Greece, Spain and Portugal. 
The report, while loudly acknowledging Turkey's process of 
economic liberalisation, which it notes is aimed at making Turkish 
industry more competitive, nevertheless charges that it is still far 
from complete by the current standards of the Community. For one 
thing, it says, the effective level of protection for Turkish 
industries is still significant. Certain surcharges (which Turkey 
is scrapping stage by stage under its reviewed import regime) 
including the EBFs (extra budgetary funds) are also illegal under 
the terms of 1970 Additional Protocol. Export subsidies, 
especially to sensitive sectors, are still generous in the eyes of 
the Community. 
What is of more basic concern to the Community is the 
conclusion of the Report that: 
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... Since the population of Turkey is expanding 
very rapidly, the effect on GDP growth per head is 
correspondingly less marked ... The distribution of 
income is very uneven, both from a regional and 
from a social view-point ... Labour productivity is 
also very low... Turkish agriculture is 
characterized by major structural and socio-
economic deficiencies ... Inflation is a big 
problem and, in any event, inflation does not 
appear to be the result of excessive domestic 
demand fed by wage increases since real wages 
remained fairly stable during the 1980-1988 
period ... The size of Turkey's external debt and 
the burden of interest payments to foreign 
creditors is strikingly awesome. 
(Briefing 1990/772) 
Again, according to the Community, "social and employment 
policies are still very poorly developed in Turkey, most noticeably 
in the organisation of the labour market, the education system and 
the provision of social security benefits." 
8. COMPETITION 
The most comprehensive study on the competitiveness of 
Turkish industry has been conducted by the Istanbul-based Foundation 
for Economic Development (IKV), which was given much credit in the 
"Commission Report". According to the findings of this study, 
around 75 per cent of Turkish industry would be capable of 
withstanding international competition if it joined the Community. 
Of the 53 industrial sectors studied, only 15, representing around 
12 per cent of industrial output, would be in a weak competitive 
position. The products best able to fend off competition from 
European industry are textiles and clothing (cotton), carpets, 
leather goods, cellulose, synthetic fibres, glass, cement, steel 
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tubes, aluminium castings, some commercial vehicles, 
durables and some sectors of the agri-food industry. 
consumer 
Non-competitive sectors include wood products, cosmetics, 
automobiles, and in the agri-food industry; meat 
dairies, preserves, sugar, wine and animal feedstuffs. 
processing, 
On the other hand, the latest "World Competitiveness Report" 
jointly published by the Switzerland-based International Institute 
for Management Development (!MD) and the World Economic Forum, 
places Turkey 20th among the OECD countries, ahead of Portugal and 
Greece and not far behind Italy, Spain and New Zealand (Briefing, 
1990/779). 
In brief, Turkey ranked between 18th and 21st among the OECD 
countries in respect of the factors of "industrial efficiency," 
"dynamics of the market," "financial dynamism," "human resources," 
"outward orientation," "innovative forward orientation," "socio-
political stability" and in terms of "natural endowments." On the 
other hand, Turkeycame fourth on the "state interference" scale, 
reflecting strong government policies to help industrial development 
and lower taxes. According to this report, between 1981 and 1987 
Turkey had the fastest growing real GDP measured in local currency, 
the fastest real growth in industrial production and the best 
productivity increases and capital formation rates and these are 
described as "points of strength" by !MD officials 
The figures based on export performance between 1982 and 1987 
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showed that Turkey's exports, and its average share in the 
international markets for the products it exports remain low but 
those markets are seen to be expanding quite rapidly. This is 
true, especially after 1990 due to expanded export markets and trade 
relations with the Eastern European new liberalising countries, 
Soviet Union and the Turkish-speaking Soviet Republics which most 
recently declared independence, as well as with the EC and USA as a 
result of decreased level of quotas imposed on Turkish exports. 
The !MD officials also note the increasing importance of more 
capital-intensive industries such as iron and steel products, 
plastics, fibres and resins in Turkey's industrial portfolio (for 
further details see Briefing, 1990, issue 779, pp.20-1). 
9. GULF WAR EFFECTS 
In this section it is aimed to review the continuing effects 
of the Gulf Crisis on the Turkish economy together with its 
political implications on both sides in the aftermath of its 
postponed case for joining the EC as a full member. 
In the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, 
following the UN Resolution on imposition of economic sanctions 
against Iraq, Turkey has closed the petroleum pipeline operating 
between the two countries for carrying the Iraqi oil to the outside 
world, as well as suspending its trade with both Iraq and Kuwait. 
Overall, according to the Treasury's recalculations in mid-
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May on total losses from the Gulf Crisis up to the end of April 
1991, Turkey has suffered a total figure of $6.25bn (see EUI, 
No.3,1991), the main items in this latest calculation being: 
- loss of earnings from transit trade to Iraq and Kuwait: 
$1.3bn; 
- extra cost of oil imports: $1.1bn; 
- loss of direct exports: $1.1bn; 
- losses by banks and contractors: $1.5bn; 
- extra expenditure on defence and refugees: $550mn; 
-other losses (mainly from the decline in tourism earnings): 
$700mn. 
According to the same source, in compensation for the losses 
above, Turkey has received, up to the first half of 1991, around 
$2.9bn in international assistance, of which $2.3bn has been in 
grants and $600mn in loans, and it has been expected by the Turkish 
officials that this amount would reach $4.2bn by the end of 1991. 
Of this, $1.1bn from Saudi Arabia in the form of free oil and $900mn 
grant from Kuwait $250mn by grants from the United Arab Emirates, 
$250mn from the USA and $45mn from the EC has been received. Saudi 
Arabia is also expected to sell Turkey 8.5mn tonnes of oil at spot 
prices in 1991, and Iran another 3mn tonnes. 
Also, pledges have been received by the USA for the creation 
of a $3-4bn defence fund for Turkey with contributions from Gulf 
countries in due course. Due to Turkey's role in the Crisis, the 
quotas imposed on Turkish textile exports to the USA have been 
expanded by 100 per cent and to the EC by 25 per cent, bringing 
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about some enhanced chances for the sector to grow (Briefing, 1991). 
Despite the flow of compensation for Turkey's losses during 
the Gulf Crisis, current figures are showing that the adverse impact 
of the Crisis on the Turkish economy still prevails. In 1991 the 
rise in the domestic market prices of petroleum products along with 
those of commodities and services produced by the Turkish public 
sector has pushed inflation up further. According to the OECD 
(Economic Perspectives, July 1991) because of both the demand for 
wage increases and the Gulf Crisis, it would be very difficult for 
the Turkish authorities to maintain public expenditures at the 
levels announced earlier this year. There is already a decline in 
tourism revenues and service exports in mid-1991 due to the same 
adverse conditions. 
Significantly, the West once more witnessed the loyalty and 
staunch support given by the Turkish Government to the Western 
Alliance and principles simply by opening its land and borders for 
the use of Western air forces and the flow of hundreds of thousands 
of Iraq refugees in the aftermath of the Gulf War. As Mr. Michael 
Lake, Chairman of the EC Commission representation in Turkey puts 
it, "we need each other. This fact is an integral phenomenon and 
tested by the recent Gulf Crisis. This establishes a firm ground 
for an economic relation at much higher level."(EC News, July 1991). 
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CONCLUSION 
Following the momentous events in the Soviet Union, Central 
and Eastern European countries launched attempts to transform their 
centralised economies into free market ones. 
The EC Commission has recently concluded 'Association 
Agreements' with the governments of Hungary, Poland and 
Czechoslovakia and is preparing the way for the extension of 
associate status to Romania and Bulgaria. The EC also proposed 
opening trade talks with Albania and the three formerly Soviet 
Baltic States. 
Alongside these new candidates with Socialist pasts, the EC 
has also been considering the negotiation terms for the membership 
of Austria and Sweden in the face of their application for full 
membership in 1990 which is hoped to be concluded by the second half 
of 1990s (see ICOC Digest 1991). Finland and Norway are expected to 
be the next ones to join the queue by the end of the current decade. 
Together with the agreement reached in Maastricht last 
December 1991 on the timetable to reach the EMU in stages by, at 
latest, 1999 it is likely that the EC' s budget will be largely 
constrained by the financing of the Southern entrants' deficits on 
their way to financial integration within the EC. The EC is also 
prepared to grant large funds to contribute to the transformation of 
the Central European, and then the Eastern European, candidate's 
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economies in order to reach a customs union with them by the turn of 
the current century. 
Overall, in the face of these rapid changes Turkey's case for 
joining the EC as a full member, even though it is proceeding to 
creating the customs union by 1996, looks rather ambiguous. 
This chapter has shown that it is unlikely to political 
backing for economic union between Turkey and the present EC in the 
near future. However, the experience of trade growth during the mid-
1980s shows the likelihood of increasing economic ties between 
Turkey and the EC even if not with formal customs union. 
In the previous chapter, the structure of Turkish financial 
markets was examined together with Turkish fiscal and monetary 
policy which combined to cause the high inflation since 1987 and the 
consequent depreciation of the Turkish lira. This nominal 
depreciation was inadequate compared to the rising inflation and 
there was a real appreciation of the lira since then. 
In the next and final chapter, the possibiity is examined of 
moving towards tracking the ECU with the lira. 
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Notes to Chapter Five 
1. For a comprehensive discussion on the future enlargement of 
the EC, see Istanbul Chamber of Commerce Digest 
(ICOC, in Turkish) No. 305, 22 July 1991, pp.53-60. 
2. For brief and comprehensive studies of the Cyprus issue, 
the interested reader is referred to: 
i) Denktas, Rauf, "Cyprus: The Final Round?" Turkish Review, 
Autumn 1988, Vol.3, No.13. 
ii) Leigh, Monreo, "The Cypriot Communities and International 
Law" and Plumer, F. Aytug, "Unjust and Illegal Economic 
Warfare: The Case of Northern Cyprus", Turkish Review, 
Winter 1990, Vol.4, No.22. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this concluding chapter, an assessment is made of the 
possible implications of pegging the Turkish lira to the present EMS 
grid and then to the EMU by 1999. These implications are explored 
for the main areas of the Turkish economy. 
For this purpose, it is thought necessary first to recall the 
recent timetable and the entry obligations prior to joining the 
future EMU as agreed in Maastricht Summit last December 1991. 
In conclusion it is argued that unless the Turkish inflation 
rate is lowered to a much closer level relative to the EC average 
and also a genuine factor mobility is guaranteed between itself and 
the EC countries, surrender of flexible exchange rates is not 
feasible for Turkey, at least, in the short run. 
1. THE MAASTRICHT AGREEMENT 
on December 11, 1991 European Community leaders meeting in 
Maastricht agreed on the text of a Treaty on European Union, 
Economic and Monetary Union and associated protocols. The texts are 
subject to ratification by all twelve national Parliaments of the 
member states, a process which should be completed by the end of 
1992. 
The Agreement extends Community action into areas not 
previously covered by the EC Treaties, especially Economic and 
Monetary Union and defence. As the thesis in question attempts to 
deal with the issue of monetary union and the convergence criteria 
in general, this section will look at the timetable and other 
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decisions agreed in Maastricht relating to the progress towards 
Economic and Monetary Union in stages as it was proposed in the 
Delors Report. 
1.1. The Timetable 
Progress towards Monetary Union is in three stages, as 
explained in Chapter I. Stage 1 was launched under existing EC 
powers; Stages 2 and 3 require changes in the Treaty because they 
involve setting up new institutions. Hence the timetable agreed in 
Maastricht is as below: 
i) January 1 1994: Stage 2 to begin with establishment of a 
European Monetary Institute; 
ii) December 31 1996: UK to notify the Council whether it 
then intends to move to Stage 3; or by January 1, 1998 if no 
decision has yet been taken by the Council; or later; 
iii) December 31 19 9 6: dead line for decision by qua 1 if ied 
majority to launch Stage 3, Economic and Mpnetary Union, if a 
"critical mass of member states ( a majority would mean six out of 
12 member states if the UK were not taking part in Stage 3) meet the 
convergence criteria; 
iv) July 1 1998: A European Central Bank and European System 
of Central Banks to be set-up if this has not already happened; 
v) July 1 1998: deadline for member states to make the 
national central banks independent; 
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vi) January 1 1999: EMU to begin "irrevocably" if this has 
not yet happened. 
So the second stage begins on January 1, 1994. By then each 
member state is to adopt programmes for price stability and sound 
public finances. In that regard, where a member state is in severe 
difficulties, the Council may agree unanimously on a Commission 
proposal to grant financial assistance. Member states shall avoid 
excessive budget deficits; the Commission must monitor government 
debt; if the risk exists of too high a deficit, the Commission 
should inform the Council which can make recommendations to the 
member state and require that action to be taken. 
From the second stage, the process leading to the 
independence of its supra-national central bank should begin. The 
European Monetary Institute (EMI) is established. 
1.2. Progress to Convergence 
The Commission and the EMI will report on progress of member 
states towards convergence. Their findings will go to the European 
Council, which will decide by December 31 1996 whether a majority of 
member states meet the convergence criteria: 
i) Price Stability: the rate of inflation should be no more 
than 1. 5% above the average of the three best performing member 
states; 
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ii) Government Deficits: these should not be above 3 per cent 
of GDP; public debt should not exceed 60 per cent of GDP; 
iii) Exchange rates: currency should have stayed within 
normal fluctuation margins in EMS for at least 2 years; 
iv) Interest rates: these should have been not more than 2 
percentage points above the three best performing states over the 
previous 12 months. 
The European Council will determine by qualified majority 
which member states are able to participate; those which do not will 
have a derogation. 
When Stage 3 begins, all the participating members will agree 
the conversion rates at which their currencies will be irrevocably 
fixed and will be exchanged for ECUs. 
The European Central Bank will have exclusive rights to 
authorize issue of ecu banknotes in the Community, both by the 
European or national central banks. Member states can issue coins 
subject to ECB approval. 
The Council can unanimously agree on exchange rate system for 
the ecu towards non-Community currencies decisions, speaking as one 
in the international area on monetary issues. 
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1.3. The British Protocol 
A special protocol to the Union Treaty provides the "opt-out" 
clause for the United Kingdom, recognizing that it will not be 
obliged or committed to move to stage 3 without a separate decision 
to do so by its government and parliament. The main points are: 
i) The UK is to notify the Council by December 31 1996 
whether it intends to move to stage 3; or by January 1 1998 if no 
decision has yet been taken by the Council; or later; 
If not joining Stage 3: 
i) The UK retains all its powers for monetary and exchange 
rate policy; and is not subject to EC disciplines (although 
accepting the Stage 2 commitment not to run excessive public 
deficit); 
ii) The UK is free to change notification and move to the 
third stage if it satisfies the necessary conditions of convergence; 
iii) The UK Government may maintain Ways and Means facility 
with Bank of England "if and so long as the UK does not move to the 
third stage"; 
iv) The Weighted votes of the UK are suspended in calculating 
the qualified majority for EMU decisions, etc. 
Overall, the Maastricht Agreement could be considered as 
successful confirmation of the principles covered in the Delors 
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Report ( 1989) as discussed in Chapter I, but with an even more 
speedy route to the final objective of a single currency. 
The opt out clause provided by a special protocol for the UK, 
however, could be a useful means for the prospective new entrants by 
which they can obtain some lessons from the experience of the future 
EMU before they decide whether joining the single currency area 
would be feasible for themselves. 
1.4. The Case for Turkey Pegging the Lira to the ECU 
The benefits of exchange rate stability and of a common 
currency are clear as have been experienced by the operation of the 
countries inside the ERM. These, together with its costs, are 
covered in Chapter II of this thesis. 
For Turkey, joining the EC and then the ERM is not likely for 
the near future because of the various reasons which were explained 
in the last two chapters. However, even without Turkish entry into 
the Community, the Central Bank in Turkey may wish to have the 
Turkish Lira "shadow'' the ECU, rather like the Austrian Schilling or 
the Swedish Krona. 
Regardless of being a full member of the EC, Turkey can still 
obtain stability by shadowing the ECU on its exchange rates via its 
major trading partner. More than 50 per cent of Turkish export 
volume is to the EC in 1991. This would bring about less uncertainty 
on their commercial operations, reducing the risk of transaction and 
translation. That would also impose firm constraints on the monetary 
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policy of the Turkish authorities thereby preventing the further 
inflationary pace of the economy. 
Nevertheless, the costs of deflating associated with the firm 
commitment to exchange rate stability via the EC, on trade balance 
and unemployment in particular, are expected to be substantially 
high for Turkey. 
To look at the current figures in Turkey as concerns these 
indicators noted above: 
The inflation rate for 1991 is about 70 per cent, interest 
rates for one year deposits range between 68 and 71 per cent 
(annually); 
The public sector borrowing requirement is over 9 per cent of 
GOP; and nominal devaluation of Turkish Lira against main currencies 
is about 60 to 65 per cent annually. 
The new coalition government consisting of True Path and 
Social Democratic Party took office in November 1991 in such an 
inflationary and unstable economic environment. It defined its 
primary objective as reducing inflation to about 10 per cent over a 
period of 4 years. Accordingly, some of the public investment 
projects under progress have been halted and large cuts from the 
defence budget have been planned. 
For a start, both state and private banks pulled their 
deposit and credit rates down by 2 to 3 percentage points to be 
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applied from January 1992. In the mean time the government deficit 
is planned not to exceed 5 per cent of GDP over the period. 
Whether the new government will succeed better relative to 
its predecessors would of course depend on the progress to be made 
towards a more successfully coordinated policy-mix between the 
urgent stabilization measures and the necessary structural 
adjustments. 
Furthermore, as has been experienced by the past petrol price 
hikes of late 1970s and more recently the Gulf War, Turkey's 
volatile structure together with its location in a highly unstable 
region makes for any researcher or academician, further attempts to 
predict the future performance of the economy more difficult. 
2. IMPLICATIONS OF PEGGING THE TURKISH LIRA TO THE ECU 
Before trying to foresee what implications of fixing the 
currency on the Turkish economy would have, it is worth recalling 
the logic which militates for close currency ties between the 
Southern entrants, including Turkey, and the EC core: 
i) The large volume of trade between the Southern countries 
and the EMS countries means that the cost in terms of risk and 
uncertainty associated with unstable exchange rates is fairly large 
(EC's share in Turkish exports is just over 50 per cent and its 
share in Turkish imports is about 42 per cent); 
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ii) The administration of EC programmes, notably the CAP, is 
considerably complicated by large exchange rate fluctuations; 
iii) Given the freeing up of capital movements that is part 
of 1992, small countries will have difficulties in avoiding the 
eroding use of their currencies unless they have strongly credible 
stability in terms of the major currencies; 
Finally all the Southern European countries have recent 
histories of fairly serious inflation. As in the case of countries 
such as Italy and France, they will require a Teutonic anchor to 
make their future price stability credible (that is obviously even 
more relevant for Turkey with its excessive inflation problem). 
Given the future prospect of stable exchange rates, it is 
quite important that the entering countries get the initial exchange 
rate right. For example, an overvalued initial exchange rate would 
ensure the necessity of either an embarrassing and credibility-
threatening early realignment or a prolonged period of depressed 
economic activity as monetary policy is obliged to gradually deflate 
the country relative to the rest of the EC. 
For that reason, it is essential to make the best possible 
estimate of the post-entry equilibrium real exchange rate and to set 
the nominal rate at a level that allows establishment of the real 
rate without inflation or deflation. Experience and common sense 
suggest that the cost of a few years' inflation that would be needed 
to eliminate a 10 per cent undervaluation falls far short of the 
cost of prolonged recession that would be needed to correct a 10 per 
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cent overvaluation. Hence, Turkey also should try to err on the side 
on undervaluation; to peg the Lira to the ECU at exchange rate that 
will probably turn out to have been undervalued. 
In fact, that was the policy that Spain attempted to follow 
when it first joined the ERM, to keep the peseta low against the ECU 
(and the DM in particular) so that Spanish industry would be in a 
favourable competitive position in the early post-entry years. The 
problem is that the capital markets try to set the rate at a level 
that makes sense to them, not at the level that is optimal from a 
policy point of view. That was the conflict which caused the 
continuous appreciation of the peseta inside the ERM since its entry 
in 1989. Presently, the peseta is the strongest currency in the ERM. 
2.1. Initial Impact of Financial Integration-Excess Credibility 
Problem 
As it is noted under the 'EMS Credibility Hypothesis' in 
Chapter II (Barra and Gordon, 1983) Turkey can import credibility by 
fixing its nominal exchange rate to the lowest inflation currency, 
thereby pre-committing to an anti-inflation strategy and setting a 
credible constraint upon its monetary policy operations. 
The impact of this enhanced exchange rate stability, 
depending also on the expectations that the lira will be fixed 
indefinitely to the ECU, would normally be to stimulate capital 
inflows into the currency with relatively higher inflation and 
interest rates within a large market offering fast growth coupled 
with a highly favourable legislative environment for foreign 
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investments. Increased demand for domestic currency would lead to 
appreciation of the Turkish lira, with, normally unfavourable 
effects on the Turkish exports because the large increases in 
reserves are likely to be difficult to sterilise fully. These 
increases might not be as high as has been in the Spanish case which 
the capital inflow led to an increase in the money supply but not a 
fall in interest rates. As credits became freely available at the 
cost constant rate, there occured an expansion of economic activity 
and a slight rise in inflation since the entry into the ERM in 1989. 
However, at the macroeconomic level, the result of such 
capital inflows can be a simultaneous investment boom and a trade 
deficit. 
With the real appreciation of the currency, Turkish exports 
would loose competitiveness in an integrated market. Given that 
under the fixed exchange rate regime monetary policy will be 
constrained with the absolute task of exchange rate stability, that 
would imply a large deficit in the trade balance, as imports are 
also expected to be affected from the overvaluation of the currency, 
further reducing the total demand for those tradeables produced in 
Turkey. 
The resulting loss of competitiveness in exports and 
increased demand for imports could lead to the aggravation of the 
trade deficit from possible import penetration effects of further 
trade liberalisation with the EC, as it is envisaged in related 
agreements. 
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The logic behind this is that the entry of the Southern 
European countries in the EC combines a liberalisation of imports by 
the entrants and an opening for their exports by the core nations. 
The first pushes toward appreciation; the second toward real 
depreciation. 
However, the visible protective barriers that need to be 
brought down by Turkey are much higher (nominal effective protection 
rate is about 33 per cent in 1991) than those that need to be 
brought down by the EC core; on the other hand, the elasticity of 
the EC' s demand, as a trading bloc, for imports from Turkey is 
expected to be larger than the elasticity of demand of Turkey for EC 
products as the whole bloc, excluding Turkey, would be able to 
produce close substitutes. 
However, if Turkey does not succeed in improving the 
components of its export volume towards more capital-technology 
intensive products rather than the present dominance of labour-
intensive manufactured goods, exceeding 50 per cent in its total 
exports, in the near future then the import penetration effects of 
the trade liberalisation would be higher. With the addition of the 
new associate member countries from Central Europe which offer close 
substitutes to major Turkish exports, such as textile and clothing, 
this presents an essential point to Turkey that deserves urgent 
attention. 
Overall by pegging the lira to the ECU, the Turkish lira 
seems likely to appreciate to some varying extent depending on the 
macroeconomic indicators, specifically the inflation rate, and the 
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attractiveness of the country for foreign capital investments at the 
time of pegging the currency. 
That is why it is essential for Turkish authorities to ensure 
a consensus with capital markets on the expected impact of the 
financial integration and possible entry into the ERM on the 
domestic currency, even by shadowing the DM for some time, before 
deciding to tie it, but erring on the side of undervaluation. 
Perhaps these losses of competitiveness on the part of the 
peripheral countries with relatively higher inflation and interest 
rates during the trade liberalisation and financial integration 
period provide part of the motive for the highly industrialised EC 
core nations to become involved in such a far-reaching objective, 
i.e the single currency area. These core nations are, and will be 
the ones to enjoy the substantial gains in competitiveness against 
the new comers. That is reflected with the growing aggregate 
surpluses of a core group around, and, including Germany which 
consists of Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Switzerland, 
while the peripheral countries are having increasing deficits (OECD 
Europe Current Accounts 1990, IMF 1989). 
On the other hand, the logic for the periphery is that with 
an integrated financial system Europe would be approximately self-
financing with the excess savings in the surplus countries flowing 
to investment in the deficit countries together with the assurance 
of various funds and credit facilities in order, first, to help 
contribute for their regional and national development as well as 
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their adjustment process, then to cushion the income effects of 
integration. 
In the integrated financial system of 1992, European 
governments will have to finance their deficits on the open market 
at risk premia that reflect the market's assessment of the 
difficulty that the country would experience in servicing its debt. 
If exchange rates were fixed in Europe then borrowing and 
lending in Europe would not entail the exchange risk that would come 
with external financing such as borrowing from Japan or lending to 
the USA. It seems likely that intra-European financing of current 
account imbalances could be more efficient, with relatively small 
flows outside the area to finance net external imbalances. 
2.2. The Expected Effect of Exchange Rate Stability on Direct 
Foreign Investments in Turkey 
At the beginning of last decade, the government of Turkey, in 
awareness of world trends, initiated the process of the integration 
of the Turkish economy to the world market system by radical 
economic reforms, as discussed in Chapter IV and V, including the 
promotion of direct foreign capital investments. Relatively, 
liberalising the capital controls, simplifying the bureaucratic 
procedures for foreign investors as well as giving equal rights for 
the acquisition of various incentives and tax exemptions or 
reductions by both national and foreign investors recently started 
to bear fruit. As the disutility of its strategic location between 
hostile blocks is reduced by the ending of the cold war, Turkey 
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becomes better positioned as a relatively sound base, both in the 
economic and political sense, at the crossroads of the world's most 
rapidly expanding markets. 
In this context, the newly opening markets of Central and 
Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, in particular Central Asian 
Republics with close historic and cultural ties seems to have made 
Turkey more attractive for foreign investments due to its geographic 
proximity to the region. 
The foreign capital permissions during the whole year period 
of 1990 totalled to 1.8 billion US. dollars, most importantly, of 
this figure 1. 2 5 bill ion dollars investment permission ensured by 
the EC countries. So the EC' s share in total foreign investment 
permissions granted by Turkey recorded a large upward trend from 
46.5% in 1987 to 70% in 1990. With the future integration to the EC 
single market this upward shift is expected to grow faster. 
Of the total foreign capital permissions issued since 1980, 
61% was in manufacturing sector within which automative and 
components industry ranked first followed by chemical products, and 
food-beverages and tobacco; 36% in the service sector - banking, 
financial intermediaries and insurance followed by tourism; 3% in 
agriculture and mining (Turkish Review, 1991). 
However if the Turkish currency becomes pegged to the Euro-
currency in the EMS grid, it is likely that the relatively small 
amount of foreign direct investments can bene£ it considerably from 
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the political and economic credibility to be acquired by the strong 
commitment to the exchange rate stability. 
Consequently with the reduction of inflation and interest 
rates within Turkey during the fixed exchange rate regime domestic 
costs of production should be reduced as the risk premia fall due to 
improved certainty on the exchange rate of Turkish lira, together 
with the opportunity of financing of 'firms' deficits from within 
the EC integrated market. 
The prospect of exchange rate stability would further 
strengthen the already advantageous position of the Turkish market 
for foreign investors. The four main attractions to such potential 
investments are: 
- its large domestic market which will approach 60 million 
people by the second half of the 1990s; 
qualified, although the number of which need to be 
increased, manual and technical labour forces with low labour costs 
and high productivity; 
- improved public utility and transportation facilities along 
with a geographic and economic location to nearby major markets 
offering new enhanced opportunities for Turkish exports. 
more importantly, Turkey is a country which has been 
scoring the highest economic growth in the OECD area since the 
second half of 1970s and is likely to continue on the same path for 
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some years ahead possibly until the growth rate of its population 
can be reduced to a level closer to the EC average. 
The total number of foreign firms operating in Turkey were 
2000 and of foreign banks were 33 at the end of 1990. The share of 
foreign investment in industrial investments is almost 15%. 
It is relatively clear cut to presume that with the exchange 
rate stability added to those highly favourable factors for 
attracting foreign capital, the current rate of increase in foreign 
direct investments in Turkey could not only accelerate but might 
also be dispersed to less favourable sectors, such as agriculture 
and also mining. 
There might not occur an instant investment boom to the 
extent experienced in Spain, for example, but in the absence of 
capital controls, which have been already freed to a large extent 
since 1986, and of less worry that depreciation will undermine 
investments, foreign capital inflows could well increase 
significantly. 
2.3. The Impact on Tourism Earnings 
The initial impact of appreciation of the Turkish lira could 
be to lower the attractiveness of the country as being a relatively 
cheap holiday resort for tourists considering spending their holiday 
there. The price elasticity of demand for tourism in Turkey is 
considered to be high, as it is revealed from various surveys. Most 
of the tourists going to the country mention their first reason for 
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choosing Turkey as being cheap country with good food and drink, 
followed by its natural and historic assets. 
When the Turkish currency stops its varying degree of 
devaluation, sometimes by more than the real rate of increase in 
domestic price levels, i.e the exchange rate misalignments, then the 
price of domestic currency in relation to the ECU, and others, would 
become more expensive through the appreciation effect of fixing the 
currency. Thus the country might start to loose its price 
competitiveness, and tourists might substitute other destinations. 
On the other hand, if Turkey achieves improved 
infrastructure and high quality services with enhanced capacity in 
the tourism sector then it can appeal to high income group of 
tourists, so-called the up-market tourists, in the longer run, who 
would leave more income in the country than the average of down-
market tourists do. In addition, because the present level of 
uncertainty on the exchange rate between Turkish lira and 
Eurocurrencies would be lowered by the pegging of the currency, 
tourists from Europe, in particular could become more inclined 
towards the idea of spending their holiday in Turkey. They would 
feel safer for the value of Turkish money they would have in 
exchange for their domestic currency. 
During the period prior to pegging the Turkish lira to the 
ECU, Turkey can still attract potential tourists who previously went 
to Spain and the other candidates for accession to the ERM, as it 
would be in a more advantageous position whereas in those countries 
the price of touristic facilities and services have been increasing. 
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However after pegging the currency Turkey should be 
attracting more up-market tourists by exploring the high income 
elasticity of demand through improving the quality of services and 
promotion, by spending more attention to environmentally friendly 
construction as well as developing cultural and rural tourism within 
the country. 
By doing so, Turkey can offset the possible loss in its price 
competitiveness by attracting more high income group of tourists and 
even increase the revenues from tourism in the country. In this 
context more foreign direct investments in the sector can play an 
important role. Provided that Turkey achieves that, then the impact 
of pegging the currency might not leave a drastic negative effect on 
the tourism revenues in the country. 
2.4. The Impact on Workers Remittances 
The workers remittances from abroad have been a considerable 
source of foreign exchange in Turkey since the early 1980s. As a 
response to the policy of continuous devaluation of the Turkish 
lira, workers' remittances were held in hard currency accounts in 
Turkey, so called the Dresdner Bank accounts, mainly in OMs. Apart 
from the effect of this policy, the amount of such remittances have 
been quite volatile especially in relation to the political 
stability of the country. 
Thus the appreciating effect of the increasing exchange rate 
credibility, both economic and political sense, could lead to a 
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shift in the demand of Turkish workers abroad to hold their savings 
in Turkish lira deposits rather than keeping them in OMs or any 
other hard currency. However if those remittances switched to liras, 
that would put further pressure on the value of the domestic 
currency and exacerbate the over-valuation. But it would also 
increase the supply of savings to finance investments. 
As those upward pressures on the currency are likely to 
deteriorate further the current account deficits to be caused by the 
capital inflows into the currency following the pegging of the lira 
to the ECU , government authorities would feel obliged to intervene 
to prevent the lire from further appreciating. In the absence of 
capital controls they would attempt to lower the interest rate 
differential between Turkey and the EC. Even so the lower interest 
rates, domestically, is expected to continue encouraging the 
domestic investments even possibly, in the excess of domestic 
savings. 
So the initial expansion of the economy and hence, its 
reflection as upward pressure on inflation seems to be inescapable 
in the short run in Turkey, similarly to what actually happened in 
Spain following the entry to the ERM on June 1989. 
2.5. Turkey's Economic Structure in relation to the Optimum 
Currency Area Argument 
An optimum currency area is sometimes defined in economic 
literature as an area of regions within which there is factor 
mobility but bewteen which there is factor immobility. The argument 
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is developed by the inclusion of other matters, such as the 
influence of the openness of the economy, i.e the size of tradeables 
sector to non-tradeables sector and the facilitating of inter-
industry production shifts (McKinnon, 1963; Mundell, 1959). 
Importantly, the theory is based on the assumption of the 
absence of chronic differential rates of inflation among regions. 
The inflation rate in Turkey has ranged between 30 and 100 
per cent since 1980 whereas the unemployment rate has been ranging 
between 12 and 10 percent (9.8% in 1988). That is quite different 
from the original Phillips Curve argument and poses mixed policy 
implications. 
The absence of a trade off between inflation and unemployment 
figures in Turkey over the past decade might partially reflect the 
existence of supply-side constraints, such as the insufficient 
number of skilled labour and of training programmes and also other 
rigidities towards the mobility of labour from the less favoured 
sectors to the more expanding sectors of the economy. 
There are also rigidities on the dispersion of capital across 
the country as private agents do not usually wish to invest in the 
less developed parts of Turkey, namely the East and the Southeast 
Anatolia. 
In this case, a policy which aims at reducing the inflation 
rapidly, say, from 60 to 10 per cent in a few years time would imply 
a large contraction on fiscal policy. That could lead to a rapid 
218 
fall in public sector expenditures, about 4 to 5 percentage points 
of GDP, as in the share of public sector borrowing requirement (the 
public sector borrowing requirements was 9. 7 per cent of GOP 'in 
1990). 
Due to existing imperfect factor mobility and the relatively 
small size of the country's tradeable sector, those large fiscal 
cuts would mean that unemployed labour, especially in the large non-
tradeable public sector services, will not be shifted easily towards 
the more expanding sectors of the economy. 
In this context, the level of foreign direct investments 
coming to the country and more importantly the dispersion of new 
investments to the sectors which would meet the production shifts 
following the inter-industry and also intra-industry trade creation 
effects of trade liberalisation with the EC, would play a crucial 
role in lowering the unemployment costs of price stability efforts 
in Turkey. Increasing foreign direct investments in more competitive 
sectors of Turkish economy as well as in the large agriculture and 
dairy products area can create essential job opportunities for the 
rapidly growing Turkish labour force (about 2 per cent per annum 
from 1980). The fall in inflation, which is a precondition for the 
Turkish lira tracking the ECU, would be expected to be accompanied 
by a rise in unemployment in line with the Philips-type prediction 
of the effects of a demand squeeze while expectations change. 
It is equally essential that Turkey achieves the reform of 
its public sector and a successful privatisation programme, the 
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fostering of its weak capital markets and also increasing the 
efficiency of tax collection thereby the share of tax revenues in 
the government budget. It is particularly important that Turkey 
achieves the fulfilment of the provision of free labour mobility 
between itself and the EC before undertaking any exchange rate 
commitment via the Community. 
The cost of fiscal tightening will depend on the level of 
macroeconomic convergence achieved by Turkey relative to EC 
standards, as discussed in Chapters IV and V, as well as the 
inflation rate with which it is about to peg the currency to the ECU 
or the DM. 
Thus it has to proceed with gradual reduction of inflation, 
starting by shadowing the ECU or the DM together with maintaining a 
stable path of economic growth so as to complete the basic 
infrastructural investments underway. The largest is the GAP Project 
consisting of 21 dams - according to the latest report the revised 
number is 21 and hydro-electric power stations with giant 
irrigation tunnels along the east and southeast Anatolian territory 
due for completion in late 1990s. On the other hand it has to do 
everything possible to minimize tax evasion so as to increase the 
tax revenues and to lessen the reliance of the public sector on 
domestic borrowing including the Central Bank's resources. 
A rapid lowering of inflation would not be an appropriate 
step in Turkey if it is achieved at the cost of a sharp decline in 
output in a country where the rate of population growth is high and 
220 
unemployment is a major social issue. Thus, a prudent demand 
management has to be accompanied by supply and productivity rises. 
However unless the inflation is reduced, and stabilised at a 
level close to the EC average and the country is guaranted a fair 
allocation of the Community's various funds as well as by the 
genuine labour mobility within the EC market, pegging the Turkish 
lira to the ECU does not seem to be feasible for Turkey, at least in 
the short to the medium term. 
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